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INTRODUCTION 
Since long both s e c u r i t y and war fa re have been t h e 
t o p i c of d i s c u s s i o n and a n a l y s i s . Af ter the World War I I , 
Academic i n t e r e s t s in n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y and unconvent iona l 
warfaire have tremendously i n c r e a s e d . 
N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y and warfare bo th a r e very complex 
phenomenon which are n o t s u s c e p t i b l e t o any c l e a r cu t 
fortDUlation and g e n e r a l i z a t i o n . Na t iona l S e c u r i t y , however, 
i n most simple terms i m p l i e s t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y , s t a b i l i t y 
of the regime, and the r e a l i z a t i o n of o t h e r n a t i o n a l and 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s and sa feguard ing the l i f e of the 
c i t i z e n s from any t h r e a t a c t i o h or s i t u a t i o n v;hich can 
damage t h e i r may of l i f e , s o c i a l o r n a t i o n a l v a l u e s . 
Unconvent ional warfare has no s a t i s f a c t o r y d e f i n i t i o n . 
In a b r o a d e r sense i t i s t h a t d i v e r s i t y of a c t i o n s and 
measures through which m i l i t a r y weak b r i n g v io l ance a g a i n s t 
a s u p e r i o r and s t r ong a d v e r s a r y . Unconvent ional warfare h a s 
the h i s t o r y of fo l lowing no p a r t i c u l a r p a t t e r n a re p r o c e d u r e . 
i n c o n s t r a s t i t has the r eco rd of r e cou r se to a l l p o s s i b l e 
means, t r i c k s , s t r a t egems and t a c t i c s . I t i s very f l u i d 
and amorphous war fa re which p o s s e s s e s w i t h i n i t s e l f h igh 
degree of f l e x i b i l i t y and c r e a t i v i t y . 
The most d i s t i n g u i s h i n g f e a t u r e of unconvent iona l 
warfare i s i t s t h r e e phased development which has a lmost 
i i 
el iminated the chances of defeat from t h i s warfare. The 
s t ra tegy of vmconventional warfare i s such t h a t i t aims 
a t proroguing the c o n f l i c t and does not concentrate on 
the immediate yei ldings of the warfare. The most bas ic 
t a c t i c s 6f linconventional warfare i s h i t -and- run but 
formulation and implimentation of t a c t i c s i s most 
dependent upon the s i t u a t i o n and circumstances. I t s 
i n s t i t a t o r s invent new t a c t i c s for every moment. •- of 
the c o n f l i c t . They a t t a ck surpr is ingly and disperse 
su rp r i s ing ly . The element of uncer ta in ty and unpredic-
t a b i l i t y i s much higher in t h i s warfare. 
Unconventional warfare has been ser ious secur i ty 
problem for the na t ions . I t i s in t h i s century p a r t i c u l a r l y 
a f t e r the World War I lnd t h a t i t s has become a consciously 
of 
chosen way/f ight ing. The most d i s tu rb ing phenomenon of 
the recent years i s i t s g loba l i za t ion . Unconventional 
warfare has not remained the secur i ty problem of the 
t a r g e t nat ion but i t has become the problem for e n t i r e 
community of na t ions . 
This work i s the conceptual and t h e o r e t i c a l study 
of nat ional secur i ty and the warfare, p a r t i c u l a r l y 
unconventional warfare, in i t s discussion and ana ly s i s , 
the at tempts hasrebeen made to unfold the various problems 
assoc ia ted with the concept of nat ional s ecu r i t y and the 
unconventional warfare, in i t s overa l l perspect ive the 
i i i 
s t u d y c o n c e n t r a t e s upon t h e t h r e a t s wh ich u n c o n v e n t i o n a l 
w a r f a r e p o s e s t o t h e s e c u r i t y o f t h e n a t i o n . 
R e s e a r c h f o r a n o v i c e i s an u p h i l l t a s k b e c a u s e 
t h e r e a r e p o s s i b i l i t i e s of g e t t i n g l o s t i n t o t h e maze 
of knowledge c o n t a i n e d i n b o o k s , j o u r n a l and v a r i o u s 
o t h e r d o c u m e n t s , I have n o t engaged i n , w i t n e s s e d , o r 
even p l a n n e d any u n c o n v e n t i o n a l w a r f a r e and so am 
c o n f i n e d t o wha t I have r e a d , h e a r d o r can s u r m i s e , 
I would l i k e t o p l a c e on r e c o r d my e v e r l a s t i n g 
g r a d i t u d e s t o my s u p e r v i s o r Dr. A k h t a r Majeed f o r h i s 
e n c o u r a g r h e n t , c o o p e r a t i o n and t h e b e n e f i t s he b e s t o w e d 
on me from h i s knowledge t h a t h e l p e d me i n u n d e r s t a n d i n g 
and a n a l y s i n g t h e v a g o r i e s of t h e p r o b l e m i n v o l v e d i n 
t h i s s tudy^ w i t h o u t w h i c h t h i s s t u d y would n o t have b e e n 
r e a c h e d t o i t s a c c o m p l i s h m e n t , I am i n d e p t e d t o P r o f , 
S .A.H, B i l g r a m i f o r h i s e n c o u r a g e m e n t and c o o p e r a t i o n 
which^ t o o , h e l p e d me i n t h e p e r s u i t of t h i s s t u d y , I am 
a l s o v e r y g r a t e f u l t o a l l o t h e r t e a c h e r s o f t h e d e p a r t m e n t 
be 
f o r t h e i r e n c o u r a g e m e n t and c o o p e r a t i o n , I b e g t o / e x c u s e d 
f o r n o t m e n t i o n i n g t h e names of o t h e r f r i e n d s who h e l p e d 
and c o o p e r a t e d me i n t h i s work . 
I n s p i t e of t h e g e n e r o u s h e l p of s o many t h e r e s t i l l 
may be some d e f i c i e n c i e s o f a r g u m e n t and s o l e c i s m f o r 
which I a l o n e s h o u l d e r t h e w h o l e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . 
(IfflBALUR REHMAN) 
C h a p t e r - I 
CONCEPT OF NATIONAL SECURITY 
Na t iona l S e c u r i t y has long been the fundamental 
concern of every s t a t e in i t s i n d i v i d u a l and c o r p o r a t e 
e x i s t e n c e . However, i t s use a s a co re concept in our 
n a t i o n a l and i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s became wide - sp read 
only a f t e r the World War I I , Na t iona l S e c u r i t y today 
has become a common p lace e x p r e s s i o n b u t what the concep t 
a c t u a l l y connotes in gene ra l o r in p a r t i c u l a r i s n o t y e t 
s p e c i f i e d . This i s , p robab ly , because of the reason t h a t 
2 3 
the ' c o n c e p t i s very complex' and ambiguous. The complex i ty 
and ambigui ty of the concep t i s man i fo ld . 
The op in ions abou t n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y vary wide ly in 
t h e i r scope and d imens ion . D ic t i ona ry d e f i n i t i o n s g ive the 
f l a v o u r of complexi ty and ambigu i ty , w i t h t h e i r r e f e r e n c e 
1, Morton Berkowitz and p.G, Bock, "National Secur i ty" , 
In te rna t iona l Encyclopedia of soc ia l sc iences ; V o l . I I , 
The Mac MilIan Company and the Free Press ; 1968, p ,40 . 
See a l so the Chapter - "Teaching National Securi ty" in 
B. Thomas Tront & James E. Marge (Ed.) National Securi ty 
Affa i rs ; Theoretical perspect ives and contemporary i s sues ; 
Transaction Book; London, 1982, 
2, K. Subrahmanyam, Our National Secur i ty , Economic & 
S c i e n t i f i c Research Foundation, Federation House, New Delhi, 
1972, p,2 
3, Arnold Wolfers. Discard and Col laborat ion, John Hopkins 
Universi ty PressT Baltimore 1961?, p . 147. 
2 
to no t ions , l ike being protected from danger, fee l ing 
4 
safe and being free from doubt. The element of s u b j e c t i v i t y 
involved in these notions and the way in which the concept 
has been used divide opinions about i t s meaning and do not 
lend i t to any c l ea r and spec i f ic formulation* This parado-
x ica l looking charac ter of the concept makes i t highly 
imprecise and incons i s t en t , 
John Herz, who introduced the idea of secur i ty dilemma, 
s t a t e s t h a t the se l f help at tempts of the na t ions , to look 
a f t e r t h e i r cwn secu r i t y , lead to the r i s i n g insecur i ty 
for other nations as each nation i n t e r p r e t s i t s own ac t ions 
as defensive and the ac t ions of o thers as p o t e n t i a l l y 
th rea ten ing , Arnold wolfers points out tha t while the 
concept of nat ional secur i ty appears to be offering guidance 
and a ba s i s for a broad consensus, i t permits every nat ion 
to l ab le whatever pol icy i t favours with an a t t r a c t i v e name 
and possibly with a deceptive name. This feature of the 
concept takes the secur i ty dilemma to such a pi tch of 
i n t e n s i t y tha t i t begins to resemble the model of those 
who see in t e rna t iona l r e l a t i ons as an unending s t ruggle 
for power. However, the concept appears to be playing a 
4. Barry Buzan, People ,Sta tes & Pears; The National Securi ty 
problem in In t e rna t iona l Relat ions , Transasian Publ i shers , 
New Delhi,1987, P .18 . 
X n n i S J . a U C J L " U i . i N . i 3 U C J L U i W I C i . CJ.OiMlUJ.<^ e c u 1 ,11X9 V , U l J V _ < ^ p t « 
John H. Herz, Political Realism and Political Idealism, 
Chicago, 1951, AISO see John H, Herz,International Politics 
in the Atomic Age, New York, 1959, pp.231-243, 
6. Wnlfers.Op.cit.D.147. 
subsidary role as i t tends to be seen e i t h e r as a 
de r iva t ive of power, in the sense t h a t a powerful 
nation a sp i r ing for a dominating pos i t ion w i l l acquire 
secur i ty as a r e s u l t or as a consequence of peace, since 
a permanent peace w i l l give secur i ty to a l l na t ions . 
Securi ty for the nat ions bent upon increasing t h e i r 
power and posi t ion in the world implies the gaining of 
pos i t ions in which they wi l l be able to force other nat ions 
by means of diplomacy, economic ac t ion , subversion, t h r e a t 
or use of armed forces - i t ac ts in accordance with t h e i r 
w i l l whether tha t implies p o l i t i c a l alignment, cessa t ion 
g 
of t e r r i t o r y , or gaining of specia l concessions , This 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of na t iona l Securi ty and the Wolfers' 
observation tha t secur i ty i s a value "of which a nat ion 
can have more or l e s s and which i t can aspi re to have in 
9 g rea te r or l e s s e r measures" have an i m p l i c i t core of 
power motivations. The maintenance of i n t e rna t iona l peace 
and secur i ty has become the s ta ted object ive of the nat ions 
t h a t have adhered to the United Nat ion ' s cha r t e r . The concept 
in t h i s environment appears to be accomodating in i t s e l f . 
The concept motivates us for the behaviour which i s d i f f e r e n t 
from but not less s i g n i f i c a n t than t h a t provided by power 
7. WolferSy Op,ci-tU/ p . 147 
8, Norman J , padelford & George A, Lincoln, In t e rna t iona l 
P o l i t i c s , Macmillan Company, Nefw York, 1954, p , 292, 
9, Arnold Wolfers, o p , c i t , p , 150. 
and to a wholest ic perspect ive which I s l i k e wise 
d i f f e r en t from but not less useful than t h a t provided 
10 ^ by peace. The concept appears to be lying between the 
extremes of power and peace and, the re fo re , l inks the 
es tab l i shed conventions of the i d e a l i s t and r e a l i s t 
school of thoughts br idging the gap which normally to 
t h e i r mutual detJriment :fcparates them. The concept 
within th i s frame work might reasonably be viewed as a 
companion of power r a the r than der iva t ive of i t and as 
a p r i o r condition of peace ra ther than consequence of i t . 
I t should be mentioned here t h a t the appearance of 
secu r i ty to be e i t h e r a companion of power or a p r i o r 
condit ion of peace does not mean t h a t they are in terchange-
ab l e . The only point of view i s t h a t they appear to be a l i k e . 
This c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the concept tends to make the 
concept incons i s ten t and paradoxical which add tremendously 
to the complexity and ambiguity of the concept. This incon-
s i s t e n t and paradoxicol charac ter of the concept and the 
non-pa r t i cu la r i za t ion of i t s area of concern generate some 
reasonably unavoidable problems for defining nat ional secur i ty 
10. Barry Buzan, o p . c i t , p,2 
11. Ib id . 
12. Ib id . 
0 
in any general sense. However, various attempts have been 
made in this direction but they have not succeeded in 
generating such a definition which can be granted the 
status of generalization. 
The concept in its due course of development has 
been used in various context and connections. Politicians 
have used it as a rhetorical phrase and military strategists 
13 to describe a policy objective. It has been used by social 
scientists both as analytical concept and as a field of 
14 
study. 
Social S c i e n t i s t s , while t a lk ing of ana ly t i c a l concept, 
general ly mean the a b i l i t y of a nat ion to p ro t ec t i t s In te rna l 
values from external t h r ea t s and, as a f i e ld of study they 
mean t h a t i t encompasses attempts to analyse to manner in 
which the nat ions plan, make and evaluate the decis ions 
and p o l i c i e s designed to increase the pro tec t ion a b i l i t y 
15 of the na t ions . Some scholars use i t to mean pr imar i ly 
the maintenance of s t a t u s quo while some othersequate 
13. Berkovitz and p.G. Bock, o p . c i t , , p.40 
14. Ibid. 
15. Ibid. 
16. Norman Padelform & George Lincoln, op.cit., p.289. 
0 
i t with terms l ike nat ional i n t e r e s t ^ ' ' , mi l i t a ry s t rength^^ 
19 and su rv iva l . National Security so far has been defined 
in various ways and, therefore , i t has no specif ic meaning. 
The e a r l i e s t s tud ies of na t ional secur i ty tend to 
concentrate on mi l i t a ry th rea t s a r i s i n g from beyond the 
20 borders . According to Walter Lippman's de f in i t ion of 
na t ional secur i ty : "A nation i s secure to the ex ten t to 
which i t i s not in danger of having to s ac r i f i ce core 
values , i f i t wishes to avoid war, and i s ab le , i f c h a l l e -
21 
nged, to maintain them by victory in such a War", I t 
appears t h a t the secur i ty of a nat ion i s c losely t i e d with 
the a b i l i t y of a nat ion to deter an a t t a c k or to defend 
i t s e l f successfully i f a t tacked. This overwhelmingly 
mi l i t a ry character of secur i ty i s based on the assumption 
t h a t p r inc ipa l t h r e a t s to secur i ty come from beyond the 
border of a nat ion. This execessively m i l i t a r i s e d charac te r 
of na t ional secur i ty has been severely c r i t i c i s e d by many 
22 exper t s of the subject on the ground t h a t nat ional s ecu r i t y . 
17, St( nley Hoffman, "Security in the age of Turbulencet 
means of Response in Third World c o n f l i c t and i n t e r n a -
t iona l Security",A(ltflphi papers. No, 167, Suntner 1981, 
PP.4-.5, 
18, A las t a i r Buchan, War in Modem Society, C.A, Watts & 
company Ltd . , London 1966, pr24, 
19. J , Walsh, "National Security" Mi l i t a ry Digest, No,81, 
Apri l ,1969,p.40. 
20. Berkowitz & P.G, Bock, o p . c i t . , p.41 
21 . Walter Lipprnan, US Foreign Policy; Sheild of the 
Republic, BostonT 1943, p , 5 1 , 
22, Barry Buzan, o p . c i t , , p , 4 . 
If defined merely in mi l i t a ry terms, por t rays a 
23 
profoundly wrong image of the concept, as i t draws 
a t t en t ion away from the non-mil i tary t h r e a t s which 
could be even more harmful and dangerous to the s ecu r i t y 
24 
of the na t ions . Besides t h i s , i t a lso motivates the 
nat ions for t h e i r excessive m i l i t a r i z a t i o n which in the 
long run may only increase i n t e rna t iona l insecu i r ty 
which i s , in turn , bound to add to the insecur i ty of 
a l l na t ions . The conceptual izat ion of nat ional s e c u r i t y , 
merely in terms of ex te rna l mi l i ta ry t h r e a t s , f a i l s to 
capture the large va r ie ty of problems facing the na t i ons , 
p a r t i c u l a r l y the Third World na t ions . In addi t ion to a l l 
t h i s , i t lacks the meaning, scope, and nature of na t iona l 
secur i ty within the boundaries of m i l i t a r y a f f a i r s giving 
the impression tha t meaning of s ecu r i t y l i e s only in the 
absence of external mi l i t a ry t h r e a t s . Mi l i ta ry has , no 
doubt, i t s own value to secur i ty of a nation to the ex t en t 
t h a t i t i s required for the e l iminat ion of coercive sources 
of t h r e a t s to secur i ty but i t does not serve a b e t t e r 
meaning to the idea of nat ional s e c u r i t y , A broader view 
of na t iona l secur i ty encompassing i t s s o c i a l , p o l i t i c a l , 
economic, and mi l i t a ry dimensions gives an enduring meaning 
23. Richard H. Ullman, "Redefining Securi ty" In t e rna t iona l 
Secur i ty , Voi.8, Ko. l , Summer 1981, p.129. 
24. Ib id . j p . 133. 
8 
to the idea of national security because national security 
can not be maintained and achieved unless and untill the 
social, economic, and political life of the nation is 
sustained. 
The scope and n a t u r e o f n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y was w i d e n e d 
by t h e v a r i o u s works of s c h o l a r s who a f t e r t h e World War I I 
s t a r t e d t h i n k i n g a b o u t n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y , b o t h i n t e r m s of 
m i l i t a r y and n o n - m i l i t a r y t h r e a t s , w h e t h e r coming from 
o u t s i d e t h e b o r d e r o r from w i t h i n t h e b o u n d a r i e s of a 
n a t i o n , * S t a n l e y Hoffman d e f i n e s n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y i n i t s 
n a r r o w e r s e n s e a s t h e " p r o t e c t i o n of a n a t i o n from p h y s i c a l 
a t t a c k and s a f e g u a r d i n g i t s economic a c t i v i t i e s from 
d e v a s t a t i n g o u t s i d e b l c w s " . N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y i n i t s 
b r o a d e r s e n s e , a c c o r d i n g t o Henry K i s s i n g e r , " c o m p r i s e s 
e v e r y a c t i o n by which a s o c i e t y s e e k s t o a s s u r e i t s s u r v i v a l 
27 
o r t o r e a l i s e i t s a s p i r a t i o n i n t e r n a t i o n a l y " . 
S e c u r i t y , a t an e l e m e n t a r y l e v e l , i m p l i e s a n y t h i n g 
t h a t g i v e s o r a s s u r e s s a f e t y , t r a n q u i l i t y , c e r t a i n t y , f r e e d o m 
28 from f e a r , r i s k , d a n g e r , o r d o u b t . I t a l s o s t a n d s f o r 
2 5 , B e r k o w i t z & p . G , Bock, o p . c i t . p . 4 1 
26 , S t a n l e y Hoffman, o p . c i t . , p . 4 - 5 . 
2 7 . M.N. Rawat. "Concep t and E n v i r o n m e n t of N a t i o n a l 
S e c u r i t y " USI J o u r n a l , V o l . 1 1 3 ; A p r i l - J u n e 1 9 8 3 , p . 114, 
2 8 . David B. G u r a l i n k , Simon and S c h u s t e r , New World 
D i c t i o n a r y of t h e American L a n g u a g e , i i n d C o l l e g e 
E d i t i o n , 1%0, p . 11^88. *• 
protec t ion or defence aga ins t a t t a c k , sabotage, subversion, 
29 in te r fe rence , espoinage e t c . In the words of the A t l an t i c 
Charter , secur i ty for a nat ion, as for the ind iv idua l , 
embodies not only "freedom from fear" , but a lso the des i r e 
of a nation to go about i t s business and l i f e in whatever 
way i t chooses to pursue i t s own i n t e r e s t s by i t s own 
30 
methods. I t r e fe rs to the s i t ua t i on tha t now and in the 
future the functioning of the nation should not be f^  warted 
but on the contrary be assured so t h a t the nation can e x i s t 
in a fundamentally unimpaired fashion. I t a l so r e f l e c t s a 
fee l ing tha t gives confidence tha t d i s a s t e r of Wiar and 
vagories of nat ional and in t e rna t iona l l i f e could be avoided 
or absorbed, Robert McNamara i s of the view t h a t not only 
nat ional confidence but a l so the freedom to develop and 
improve the future pos i t ion i s implied by secur i ty . To him, 
secur i ty i s the development of economic, soc i a l , and p o l i t i c a l 
l i f e of a nation which may not r e l a t e to yesterday but to 
31 tomarrow. National Secur i ty seems to be suscept ible to 
a va r i e ty of meanings. Some scholars have defined i t in 
the following ways: 
29, Ib id , 
30, Norman padelford & George Lincoln, 02j_cit,, p,291 
31, Robert S. McNamara. The Essence of Securi ty , Hadder 
and Stoughton, London7 1968, pp.l49-5'oT 
10 
Fronk N, Traqer and F,N, Slmonle: "National Security 
is that part of government policy having as its objective 
the creation of national and international political 
conditions favourable to the protection or extention of 
vital national values against existing and potential 
32 
adversaries", 
Arnold Wolfers; Security is a value "of which a 
nation can have more or less and which it can aspire to 
have in greater or lesser measures. It has much in common 
in this respect with power or wealth, two other values of 
great importance in international affairs. But while wealth 
measures amount of a nations material possession and power 
its ability to control the actions of others. Security in 
an objective sense jneasures the absence of threats to 
acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of 
33 threats that such values will be attacked", Michael H<H. 
Louw; "National security includes traditional defence policy 
and also the non-military actions of a state to ensure its 
total capacity to survive as a political entity in order 
to influence and to carry out its internal and International 
34 
objectives". 
32, Frank N, Trager & Frank N, Simonie, "An Introduction 
to the study of National Security" in F.N, Trager and 
P.S, Kro enberg,{?d,), National security and American 
society, Kansas University Press, Lawrence, 1973,p,36, 
33, Wolfers, op.cit, , p, 150 
34, Michael H,H. Louw. "Introduction, National Security, 
ISS University of Pretoria? pretoria, 1978, 
11 
J u l e s Comban; " S e c u r i t y means more indeed than the 
maintenance of a p e o p l e ' s homeland, o r even of t h e i r 
t e r r o r i t o r i e s beyond these s e a s . I t means the maintenance 
of world r e s p e c t fo r them, the maintenance of t h e i r 
economic i n t e r e s t , eve ry t h i n g in a word, which goes t o 
35 
up the grandeur , t h e l i f e i t s e l f of t h e n a t i o n , " 
Ian Bellanvf " s e c u r i t y i t s e l f i s a r e l a t i v e freedom 
from War coupled wi th a r e l a t i v e h i g h e r e x p e c t a t i o n t h a t 
d e f e a t w i l l no t be consequence of any war t h a t should 
II36 
o c c u r , " 
""' 37 CyA«W. Manning; "Secu r i t y i s freedom from, i n s e c u r i t y ? 
John E. _Mar2; '^Security i s r e l a t i v e freedom from 
harmful t h r e a t s " 
35 , Norman Padei ford & George L inco ln , o p , c i t . , p .291 
36, Ian Be l l any , "Towards a Theory of I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
s e c u r i t y " . P o l i t i c a l s tud ies , . Vol , 29, N o , l , 1981, 
P .102 . 
37, C.A. Mannin, "The e lements of c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y " 
in C o l l e c t i v e S e c u r i t y , M, Bourquin(Ed.) I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
I n s t i t u t e of i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o - o p e r a t i o n , P a r i s , 1936, 
p . 1 3 4 , 
38, John E, Marz,Beyond S e c u r i t y : P r i v a t e p e r c e p t i o n s 
Among Arabs and I s r a e l i s , I n t e r n a t i o n a l peace Aca'demy, 
New Yorfc, 1980, p , 105, 
id 
These d e f i n i t i o n s , while point ing out some of 
the c r i t e r i a for na t iona l secur i ty , appear to be offer ing 
an a l t e r n a t i v e to the power struggle model of r e a l i s t as 
a way of i n t e rp re t i ng the bas ic dynamics of i n t e rna t i ona l 
39 
a f f a i r s . The de f in i t i ons fur ther give the impression 
t h a t na t ional secur i ty has some firm or absolute meaning which 
is read i ly i den t i f i ab l e bu t , in f ac t they are too vague 
to be used in speci f ic and p a r t i c u l a r terms. Although the 
term nat ional secur i ty i t s e l f implies the absolute meaning 
of the secur i ty because something may be e i t h e r secure or 
insecure . But t h i s does not portray the t rue p ic tu re of 
40 the concept as secur i ty i s not a t a l l an absolute concept. 
I t i s a r e l a t i ve because absolute secu r i ty or secur i ty in 
any comprehensive sense i s beyond the reasonable p o s s i b i l i t y 
41 of at ta inment . I t i s beyond a t ta inment because an enormous 
array of t h r e a t s , danger, and doubts loom over every nation 
and as A«D, Lindssay remarks "The search for per fec t secur i ty 
42 defeats i t s own end. However, i t may be said t h a t i t was 
once possible for some s t a t e s to offer t h e i r prople absolute 
secu r i ty when invasion was supposed to be the only t h r e a t to 
39. Wolfers, o p . c i t . , pp.3-4 & 216 
40. Norman padelford & George Lincoln, o p . c i t , p ,298, 
4 1 . Wolfers, o p . c i t . pp. 18-19 
4 2. A»D. Lindsson. "Introduct ion" Leviatham, London, 1914, 
p . XXII. 
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the i r security. Tciay s ta te can offer i t s people not 
Absolute but only relative stcurity. I t i s , th^r*for«, 
reasonably useful to use security or define i t in relat ion 
to specific cases. However relat ive security i t se l f i s a 
permanently unsatisfactory condition because i t can never 
serve as a stable rest ing place because the factor which 
defines a satisfactory relat ive level a t any given momemt 
43 are themselves empheral. Relative security a t a time 
may be satisfactory but with the change of time i t also 
changes. 
The problem with the concept of national security 
is that its susceptibility to a variety of meanings defies 
the pursuit of a generally acceptable definition. Charles 
Schultze points out in this connection that national 
security deals with such a wide range of risks about whose 
possibilities we have little knowledge, and of contingencies 
whose nature we can only dimly perceive, that it does not 
44 lend itself for any clear and specific formulation, 
Arnold Wolfers is of the view that "It deals with a range 
of goals so wide that highly divergent policies can be 
45 interpreted as policies of security". The concept apj 
to be encompazing a whole domain indicating an area of 
43, Barry Buzan. op.cit^, p. 215 
4-1. Charles h, Schultze. "The Economic content of National 
security policy". Foreign Affairs, Vol, VI, No,1 * 
1973, pp.529-30. — 
45. Wolfers, op, cit. , p, 150, 
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concern rather jus t a fixed point or a precise condition 
and for this reason i t cannot be defined in any general 
sense but rather in relat ion to specific cases. I t may 
be said that i t i s the r e l a t i v i s t i c dimension of the 
concept where most of i t s real meaning l i e s . 
In essence, i t may be said that security of a nation 
consists of i t s t e r r i t o r i a l in tegr i ty , s t ab i l i t y of the 
regime, and the real izat ion of i t s other national and 
international in teres ts and safeguarding the l i f e of i t s 
inhabitants from any threat , action or situation which 
46 damage the i r way of l i f e in any way. National Security 
in other words may be defined as the ab i l i ty of a nation 
to maintain and sustain i t s consti tutional order and to 
a s se r t i t s fundamental identity in time and space. Any 
thing that internally or externally comes in the way of 
maintenance of consti tutional order is a threat to national 
securi ty. 
Nations exis t today at the hub of a whole universe 
of threats and different components of the nations appear 
to be vulnerable to different kind of threats . These threats 
determine the security and insecurity of the nations as the 
view of thei r security is generally coloured by the i r 
4 6, Norman J , padelford & George A, Lincoln, The Dynamics 
of International Po l i t i c s , The MacMillan Company, ~ 
New York, 1962, pp, 197-98, 
l o 
of a nation i s 
perception of t h rea t s and v u l n e r a b i l i t i e s . Secur i ty , 
mainly measured in terms of th rea t s to i t and i t s 
v u l n e r a b i l i t y to them because the "secur i ty of a nat ion » 
47 increases as i t s vu lne rab i l i t y decreases, and vice versa . 
Threats to na t ional secur i ty are many which are 
e x t r a - o r d i n a r i l y complex as they come in diverse ways 
and forms which cannot be ea s i l y weighed off as they 
48 are in s t a t e of constant evalua t ion . They v^ry enormously 
in range and i n t e n s i t y , pose r i sks which cannot accura te ly 
be assessed and depend upon p o s s i b i l i t i e s which can not be 
49 ca l cu l a t ed . This complexity and d i v e r s i t y of t h r e a t s 
make the concept of na t ional secur i ty a problem in many 
dimensions ratl ier than j u s t a matter of mi l i t a ry defence 
and lead to the imposs ib i l i ty of using i t in any general 
sense. 
The t h r ea t s to secur i ty of a nat ion are both m i l i t a r y 
and non-mil i tary but mi l i t a ry t h rea t s occupy the t r a d i t i o n a l 
50 hea r t of na t ional s ecu r i ty concern. However, a l l the na t ions , 
to some degree, are vulnerable to various kinds of t h r e a t s 
l i k e p o l i t i c a l and economic but m i l i t a ry th rea t s involving 
the use of force can and usually do, threaten a l l the 
components of a nat ions by d i s t o r t i n g , de s t r ac t i ng , or 
4 7. Richard N. Ullman. o p . c i t . p,146 
4 8. Barry Buzan. o p . c i t . , p. 89 
4 9, Ib id . 
5 0, i b i d . , p,75 
5 1 . Ib id . 
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•Wrecking t h e work of n a t i o n i n p o l i t i c a l , economic and 
52 
s o c i a l s p h e r e s . M i l i t a r y t h r e a t s a r e of many t y p e s . 
At t h e m o s t e x t r e m e l e v e l a r e t h e t h r e a t s of i n v a s i o n , 
o c c u p a t i o n , o r d i smembennen t , h a v i n g t h e aim t o o b l i t r a t e 
53 t h e n a t i o n . M i l i t a r y t h r e a t s may a l s o b e of p u n i t i v e 
n a t u r e whose o b j e c t i v e , u s u a l l y , i s t o f o r c e a change 
i n t h e government p o l i c y r a t h e r t h a n t o s e i z e t e r r i t o r y 
o r o v e r t u r n t h e i n s t i t u t i o n s . M i l i t a r y t h r e a t s may a l s o 
b e i n d i r e c t in t h e s e n s e t h a t t h e y a r e n o t a p p l i e d 
d i r e c t l y upon t h e n a t i o n b u t aim a t t h e e x t e r n a l i n t e r e s t 
of t h e n a t i o n l i k e t h r e a t s t o a l l i e s , s h i p p i n g l a n e s , 
54 
s t r a t e g i c a l l y p l a c e d t e r r i t o r i e s . 
M i l i t a r y t h r e a t s u s u a l l y have p o l i t i c a l o b j e c t i v e s 
l i k e s e i z u r e of t e r r i t o r y , change of g o v e r n m e n t , o r 
m a n i p u l a t i o n of p o l i c i e s . Bu t t h e s e o b j e c t i v e s can e l s e 
be a c h i e v e d by p o l i t i c a l means . N o r m a l l y t h e t a r g e t o f 
p o l i t i c a l t h r e a t s i s s u p p o s e d t o be t h e i d e a of n a t i o n , 
p a r t i c u l a r l y , i t s o r g a n i s i n g i d e o l o g y a n d t h e i n s t i t u t i o n s 
55 
which e x p r e s s i t . S i n c e t h e n a t i o n s t a t e i s s a i d t o b e 
a p o l i t i c a l e n t i t y i t may f e a r p o l i t i c a l t h r e a t s a s much 
a s m i l i t a r y o n e s , p o l i t i c a l t h r e a t s s tem from t h e g r e a t 
5 2 , I b i d . 
5 3 . ^ I d , 
5 4 , I b i d , 
5 5 . I b i d . , p , 7 6 
5 6 , l M . d , 
1 7 
b a t t l e of ideas . Information and t r a d i t i o n as the 
cont rad ic t ion in ideologies i s b a s i c , the nation 
pursuing one may well feel threatend by idealogies 
57 pursued by o thers . P o l i t i c a l t h r e a t s have t h e i r 
own area of vu lne rab i l i t y bu t they are not l e s s 
s ign i f i can t than mi l i t a ry th rea t s as ignorance of 
p o l i t i c a l th rea ts may d r a s t i c a l l y hamper the secur i ty 
of a na t ion . 
Besides mi l i t a ry and p o l i t i c a l t h r e a t s , there a re 
t h r ea t s to the secur i ty of a nation which have economic 
overtones, Havever, these t h rea t s are more d i f f i c u l t t o 
r e l a t e to the secur i ty of a nation than mi l i t a ry and 
p o l i t i c a l anes because in economic domain the normal 
condit ion of actors (Nations) i s one of r i s k , danger & 
58 competit ion. If i n secu r i t y in economic domain i s a 
normal condit ion then i t i s very hard to ident i fy the 
boundary a t which, i s sues acquire a spec ia l s t a tus as 
59 t h r e a t to the secur i ty of nat ion. Economic th rea t s 
operate aga ins t the economy of the t a r g e t na t ion . 
Economic th rea t s may, however, produce both mi l i t a ry 
and p o l i t i c a l consequei)ces i f implemented but there 
i s no d i r e c t th rea t to the other s ec to r s of a n a t i o n ' s 
secur i ty as there i s with mi l i t a ry t h r e a t s . 
57. Ib id . 
58. I b i d . , p.79 
5 9l Ib id . 
60. I b id . 
The meaning and nature of s ecu r i t y d i f fe r s from 
nation to nation as each one of them i s exposed to 
d i f f e r en t kinds of t h r ea t s depending upon the condit ion 
of na t ions . When the nat ions are s t rong , nat ional 
secur i ty can be viewed primari ly in terms of p ro tec t ing 
or safeguarding the nation from ex te rna l t h r e a t s . And 
when the nations aire weak, they concentrate on domestically 
generated th rea t s more than external ones. This i s the 
condit ion of the majority of the Third World nat ions 
"which e i t h e r dont have or have fa i l ed to generate a 
domestically strong p o l i t i c a l and soc i a l consensus to 
e l iminate the l a rge - sca le use of force as a major and 
continuing element in the domestic p o l i t i c a l and soc i a l 
l i f e of the nat ion. This d i s t i n c t i o n between nat ions 
with ser ious domestic secur i ty problems and those whose 
primary secur i ty concern's are external i s c ruc ia l for 
the understanding of nat ional s e c u r i t y . The weaker the 
na t ion , the more ambigous becomes the concept in r e l a t i o n 
6 2 to the nat ion . However, when we t a l k of the secu r i ty of 
a nat ion we, in fac t , general ly re fe r to the percept ions of 
ru l ing e l i t e s , and the key decision makers of t h a t very 
na t ion . 
61 . I b i d . , p. 67 
62. I b i d . 
lb 
For the weaker nations particularly^ and to some 
extent all the nations^ principal threats to their 
security come from within the nations rather than from 
outside the boundaries of those nations. Domestic threats 
may be consisting of any specific type of action, 
situation, or sequence of events which threaten drasti-
cally and over a relatively brief span of time can 
degrade the quality of life for the inhabitants of the 
nationa and narrow down the policies available to the 
government of that nation. The principal domestic threats 
may form a broad spectrum of disturbances and disruptions 
ranging from unconventional warfare like guerrilla warfare, 
terrorism and insurgency to boycotts, raw materials 
shortages, and the devastating natural disasters. 
Among the domestic threats, internal subversion, 
according to Latin American national security doctrine 
theoreticians, is the most devastating threat to national 
security. Internal subversion can come from a variety 
of causes and situations such as militant political 
contentions, secessionist ambitions, economic deprivation 
or devastating hatural disasters. Domestic threats in 
6 31 J,A. Vieragallo, "National security Doctrines and 
their impact on Human Rights" in aose Antonion 
Vieragallo (Ed.) The Security Trap. Arms Race 
Mil_itarism and dis'armament. A concern for christians, 
TOOC International Rome, 1982,pp.89-90. ~ 
cU 
a d d i t i o n t o u n d e r m i n i n g n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y , open t h e 
g a t e f o r f u r t h e r t h r e a t of e x t e r n a l i n t e r v e n t i o n e i t h e r 
a s a p a r t i c i p a n t on one s i d e o r t h e o t h e r , a s S y r i a and 
I s r a e l i n t e r v e n e d i n Lebnon i n 1976 o r a s i n v a d e r s 
t a k i n g a d v a n t a g e of n a t i o n , weakend by i n t e r n a l s t r i f e . 
To s e n s e t he f u l l d i m e n s i o n o f t h e t h r e a t s one h a s t o 
r e c a l l 1 9 3 0 ' s i n v a s i o n of J a p a n on Ch ina and t h e 
c a t a s t r o p h i c e f f e c t s of U.S . i n t e r v e n t i o n i n Vie tnam 
and Combodia and t h e USSR's I n t e r v e n t i o n i n A f g h a n i s t a n , 
The t h r e a t s t o t h e s e c u r i t y of a n a t i o n h a v e b o t h 
i n t e r n a l and e x t e r n a l d i m e n s i o n , b u t w h e t h e r t h e t h r e a t s 
a r e i n t e r n a l o r e x t e r n a l b o t h undermine t h e s e c u r i t y of 
t h e n a t i o n a s w e l l as t h e s e c u r i t y o f i t s I n h a b i t a n t s a s 
t h e i r s e c u r i t y i s i n t e r l i n k e d w i t h t h e s e c u r i t y o f t h e 
n a t i o n . As " f o r Hobbes , i t d i d n o t much m a t t e r w h e t h e r 
t h e t h r e a t s come from w i t h i n o r o u t s i d e o n e ' s n a t i o n s . 
A v i c t i m i s j u s t a s dead i f t h e b u l l e t t h a t k i l l s h im 
i s f i r e d by a n e i g h b o u r a t t e m p t i n g t o s e i z e h i s p r o p e r t y 
a s i f i t comes from an i n v a d i n g a rmy, A c i t i z e n l o o k s 
t o t h e s t a t e , t h e r e f o r e , f o r p r o t e c t i o n a g a i n s t b o t h 
64 t y p e of t h r e a t s . 
6 4 . R i c h a r d H. Ul lman. o p . c l t . , p , 1 3 0 
21 
A forceful argument can be made tha t nat ional 
secur i ty i s a very complex and paradoxicol concept. 
Academic i n t e r e s t in i t , however, has tremendously 
increased in recent decades and various de f in i t ions 
have been developed by academicians but no general 
consensus has been developed, so fa r , for any one of 
them. National s ecu r i ty i s widely being used but i t 
ye t requires to be defined in a general ly accepted 
form,I However, i t may sdrve a b e t t e r meaning to the 
concept i f defined and character ized by the th rea t s 
which challenge the secur i ty of a na t ion . Because the 
degree of secur i ty which a nation feels depends upon a 
number of in te rna l and ex terna l circumstances. 
C h a p t e r - 1 1 
CONVENTIONAL AND UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE 
War i s a s o l d a s o u r h i s t o r y . We have been w r i t i n g 
a b o u t i t s i n c e we l e a r n e d w r i t i n g , b u t we have n o t b e e n 
a b l e y e t t o d e f i n e i t i n such a way t h a t c o u l d be g e n e r a -
l i s e d . V a r i o u s s c h o l a r s of r e p u t e and e r u d i t i o n l i k e K a r l 
Von C l a u s e w i t z , L i d d l e H a r t / J o m i n i Foch e t c , h a v e w r i t t e n 
i n d e t a i l a b o u t t h e war b u t none h a s been a b l e t o d e f i n e 
i t in an a l l i n c l u s i v e manner . T h i s i s s o b e c a u s e war h a s 
been c o n s t a n t l y c h a n g i n g and d o u b t s have a l w a y s b e e n r a i s e d 
2 
a b o u t i t s t r u e n a t u r e and common c a u s e of i t s o c c u i r e n c e . 
War h a s become a v e r y complex phenomenon t a d a y . N o t h i n g 
c o u l d b e s a i d a b o u t i t w i t h c e r t a i n t y . I f a n y t h i n g w i t h some 
s o r t of c e r t a i n t y c o u l d be s a i d a b o u t i t , i t i s t h a t i t i s 
i t s u n c e r t a i n and c o n s t a n t l y c h a n g i n g n a t u r e . The p u r p o s e 
of war may remain f a i r l y c o n s t a n t and e a s i l y d e f i n a b l e 
b u t i t s s t r a t e g i e s and t a c t i c s a r e f o r e v e r c h a n g i n g and 
t h i s i s p r o b a b l y b e c a u s e t h e y have b e e n a d o p t e d t o t h e 
3 
v a r i a b l e f a c t o r s of t e r r a i n , weapon s y s t e m s and men. 
1 , Wil l iam P, Yarborough, "Unconventional Warfare" , The 
Annals of the American Academy of P o l i t i c a l and S o c i a l 
S c i e n c e , P h i l a d e l p h i a , Vol , 34l7 May 1962, p . 2 
2 , C o l l i e r ' s Encydopedia, Vol., 23 Macmillan. Educat ion 
company. New York, p ,233 
3 , Robert Leck ie , Warfare , Harper & Row P u b l i s h e r s , 
New York, 1970, p , 3 0 . 
War, l ike hurricane or natural cataclysm, presents 
Innumerable faces and facets and c r e a t s response and 
reac t ions from the th ings , both animate and inanimate, 
which i t touches. These very react ions then themselves 
become par t of the fabr ic of war and wax, wane, bil low 
and precess confounding overal l descr ip t ion and defying 
4 
exact ca tegor iza t ion . In the u l t imate , the parable of 
b l ind men and elephant appl ies to war. I t i s so complex 
tha t from the point of view of soldier^ I t i s one th ing 
and from tha t of h is mother, another. Due to the 
uncer ta inty and complexity of war, i t i s not suscept ib le 
to descr ip t ion in a s ingle phrase or sentence. However, 
for our present purpose, we, d iscuss ing war in general 
and defining conventional and unconventional warfare, w i l l 
t ry to draw a d i s t ingu ish ing boundary l i n e between these 
warfares . Hundreds of scholars have s tud ies war - i t s 
na tu re , purpose and causes - and they have adopted 
d i f f e r en t approaches on which they assume war to have i t s 
bas ic r o o t s . Some scholars find the o r ig in of war in the 
nature of man while some others to the nature of soc ie ty 
and they have defined i t according to t h e i r assumptions. 
4. William P. Yarborough. o p . c i t . , p , 2 
5. Ib id . 
24 
Biological Scholars or theorists believe that 
war basically has its roofs in human nature. They first 
define war believing that all forms of life, from plants 
to human beings, are engaged in constant struggle in 
which only the fittest survive. According to this belief, 
war is one of the forms this struggle takes. They further 
believe that human beings are always driven by their Instinct 
to compete and to struggle. They regard war as one of the 
7 
forms by which such behaviour i s expressed. Psychological 
scholars or t h e o r i s t s opine tha t war i s the manifestat ion 
of aggressive tendencies of human be ings . They regard war 
as a behavioural pa t te rn of human groups, resolving 
personal tension. 
Behaviouris ts , on the other hand, think t h a t human 
aggressiveness i s learned and not i nna t e . Human beings by 
t h e i r nature are ne i t he r aggressive nor submissive, 
ne i t he r warlike nor peaceful, they develop themselves 
in e i t h e r d i rec t ion depending on what they learn by 
in t e r ac t i ng with t h e i r environment and c u l t u r e , they 
do not ac t and r eac t mechanically according to t h e i r 
i n s t i n c t bu t de l i be r a t e ly according to the views and 
9 
emotions they have learned through experience. 
6, C o l l i e r ' s Encyclopedia, o p , c l t , , p , 2 3 1 
7, Ib id , 
8, Ib id , 
9, I b i d . 
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Anthropol igis t see war as a product of the cu l t u r a l 
experience of human beings . I t i s not an ex terna l 
phenomenon but appeared a t some de f in i t e stage of 
human development. They consider war a clash between 
c u l t u r e s . However, i t has been recognised by most 
of scholars that whatever be the ul t imate cause of 
war, i t i s , a t l e a s t in immediate sense, a p o l i t i c a l 
a c t . l l 
12 Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary 
defines war as a h o s t i l e contention by means of armed ^ 
forces , car r ied on between na t ions , s t a t e s or r u l e r s or 
between p a r t i e s in the same nation or s t a t e , the employ-
ment of armed forces aga ins t a foreign power or aga ins t 
on opposing party in the s t a t e . Hofman Nikerson in 
Encyclopedia Britanftite s t a t e s t ha t "war i s the use of 
organised force between two groups pursuing cont rad ic tory 
p o l i c i e s , each group seeking to impose the policy upon 
13 the o the r . Many formal de f in i t ions and c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s 
of war were examined by Quincy Wright, What the nature 
and pos i t ion of war a t d i f fe ren t times in our h i s to ry 
was, he analysed t h a t as follows: " a customary reac t ion 
10. Ib id^ ,p .232, 
11 . I b id . , p .231 
^ 2. Webster 's New Twntieth Century Dictionary of Bhqlish 
Lanquaqg Ilnd Edi t ion, Coll ins World, 1976,p.2054 
13. Hofman Nikerson. Encylopedia Br i tannlca , Vol.23, 
William Benton Publ isher , U.S.A., p.323". 
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to circumstances, jeopardizing groups s o l i d a r i t y and 
secur i ty - a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of pr imi t ive s o c i e i t e s ; 
a leg i t imate instrument of s t a t e pol icy a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c 
of ancient s o c i e t i e s ; an indispensable means for main ta i -
ning j u s t i c e - a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of medieval society; a 
l eg i t imate procedure for s e t t l i n g quarreil between 
sovereigns - a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of ea r ly stage of modern 
soc ie ty ; an inev i t ab le condition for the coexistence of 
sovereign s t a t e s - a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of i n t e rna t iona l law 
p r i o r to the World War I ; and an i l l e g i t i m a t e form of 
s t a t e behaviour - a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of in t e rna t iona l law 
* 14 
elaborated in general conventions since First V/orld War, 
He, however, defines it in its broader sense as "a violent 
contact of distinct but similar entities" and in narrower 
and more exact sense as "the legal condition which equally 
peimits two or more hostile groups to carry on conflict 
15 by armed forces. Westjlake defines it as a contention 
between two or more states through their armed forces 
for the purpose of over- powering each other and imposing 
such conditions as the victor pleases. 
14- Quincy Wright, "History of the concept of war" in 
T. S. Rama Rao (Ed,), Studies in the History of law 
of Nations, The Indian Year book of International" 
Affairs, Madras, 1964,p.126, 
15, Quincy Wright. The study of International Relations, 
Appleton - Century,"Grafts; New York, 1955,pp-149-50, 
16. Westlake. International Law, p.1 
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War, in our t ime, has become a very complex 
phenomenon. I t s evaluat ion has been towards the 
m u l t i p l i c i t y of means and complexity of methods. 
I t i s now, not j u s t a mi l i t a ry a c t i v i t y but fought • 
of many fronts l ike diplomatic , p o l i t i c a l , economic, 
propaganda and m i l i t a r y with a complex of mi l i t a ry , 
p o l i t i c a l , economic, psychological and other means 
simultaneously. The r e l a t i v e importance of each dimension 
of war i s not constant and changes from war to war and 
during various stages of war. War has become very complex 
17 and paradoxical phenomenon that i t was over befoire. 
The problem of war was analysed by Karl Von 
clausewitz a t g rea te r length . He wrote tha t "v/ar i s 
only a pa r t of p o l i t i c a l in te rcourse , therefore by 
no means an indepdent thing in i t s e l f . War i s nothing 
but a continuation of p o l i t i c a l in te rcourse with a 
18 
mixture of other means. In h is d iscuss ion two i n t e r -
re la ted problems of war - war as a mi l i t a ry a c t i v i t y 
and war as a p o l i t i c a l ac t , were analysed by him. The 
most bas ic def in i t ion he offered was - war i s an a c t 
of violence by which one party compels the o the t to 
17, Norman D, Palmer, Howard Perkins . In te rna t iona l 
Rela t ions , The World community in t r a n s i t i o n , C.B.S, 
publ ica t ion , Delhi,1985,pn,184-185, see also 
c o l l i e r ' s Encyclopedia, Vo£b.23,p,233, 
18, Karl Von Clausewitz, On ^^ar. Translated by O.J. Matthings 
J o l l e s , Modern Library Book, New York, 1943, p.596, 
Zi 
obey h i s w i l l . This de f in i t ion spr ings two formulas, one 
expressing the outward aspect of war as an armed violence 
and other expressing i t s inward purposive aspect as an 
ac t in pursu i t of p o l i t i c a l goals . The f i r s t s t a t e s t h a t 
war i s an act of violence pushed to i t s almost bounds, 
the second tha t war i s a continuation of policy by other 
means, i f war were to foiled mi l i t a ry logic alone, i t 
would become absolute aiming a t the t o t a l des t ruc t ion of 
the ene'iny. He regarded war as an instrument of s t a t e 
19 po l icy . Since there i s disharmony of nat ional i n t e r e s t s , 
the po l i c i e s of one s t a t e clash with the embitions of o the r s . 
In such a system where the i n t e r e s t of one s t a t e are in 
c o n f l i c t with the i n t e r e s t s of other s t a t e s , war to 
Ciausewitz, i s an indispensable means forresolving 
20 c o n f l i c t s . I t i s to say t h a t war, to Clausewitz, i s a 
v io l en t nneans for resolving c o n f l i c t s , 
CI .sewitz holds that war shares common p roper t i e s 
with p o l i t i c s , since a l l p o l i t i c a l behaviour i s charac te r i sed 
by r e l a t ionsh ip of c o n f l i c t among ind iv idua ls and groups 
21 who se'^k to sa t i s fy t h e i r contending i n t e r e s t , probably 
19, Collier 's Encyclopedia, op, c i t , , P,233, 
20, I b i d , , P,234. 
21, Merle Kiling "Cuba: A case study of a successful attempt 
to seize political power by the Application of Unconven-
tional Warfore"; The Annals» Vol.341, May 1982, P,43. 
2o 
echoing Clausewltz, Mao Tse-tung a lso said t ha t war can 
not for a s ingle moment be separated from p o l i t i c s ; p o l i t i c s 
22 
is bloodless war, war is the politics of bloddshed, 
A role has been granted to the politics in the process 
leading up to the outbieak of war but on the actual 
conduction of war it has very little influence. We can say 
that war is the continuation of politics but not a controlled 
instrument of it. 
Professor Eagleton once noted that "for centuries war 
has bf^ en regarded as a means of remedying injust situations 
23 
of s e t t l i n g disputes of enforcing r i g h t s , James T, Shotwell 
s t a t ed tha t war has b'^en the instrument by which most of the 
grea t facts of p o l i t i c a l nat ional h i s to ry have been es tab l i shed 
0 A 
and maintained. The saire theme wgs developed by Quicy Wright 
I'War has been the method actually used for achieving the 
major political changes of modern world, the building of 
nation states, the expansion of modern civilization throughout 
the World and changing of dominant interests of that 
25 
civilization. 
22, Moo Tse-tung; Selected Military writings. Foreign 
Language Press; Peking; 1963; p.iJSl, 
23, Eagleton Clude, Analysis of the problem of War, Vol.4, 
The Ronald Press~Company, 194J7 New York, P,5. 
24, James T, shotwell. War as an Instrument of National 
policy, Karcourt Brace, New York, 1929, P.IS, 
25, Quincy wright, A study of V»ar, University of Chicago 
Press, Chicago,"1942, Vol.l, P,250. 
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War, however, in i t s l i t e r a l sense, i s f ight ing the 
hallmark of which i s violence. War, therefore , may be 
defined as a v io len t contes t car r ied on be-b^eon or among 
groups, in v/hich each contender t r i e s to wear down the 
other with the in ten t ion of imposing i t s w i l l upon each 
o ther . 
War, in addi t ion to t h i s , has been us^d metaphorically 
to numerous types of opposition - both con f l i c t and competi-
t ion - tha t have been dis t inguished from r e l a t i ons of 
peaceful coexistence and cooperation, i^ue to i t s metaphorical 
use, we have, tod^y, various connotations of i t l i k e cold 
war, hot war, l imi ted war, t o t a l war, c i v i l war, g u e r r i l a 
War, propaganda war, nuclear war, p o l i t i c a l wgr, psychological 
War, imper i a l i s t wars, wars of na t ional l i b e r a t i o n , conven-
27 
t iona l warfare, unconventional warfare, and so on , These 
usages of war are va l id watchwords, and not mere s t r eo ty^s 
constructed by the mass media. They a l l have blossomed forth 
in our parlance of s t ra teby and each usage serves some 
p a r t i c u l a r purpose but a l l t h i s semantics, in fac t , has made 
the study of war more complex and complicated. However, for 
our present purpose, we wi l l t ry to define and d i f f e r e n t i a t e 
conventional and unconventional warfare. 
26, Ta lco t t Parsons, "Some Reflections on the Place of 
Force In Social Process; in Harry Eckstein (ed) ; 
In te rna l war? '•'•'he Tree Press , New York, 1984, p , 33, 
27. Norman D. Palmer, Howard Perkins; op. c i t , , P,185, 
3. 
The terms conventional implies to be having a l l i e d 
meaning with customs, t r a d i t i o n s , usages and c u l t u r e . 
Conventional warfare in t h i s sense may be defined as a 
Warfare which i s fought according to thr^ i n t e rna t iona l 
customs, t r ad i t i ons and conventions which c o n s t i t u t e the 
laws of war. In other words, i t may be said tha t a warfare 
which i s control led and regular ised by the laws tf war may 
be termed as conventional marfare. 
The category of conventional warfare i s vast i i t 
covers a l l Warfares which do not go aga ins t the laws, 
28 
usages and customs of War , The most fundamental cha rac te r -
i s t i c of conventional warfare is t h a t i t i s a pos i t i ona l 
Warfare, in which regular ly cons t i tu t ed mi l i ta ry un i t s of 
a nation f ight face to face . The term conventional appl ies 
to mi l i t a ry operations undertaken by regular ly cons t i t u t ed 
elements of mi l i ta ry ac t ing in general accordance with 
29 
doctr ine for operationsagainst a conventional enemy. 
Operat ional ly , conventional warfare i s marked by t r a d i t i o n a l 
o rganisa t ions , weaponary, doctr ine, t a c t i d s , combat, and 
techniques in which standardized un i t s and t h e i r personnel , 
equipment, weapons, passess spec i f ic combat funct ions. 
Of these many aspects of conventional warfare which warrant 
28. William V, O'Brien/ -^ he 5onduct of lus t and Limited 
War; Praeger; New York, 1981, p,142. 
29. Charles T.R, Bahannan, "Ant iquer r i l l a Operations"; 
The Annals; philadephia; Vol.341, May, 1962, P,22, 
30. Virgi l Ney, " Tact ics and Techniques of Riot Warfare", 
Mil i tary Review, Vol.L.No.5, May 1970, P. 61, 
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normative regulation and limitation, thr most important 
include massive fire power and tactical air support, 
conventional strategic bombings, navel and air blockades, 
31 
scorched earth defense. of paramount importance to its 
Tactical success is its capability of carrying out the 
military doctrine of fire and movement. 
However, regardless of all aspect of conventional 
Warfare, its primary purposes like any other warfare 
remains the same: to deliver violence upon the enemy and 
his installations for the purpose of destroying his will 
and ability to resist by force of arms and to compel the 
enemy to accede to the will of the victor and negotiate 
32 
and surrender his arms and position. Conventional 
warfare, however/ has no specific meaning but in simple 
terms it has been defined as a warfare which is controlled 
and regularised by the established norms, usages, customs 
and traditions which the humanity so far has evolved for 
the proper and orderly conduct of the warfare and which 
together constitute the laws of war. 
Unconventional is the reverse of the term conventional. 
Unconventional warfare, therefore, may be defined as a 
ware fare which does not oblige the laws of war. In other 
31, William V, O'Brien, op.cit., p,144. 
3 2, Virgil Ney, "op.cit,. p. 61. 
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Words, it does not abide by any rules and does not 
follow any particular recourse. This expression is 
meant to describe the unusual or unorthodox ways of 
33 
carrying the fight to the adversary. The unconventional 
military operations consist of these operations for which 
there is no direct precedent in contemporary conventional 
military doctrines. Unconventional warfare comprises all 
types of warfare alien to the conventional warfare of the 
petiod invovled. 
Unconventional warfare, dplike conventional warfare, 
is not the war of position. It rather avoids positional 
fighting, Besically it is a warfare of surprise, flexibility, 
detachment and high movements. It is also described as 
shapeless and insiduous kind of war, the essence of which 
is that it should take forms which the opposing side finds 
35 difficult to deal with. Broadly speaking, it is that 
diversity of action and measures through which people can 
36 
bring violence aga ins t an enemy, Paul M,A. Linebarger ' s 
desc r ip t ion of psychological warfare descr ibes well the 
33, Marris Green Span, " In te rna t iona l Law and i t s p ro tec t ion 
for pa r t i c ipan t s in Unconventional warfare, "ri>e Annalg. 
Vol. 341, May 1962, p , 3 1 , 
34, Joseph P. Kutger, " I r regu la r warfare in Transition•*, 
in Franklin Mark Osanka(Ssl), Modern Guer r i l l a warfare . 
The Free Press , New York, 1971,p.3*9, 
35, Marris Greenspan,op .c i t , , p, 31, 
36, Slavko N. Bjelajac,"unconventional warfare in the Nuclear 
Era" in Franklin Mark Osanka, (ed) , Modem Guer r i l l a 
warfare . The Free Press , New York, 1971,p,440, 
3x 
unconventional and fully applies to it. - "It is not 
controlled by the laws, usages, and customes of war; 
and it can not be defined in terms of terrain, order 
of battle, or named engagements. It is a continuous 
process. Success or failure is often known only monthx or 
37 years after the execution of operation. Dictionary 
of Military and Associated Terms,(U.S. Department of 
Defense) , defines unconventional warfare as "a broad 
spectrun of military and paramilitary operation conducted 
in enemy held, enemy denied or politically sensitive 
territory. ^Unconventional warfare includes but is not 
limited to the interrelated fields of guerrilla warfare, 
evasion and escape, subversion, sabotage, direct actions, 
missions and other operations of 3Ow visibility, covert 
or clandestine nature. These interrelated aspects of 
unconventional warfare may be prosecuted singly or 
collectively by predominantly indigenous personnels, 
usually supported and directed in varying degrees by 
(an) external source(s) daring all conditions of war 
..38 
and peace," 
37, Paul M.A, Linebarger, Psychological warfare, Washington^ 
1948, p.l 
38. The, joint Chiefs of 3taff Publication,!, Department 
of Defence, U.S.A. 
3u 
4 0 a t hand between the adve r sa r i e s , in which one i s 
over t ly in dominion and holds the s t ruc tu re of government, 
publ ic channels of communication, cent res of adminis t ra t ion , 
and the other lacks a l l t h i s and operates in the i n t e r s t i c e s , 
hiding i t s i d e n t i t y , remaining out of uniform e i t h e r for 
lack of them or expediency, taking co la ra t ion from the 
41 
milieu and being furtive about support from outside. 
It is said that unconventional warfare is multifarious 
in its pattern and relatively or entirely tinconditioned 
42 by the elements of common culture relevant to the hostilities. 
Unconventional warfare is not a warfare designed to 
over-turn the state by hard blowis; rather it is designed 
to nibble at the foundations of state removing the 
underpinning by a process of evasion until the whole structure 
43 
crumbles and falls. It attacks at the Mechanism through 
which the enemy (state) exercises control. It does not 
concentrate on occuping a territory or defending that; 
rather it concentrate on the enemy: human and physical 
resources with the intention of immobilizing and dis-
integrating enemy forces, disrupting transportation. 
40. Charles Burton Marshall, "Unconventional warfare as 
a concern of Americal Foreign Policy", The Annals, 
Vol. 341, May 1962, p.96. 
4 1. Ibid., p.97. 
42. Ibid., p. 196. 
43. Morris Greenspan, 0£j£it., p. 31. 
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Unconventional warfare i s a l so described as the 
oeople ' s ^/arfaro in the sense t h a t i t i s always waged 
by m i l i t a r i l y weak aga ins t the m i l i t a r i l y superior . I t 
general ly occurs where the adversar ies have a g rea te r 
d i s p a r i t y in s t rength and c a p a b i l i t i e s whether in men, 
resources , or organisa t ional s t r u c t u r e . This i s to say 
t h a t , in unconventional warfare, one adversary genera l ly 
r e l i e s on regular army, the other f igh t s with an i n f e r i o r 
army, equipment, and organisa t ion . Unconventional warfare, 
through out our h i s t o r y , has been fought and employed in 
many ways d i f fe ren t to the conventional ways of the t ime. 
I t has been employed as an in t e rna l r e b e l l i o n , as an over t 
a id to fr iendly forces engaged in s t ruggle with a p o t e n t i a l 
enemy; as a subversive a l ien element in attempting to 
develop open rebe l l ion in another nat ion; as an adjunct 
to the nat ive conventional forces engaged in c o n f l i c t with 
the enemy and as the only means of f ight ing the super ior 
39 force. Unconventional warfare has cont inously been 
assuming various forms depending upon the s i t u a t i o n s , 
appor tun i t i e s and c o n s t r a i n t s . 
Unconventional warfare is genera l ly charac te r i sed 
by assymmetary in j u r i d i c a l s t a t e s , and mi l i t a ry resources 
39, Joseph P, Kutger, o p . c l t , , p ,40 . 
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44 communication and war production of the enemy. I t i s 
a d i s i n t eg ra t i ve weapon which seeks to destroy the l inks 
which bind together the p o l i t i c a l , economic and mi l i t a ry 
organism of the enemy. 
History teaches us t h a t we have been f ight ing both 
conventional and unconventional warfare s ince long. These 
warfare are as old as the h i l l s , perennial as the sea 
45 and contemporary as the very day. They have been occuring 
under a l l forms of p o l i t i c a l , socia l and economic order 
and recourse to them appears to follow no p a r t i c u l a r 
pa t t e rn in terms of race , form of government, soc ia l 
46 
economic or p o l i t i c a l order . The h i s to ry of warfare 
shows t h a t the nature of warfare has never been cons tan t . 
I t i s in the process of continuous changes 'which has 
always been conditioned and charac te r i sed by the ebb and 
flow of the invention of new weapons, new s t r a t e g i e s and 
t a c t i c s , new doct r ines followed by the invention of new 
47 
defences, new deployments and new organ i sa t ion . I t was 
44, Slauko N, Bje la jac , "Unconventional Warfare: American 
and Soviet Approaches", The Annals, Vol,341, May 1962, 
pp. 77-78. 
45, Michael Elliat-Bateman (Ed,) , The Fourth Dimension of 
warfare, Manchester University Press , Manchester, 1970", 
p . l . 
4 6. Charles Hodges, "Why War" in F . j , Brownj Charles Hodges 
and J . S , Roucek, Contemporary World P o l i t i c s , John Wiley 
and Sons, We« York, 1940,' p .25 , 
47. Michael E l l i a t Ba teman , (Ed . ) , 02 iC i t . , p . l . 
33 
a l s o po in t ed ou t by Karl Von Clausewitz t h a t "each 
age has had i t s own p e c u l i a r forms of war; i t s own 
r e s t r i c t i v e cond i t i on and i t s own p r e j u d i c e s . 
As we know t h a t war fa re i s a. v i o l e n t i n t e r a c t i o n 
jn which each con tender t r i e s to wear down the o t h e r 
for the purpose of imposing d e s i r e d w i l l and c o n d i t i o n 
upon each o t h e r . To do so^ each con tende r seeks t o i t s 
own advan tage , a r e d r e s s of r e l a t i v e c a p a b i l i t i e s fo r 
coe rc ion between i t s e l f and the a d v e r s a r y in o r d e r to 
e n a b l e i t s purpose t o p r e v a i l . To d e f e a t an enemy, 
acco rd ing to C l a u s e w i t z , i s the p r o d u c t of two f a c t o r s , 
the sum of a v a i l a b l e means i n c l u d i n g the s t r e n g t h of 
49 the t r oops and t h e i r arms p l u s t h e w i l l to f i g h t . 
The contending groups may go about t h i s i n many ways 
- g e n e r a l l y mob i l i z i ng t h e i r r e s o u r c e s , i n s t i l l i n g 
suppo r t fo r t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e causes and t r y i n g to 
impai r confidence and w i l l w i t h i n the adver sa ry 
e s t a b l i s h m e n t . Whatever they may do more b u t a s an 
e s s e n t i a l element of w a r f a r e , they must b r i n g v i o l e n c e 
to wear down each o t h e r . They can b r i n g v i o l e n c e in Ways 
g e n e r a l l y known today as conven t iona l and unconvent iona l 
b u t a t the p r a c t i c a l p l a i n the demarca t ing l i n e between 
48 , Char les w. Thayer, in " I n t r o d u c t i o n " , G u e r r i l l a , 
Harper & Row p u b l i s h e r s , London, 1967. 
49 . I b i d . 
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them i s exceedingly tenous and imprecise. This is 
probably because of the reason t h a t every warfare i s 
the province of uncer ta inty and unpred ic t ab i l i t y and 
unconventional warfare i s i t s i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n . However, 
for the purpose of c l a r i t y and understanding we wi l l 
t ry to draw demarcating l i n e s between them. 
Unconventional warfare in addi t ion to some of i t s 
(Oddesities, i s founded on many of the same p r inc ip l e s 
t h a t Clausewitz propounded for other warfares . The most 
famous of these p r inc ip l e s i s h is very popular statement 
t ha t war i s nothing but the cont inuat ion of p o l i t i c a l 
in tercourse with a mixture of other means. This i s said 
t h a t warfare, whether conventional or unconventional, i s 
unmanageable apar t from ru les by which we recognise what 
behaviour i s appropriate to i t and define our a t t i t u d e s 
towards i t . This complexity makes the dividing l i n e s 
between conventional and unconventional warfare very t h i n . 
Conventional warfare i s b a s i c a l l y a pos i t iona l warfare 
which generally takes place where adversar ies possess an 
50, Morris Greenspan, o p . c l t , , 0 , 3 1 , See a l so Samuel p, 
Huntington, " In t roduc t ion" ' in Franklin M, osanka, (Ed.) Modern Guer r i l l a Warfare, The Fre^ Press , 
New York, 1971, p , x v i i i . 
51 , Geoffery Best, Humanity in warfare, Weidenfold & 
Nicolson, London, 1981,p.1 , "" 
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a p p r o p r i a t e p a r i t y of s t r e n g t h , o r g a n i s a t i o n i n f r a -
s t r u c t u r e based on a f ixed t e r r i t o r y ; whereas 
unconvent iona l warfare t akes p lace where a d v e r s a r i e s 
p o s s e s s g r e a t d i s p a r i t i e s in s t r e n g t h and c a p a b i l i t i e s 
52 
- whether in men, r e s o u r c e s or o r g a n i s a t i o n b a s e . 
Convent ional war fa re focuses i t s a t t e n t i o n on m i l i t a r y 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s in terms of l and , sea and a i r o p e r a t i o n s 
which t o g r e a t e x t e n t in our t imes a r e dependant upon 
the use of heavy armaments, t a n k s , a r t i l l e r y , a i r c r a f t 
e t c . In unconvent ional warfare such arms a r e used which 
53 
could, easily be carried out by its perpetuators. Both 
conventional and unconventional warfares differ in terms 
of organisation, armament, equipments, supply, tactics, 
command, in conception of the terms front and rear; in 
54 
the matter of military responsibilities. Conventibnal 
warfare usually involves the crossing of international 
borders. In contrast to this, unconventional warfare 
generally takes place entirely within the boundaries 
of a single state, in conventional warfare, the defeated 
adversary state is usually occupied by the victorious 
55 state , whereas this is not commonly heard in case of 
52. John Howell, "Unconventional and Revolutionary Warfare," 
International Relations, Vol,111,No,4, op.cit,1967,p,296, 
53. A.H. Sollom, "No where yet Every where" in Franklin 
M, Osanka (Ed.) , Modern Guerrilla Warfare, The free Press, 
1971, New York, p.21. 
54. Mao Tse-tung, Guerrilla warfare. Translated by Samuel 
B. Griffith, Cassell, LonHon,1963,p.38. 
5b. Virgil Ney, op.cit., p.67. 
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unconventional warfare. Conventional soldiers with 
heavy equipment in field formation tend to cluster 
together centralizing their power on terrain that 
allows rapid movement. They generally rely on roads, 
consider cities and economic establishments as vital 
targets to defend. In combat, rigid adherence to the 
principles of concentration keeps units at unwiedly 
battalion or even regimental levels usually with 
enormous stress on holding land rather than destroying 
57 
enemy forces. The principle of concentration and 
defense of land in unconventional warfare is considered 
not so vital as in case of conventional warfare, because 
unconventional soldiers fight in such a way that avoids 
rigid contact with the enemy. They attack surprisingly, 
58 
and then suddenly we see total parsivity. The adversary 
thinks that the things have returned to normalcy then 
suddenly a fresh blow lands from a new direction. They 
always avoid to attack the targets where they think the 
enemy is capable of striking back. The theatre of 
unconventional warfare is always the rear of the enemy. 
56, Roger Hilsman, "internal War: The New Communist Tactic" 
in T.N. Greene (Ed.) The Guerrilla and How to Fight Him 
Praeger, New York, 1962, p,2l. "" 
57, Ibid. 
58, CheQueuara, Guerrilla Warfare, Translated by Harries 
Clichy Paterson, Cassell, London, 1963, p,118. 
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In con t ras t to the r i g i d i t y in conventional warfare, 
the unconventional so l ide r s invent t h e i r own t a c t i c s 
for each moment of b a t t l e and cons tan t ly surpr ise the 
enemy. 
The important d i s t i n c t i v e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of both 
warfare is tha t the s t ra tegy of unconventional warfare 
lacks a log ica l procedure which can be an t i c ipa ted and 
59 thwarted by the enemy. Whereas in conventional warfare 
there i s a logical order , unconventional warfare r e l y s , 
extremely, on decent ra l i sed organisa t ion and highly 
f l ex ib le s t r a t egy . The order of procedure in conventional 
welfare is s t ra tegy , t a c t i c s , and weapon requirements and 
in unconventional warfare the order i s p r a c t i c a l l y reversed. 
In unconventional warfare the a v a i l a b i l i t y of weapons and 
tc ' c t i ca l p o s s i b i l i t i e s plan the s t r a t egy . 
The difference a l so l i e s between the s t r a t e g i e s 
of both warfares. The s t ra tegy of unconventional warfare 
i s unlike tha t employed in conventional v-erfare as the 
t a c t i c s of former i s constant a c t i v i t y and movement. In 
conventional warfare the a t tacking pa r ty , as a well known 
60 
59, Virgil Ney, "Guerrilla Warfare and Modem Strategy" 
in Franklin M. Osanka (Ed.) Modern Guerrilla Warfare, 
The Free Press, New York, 1971, p.97, 
60, J.K, Jawodny, "Guerrilla and Sabotage: Organisation, 
Operations, Motivations, Escalations", The Annals 
Vol. 341, May 1962, p.11. 
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rule of tactics, must concentrate his forces in order 
to be stronger than his opponent at the moment of 
64 
conflict. The strategy of conventional warfare is 
both defensive and offensive. Unconventional warfare 
rests on the strategy of hit run - attacking while 
moving and moving while attacking. In this warfare 
it is not visible from which side the attack will be 
landed. The unconventional soldiers giving the impressions 
that they will attack from the east, attack from the west. 
They attack surprisingly and disperse surprisingly. They 
do it repeatedly without giving rest to the enemy. The 
strategy of unconventional warfare in over all perspective 
is defensive/ however, in terms of tactics is very offensive. 
In short, unconventional v;arfare is defensive in its 
character and offensive in its nature. Conventional and 
unconventional warfare differ in terms of strategy and 
tactics, the purpose of strategy and tactics in both 
warfares in its ultimate sense is the samei to wear 
down the enemy, 
of 
The ele-nent/mobility i s the general c h a r a c t e r i s t i c 
of both Warfare. But i t s a p p l i c a b i l i t y in unconventional 
warfare i s greater than in conventional warfare. 
62 
61, D.L. pal i t . War in the de te r ren t Age, The English 
Book Store , New Delhi,1966, p .1^2. 
52. Charles W. Thayer, og^c i t . 
63 , Mao Tse-tung, o p . c i t . , p . 4 1 . 
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There are differences a lso in terms of leadership 
and command. In unconventional warfare small units^ 
ac t ing independently play the p r inc ipa l r o l e and there 
must be no excessive in te r fe rence with t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s . 
In conventional warfare, p a r t i c u l a r l y , in a moving 
s i t ua t ion a ce r ta in degree of i n i t i a t i v e i s accorded to 
subordinates but in p r i nc ip l e the overa l l command i s 
c e n t r a l i s e d . This i s done because a l l un i t s and a l l 
supporting arms in a l l d i s t r i c t must coordinate to the 
64 h ighes t degree, in case of unconventional warfare, 
however, t h i s i s not generally heard. 
Conventional warfare i s a c l e a r cut a f f a i r in which 
regular troops f ight a t f ron t s . Unconventional warfare i s i 
warfare, chief ly charac te r i sed by the absence of fixed 
and rea r a reas , quick concentrat ion for act ion and immediate 
disengagement a f t e r f igh t ing . Conventional warfare i s the 
f igh t ing with concentrated troops of the regular army. In 
t h i s Warfare r e l a t i v e l y big forces are grouped and operated 
on a r e l a t i v e l y big forces are grouped and operated on a 
r e l a t i v e l y vast b a t t l e f i e ld , a t t ack ing the enemy where 
hs i s r e l a t i v e l y exposed, advancing deeply, then withdrawing 
swi f t ly . Such f ight ing i s charac te r i sed by extreme dynamism, 
i n i t i a t i v e , mobili ty and rap id i ty of decision in face of 
new s i t u a t i o n s . Unconventional warfare i s ba s i ca l l y a 
defensive warfare aga ins t a superior and well organised 
enemy and i t i s resor ted to by daring - ' i}«nds of men-civi l ian 
64, Mao, Tse-Tung, o p . c i t , , p . 3 9 
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and soldiers alike- who lack numbers,weapons and 
65 
equipments and whose creed i s to avoid open combat. 
Thus, we can say tha t unconventional warfare 
follows no r u l e s . Besides using violence i t r e so r t s 
to a l l possible t r i c k s , s t r a t e g i e s in -order to achieve 
des i red gools. In t h i s warfare, i t s i n s t i g a t o r s do not 
appear in the open. I t i s very f luid and amorphous and 
possesses within i t s e l f a very high degree of f l e x i b i l i t y 
and c r e a t i v i t y . 
65. D.K. P a l i t , o p . c i t . , p.119 
C h a p t e r - I l l 
TYPOLOGY AND TACTICS OF UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE 
U n c o n v e n t i o n a l w a r f a r e i s a s o l d a s t h e h i l l s and a s 
c o n t e m p o r a r y a s t h e v e r y d a y . We f o u g h t i t i n t h e p a s t ; we 
a r e f i g h t i n g i t even toe a y . I t h a s b e e n , t h r o u g h o u t t h e 
h i s t o r y , a v e r y f l u i d and amorphous w a r f a r e which p o s s e s s e s 
w i t h i n i t s e l f v e r y h i g h d e g r e e of f l e x i b i l i t y and c r e a t i v i t y , 
which f o l l o w s no p a r t i c u l a r p a t t e r n and p r o c e d u r e , which h a s 
t h e r e c o r d of r e c o u r s e t o a l l p o s s i b l e means , t r i c k s , 
s t r a t a g e m s and t a c t i c s . I t s c o n s p i c o u s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c i s 
t h a t i t h a s a lways b e e n t h e c h o i c e of m i l i t a r i l y weak, s h o r t 
of c o n f r o n t i n g a s u p e r i o r and b e t t e r o r g a n i s e d enemy i n t h e 
open combat - who used i t a s an i n s t r u m e n t f o r b r i n g i n g 
v i o l e n c e a g a i n s t t h e enemy in o r d e r t o o b l i t r a t e him b a s i n g 
t h e i r m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n s on t h e h i t - and - run t a c t i c s . 
Such t a c t i c s were used f o r e x a m p l e , by Emperor Hang o f t h e 
Han d y n a s t y a g a i n s t t h e Miao d y n a s t y u n d e r t h e l e a d e r s h i p 
of T s i Yao i n a b o u t 3 , 6 0 0 B . C . , and by a Roman G e n e r a l 
F a b i u s who r e c o g n i s i n g t h e H a n n i b a l s s u p e r i o r i t y i n men 
and c a v a l r y t o o k t o h i l l s , r e f u s i n g t o f i g h t i n open , 
c o n f i n e d h i s a c t i v i t i e s t o u n d e r g r o u n d and r a i d s by n i g h t . 
They were used i n t h e p e l o p o n n e s i a n War b e t w e e n 431 a n d 
404 B . C . and i n S p a n i s h P e n i n s u l a r War from 1808 t o 1 8 1 4 . 
1 , J o h n B a y l i s and o t h e r s . Con tempora ry s t r a t e g y , Croom Helm. 
London , 1 9 8 7 , p . 2 1 0 . 
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After the Spanish Peninsula-War, s imi la r t a c t i c s 
were used by the Greeks agains t the Ottoman Empire 
(1812-27), in Mexican City Campaigns (1847), in the 
American Civil War (1861-65) and in the Boer War 
2 
(1898-1902) as well as in numerous other campaigns. 
Unconventional t r a c t i c s have always been used but i t i s 
in t h i s century, p a r t i c u l a r l y a f t e r the World War I I , 
tha t i t s use has become widespread. This is the s ta rk fac t 
tho t the newspapers br ing us every week. 
We have been wr i t ing about unconventional warfare 
since we s t a r t ed wri t ing about warfare i t s e l f . There were 
t h e o r i s t s and p r a c t i t i o n p r s of unconventional warfare in 
the long pas t . There are t h e o r i s t s and prac t ioners of i t 
in the present time. Various scholars have wr i t t en about 
i t . The pzomlnent among them are sun Tzu, Karl Von c lausewitz , 
T,E, Lawrence, Mao Tse-Tunn, Che Guevara, Vo Nguyen Giap 
and Carlos Mavighella. I t was a Chinese t a c t i c i a n and 
mi l i ta ry h i s t o r i an . Sun Tzu who percept ively analysed 
unconventional warfare in some drpth in h is study, 'The 
3 Art of War', in about s ix th century B.C. The Modem theory 
of unconventional v/arfarc wqs largely developed by Karl Von 
Clusewitz in the chapter of 'On War' e n t i t l e d 'Arming the 
2, Ib id , 
3. Sun Teu, The Art of War, Translated by S,B, G r i f f i t h , 
Oxford University Press , 1963, 
u 
4 Nation* but real milestone in the evolut ion of 
unconventional warfare come with T.E, Lawrence's 
c mpaigns agains t the Turks in the F i r s t World War 
who reduced unconventiotial warfare to a s e t of p r inc ip les 
and a r t i c u l a t e d c lea r ly the nature of the t a c t i c s he used 
in his campaigns against the Turks, These scholars have 
dea l t with unconventional warfare to a g rea te r ex ten t , 
described the conditions and s i t u a t i o n s under which i t 
can be i n i t i a t e d and sus ta ined, analysed both the techniques, 
aiiTis and objec t ives , and l imi t a t i ons of unconventional 
warfare bu t , in fact , i t was Mao Tse-tung who developed in 
great deal , more depth and s o p h i s t i c a t i o n , the ideas of 
Sun Tzu, clausewitz and Lawrence and blended them with h i s 
own expereince in to a r e l a t i v e l y coherent and systematic 
body of p o l i t i c o - m i l i t a r y theory. The theory developed bj 
Mao-Tse-tung became the bas i s of the wr i t i ngs of the most 
4, Karl Von Clausewitz, On war. Translated by O.J. Matthi js 
J o l i e s , Modern Library Book, New York, 1943. See a l so 
Klaus Knorr, "Unconventional warfare: Strategy and Tactics 
in In te rna l P o l i t i c a l S t r i f e " , The Annals, Vol.341, May, 
1962, P.54. 
5, T.E, Lawrence, the Seven p i l l a r s of Wisdom, penguin, 
London, 1962, 
6, Mao Tse-tung, Selected Mi l i ta ry Wri t ings , Foreign Language 
Press , Peking, 1962, See a lso Mao Tie- tung. Guerr i la 
warfare, ' t ranslated by S.B, Samuel, Casse l l , London, 1963, 
and John Baylis , Op. C i t . , P.211. 
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contemporary wr i t e r s l i k e Vo Nguyen Giap^ ^he Guvevara 
and Carlos Marighella, 
^he f i f s t ser ious attempt to synthesize the various 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of unconventional warfare was made by Karl 
Von Clausewitz who t r ea ted i t solely on i t s operat ional 
7 
mer i t s . He described unconventional warfare as "a peop le ' s 
Q 
war" one which depends on the int imate support of the 
population at l a rge , "o said t ha t "a peop le ' s war should, 
l ike a kind of nebulous vapary esSence, nowhere condense 
9 in to a sol id body". He fur ther defined unconventional 
warfare as "a slow gradual f i r e " , Clausewitz considred 
unconventional operations which he said "must not at tempt 
to crunch the core, they must only n ibble a t the surface and 
the edges" - as a weapon of s t r a t i g i c defence e/en thoagl) 
t h e i r actual t a c t i c s were almost e n t i r e l y of offensive 
ac t ions such as ra ids and ambushes aid seldem a defensive 
b a t t l e . Before Clausewitz unconventional w<arfare was 
considered purely a mi l i t a ry phenomenon, but i t was he who 
injected in i t the p o l i t i c a l overtones which a l t e r ed i t 
charac te r r«tdically. 
7. D.K. pal i t . War in the Deterrent Age, The English Book 
Store , New Delhi, 1966,p.10. ~ 
8 . Karl Von Clausewitz, on War .Translated by O.J, Mat th i j s 
J o l l e s , New York, 1943, p .457. 
9 . I b i d . , p . 4 5 9 . 
10. Karl Von Clausewitz, On War, Washington,D.C. ,1950,p.458. 
1 1 . Karl Von Clausewitz, on War, Translated by O.J. Mathijs 
J o l e s , o p . c i t . , p .459. 
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After the Clausewitz, the serious treatment to 
unconventional warfare wa given by a British soldier 
T.E, Lawrence who practiced it against the Turks in 
the First World War and outlined in his book 'The 
Seven Pillars of Wisdom' most of the basic principles 
of it. In his book he describes unconventional warfare 
in terms of "an influence, an idea, a thing intangible, 
invulnerable, without front or back, drifting about like 
a gas," He sa*f the problem of his war in terms of three 
categories of related variables. "The algebraical element 
of things, a bilogical elemtn of lives, and psychological 
12 
elemtn of ideas". In so doing he was moving away from 
the traditional notion of unconventional warfare as a 
purely military phenomenon, and, like Karl Von Clausewitz, 
he put more stress on the political dimension of such 
conflict. 
These sholars have wr i t ten about unconventional 
warfare. However, the c r ed i t to develope a systematic 
theory of unconventional warfare goes to Mao Tse-tung, 
Mao s t a r t s with the assiimption -that supreme form of s t ruggle 
i s war and in war no body f ights according to the terms and 
12, T.E, Lawrence, The Seven P i l l a r s of tfisdon, penguin, 
London, 1962, pp.197-198. See also D. G a m e t t , ( E d ) , 
The Essent ia l T.E. Larence,Jonathan Cape, London,1951, 
p799. 
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condit ions of the enemy. What Mao evolved was a s t r a t egy 
13 which, as he saw i t , played to the enemy weakness. 
concept 
In a broader/Mao conceives mi l i t a ry po ten t i a l in 
terms of six main component: three of them tangible and 
14 three i n t a g i b l e . The tangib les are the weapon system 
tha t includes a l l types of mi l i t a ry equipmenti the l o g i t i c a l 
system and manpower. The in t ag ib l e s are the s t r a t e g i c 
concept of space, time and the wi l l to f i gh t , Mao, lacking 
in China, i n t ang i l e components, p a r t i c u l a r l y the weapon 3 
system and l o g i s t i c s , concentrated on in tangib le components 
of space, time and w i l l which together with manpower, were 
h i s main resources . Thinking on these l i n e s Mao developed 
a theory of unconventional warfare which he termed as 
p ro t rac ted warfare which possesses through three phases 
15 of i t s development. 
The f i r s t phase, in which unconventional f igh te r s 
remaining on defensive, c rea te the condi t ions for the 
second phase explo i t ing the manpower and the space to 
prolong the s t a t e of war to a near permanent conception, was 
termed by Mao-tung as s t r a t e g i c defensive. During the f i r s t 
phase in which the enemy holds the s t r a t e g i c i n i t i a t i v e . 
13,E,L. Katzenback, J r , "Time, space and wil ls The P o l i t i c s 
and Mi l i ta ry Views of Mao Tse-tung", in T,N. Greene,(Ed.) , 
The Guer r i l l a and How to Fight Him, Praeger, New York,p,14 
14. D.K. p a l i t , 0£j_cit., p.124. 
15. William V, O'Brien, The Conduct of J u s t and Limited War, 
Praeger, New York, 1981,p. iS^ S"! 
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unconventional f ighters prepare themselves for the second 
phase, weakening the eneymy through ambushes, r a i d s , 
1 fi 
assass ina t i on e t c . 
The second phase begins when the enemy stops h i s 
advance and concentrates on holding t e r r i t o r y and 
17 consol idat ing his gains . This phase i s the period of 
s to lemate . During t h i s phgse, the in ten t ion is to be 
prepared for the l a s t phase by bui lding up stocks of 
captured equipment, organis ing bas ic i n d u s t r i e s and 
c rea t ing a rudimentary l o g i s t i c a l systme. Since, in Mao's 
theory t h i s process i s i nev i t ab l e , there i s no hurry . The 
War, therefore , goes on which proves cheep for the 
unconventional f ighter and expensive for the enemy in 
18 c a s u l t i e s , equipment and f inaces . 
The th i rd phase i s entered only when i t is ce r tq ln 
tha t the decision wi l l be favourable for unconventional 
f i g h t e r s , in t h i s phase, unconventional warfare aims at 
o b l i t r a t i n g the enemy through stepped-up unconventional 
oj jerat ions. The unconventional operat ions gradually 
t r a n s i t to conventional offensives . I f theire i s any chance 
of defeat , the warfare rever ts i t s e l f to phase tv;o again; 
16, D,K. P a l i t , op, c i t . , p . 126. 
17, George K, "^anhon. Communist Revolutionary Warfare, 
Methven and Co. Ltd,^ London, 1962, p . l l . 
18, D.K. p a l i t , OP .c i t . , P,126. 
i f the affensive opens succussfully and moves towards 
i t s hoped culmination, i t i s the unconventional offensive 
tlvt becomes supplementary and conventional forms of 
warfare become the main t a c t i c s , ^ 
The main inference of Mao's theory of unconventional 
warfare i s t h a t a decis ion must be avoided a t a l l cos ts 
regard less of how long a s t a t e of warfare may l a s t , 
Mao in h i s theory has almost el iminated the defeat . The 
aim of his theory is to continue the. s t a t e of warfare 
so tha t unconventional f igh te r s may r e t r e a t in space and 
advance in t ime. The p e c u l i a r i t y of his theory i s tha t 
re t rogress ion i s poss ible t h a t a war may s l i p back to any 
phase as well as i t can s l i p forward. 
I t i s the f l e x i b i l i t y of Mao's theory of warfare 
tha t he f e l t confident of matching even the most mater ia l ly 
Superior adversary. If the commitment i s l imited and there 
appears to be a reasonable prospect for a quick dec is ion , 
regular 
a/offensive is launched - t h a t i s , s t a r t with phase t h r e e . 
On the other hadn if the enemy is known to be overwhelmingly 
super ior for open confrontment, the armed s t rugg le s t a r t s 
with phase one in the confidence tha t the phase one would 
eventual ly lead to the phase of s ta lemate and a t t r i t i o n . 
19, Ib id , 
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a f t e r t h a t i t would be merely a matter of time and 
patience before phase three i s launched. In t h i s theory 
of v;arfare there i s no room for fa i lu re because the 
cycle can always be reversed, 
The problem with unconventional warfare i s how 
to keep i t going, "'"he ob jec t ive , however, in ear ly 
days of the conf l i c t , i s to avoid mi l i t a ry dec is ion . 
During the per iod , the emphasis is put on h i t and run 
t a c t i c s in order tt) l ive to f ight another day. The 
problem with Mao was how to organise "space to y ie ld 
t ime". Summing up these c h a r a c t e r i s t i c fea tu res . 
General Giap defines unconventional warfare as "a 
form of f ight ing by the masses of a weak and, bafliy 
equipped country agains t an aggressive army with b e t t e r 
equipment and techniques. Guer r i l l as r e l y on heroic s p i r i t 
to triumph over modern weapons, avoiding the enemy when 
he i s s t ronger and a t tack ing him when he i s weaker, now 
regrouping, now wearing out, now exterminating the enemy, 
they are determined to f igh t every where so tha t wherever 
the enemy goes he is submerged in a sea of arined people 
who h i t back a t him, thus , undermining h i s s p i r i t and 
21 
exhausting h i s forces , in Clap 's descr ip t ion of 
20, See E.L, Katzenback, o p , c i t , 
21 . Vo Nguyen Giap, People ' s War, Peoples ' s Army, Pr?eger, 
New York, 1962,p,48, 
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unconventional warfare the emphasis i s put on the 
pro t rac ted nature of the c o n f l i c t . This emphasis which 
Mao put on the fundamental importande of unconventional 
warfare i s shared by most of other w r i t e r s of unconventional 
22 
warfare. What ever the environment of the c o n f l i c t or 
the method of development, according to most of unconventional 
t h e o r i s t s the unconventional warfare i s s p l i t in to a number 
of three s t r a t e g i c phases. In the f i r s t , the s t r a t e g i c 
defensive or conspiracy phase; the unconventional f igh te r s 
bui ld up the foundations for the warfare, e s t ab l i sh ing and 
expanding t h e i r p o l i t i c a l and mi l i ta ry i n f r a - s t r u c t u r e , 
buiding up popular support through smal l -scale r a i d s , 
capturing weapons to conduct the c o n f l i c t . In the second, 
the s t r a t e g i c stalemate or equil ibrium phase, the insurgents 
continue to expand t h e i r organisa t ional i n f r a s t ruc tu re and 
concentrate on unconventional t a c t i c s to wear down the 
enemy and redress the balance of forces . Once the process 
of consol idat ion and bu i ld ing up of unconventional forces 
has taken place, the phase of s t r a t e g i c counter - offensive 
i s reached, when the focus of unconventional operat ions 
changes to mobile warfare, and the enemy i s defeated in 
23 
conventional pitched b a t t l e s . In o ther words, a forceful 
argument can be made t h a t unconventional warfare i s b a s i c a l l y 
22, John Baylis and o the r , o p . c i t . , p , 2 l 3 . 
23, I b i d , , pp,217-18. 
Oo 
a war of long duration 'the seeds of which ^ ke a long 
duration or time to germinate and the roots and tendrils 
spread silently underground long before there are any 
overt signs of the new plot. Then suddenly one day, like 
new wheat springing up in a cultivated field there is a 
blaze of color, an overnight growth: the rebells are 
24 
there and every where. The over all strategy of unconven-
tional warfare is to avoid positional fighting in order to 
avoid the quick decisions and prorogue the warfare, it is 
in this sense that txnconventional warfare is called the 
warfare that has no visible fronts or fronts at all. It 
is not a warfare of position but a warfare of detachment 
that does not concentrate on immediate yieldings of the 
warfare but on prolonging it. This is probably the most 
distinguishing feature of unconventional warfare. Unconven-
tional warfare contrives to prolong the warfare and in 
reverse conventional warfare concerns itself with hew to 
win a war. 
The development of a theory of unconventional warfare 
has long history. It has become very complex phenomenon as 
its evolution has been towards the multiplicity of means 
and complexity of methods since long. Different scholars 
24, R, Taber, The War of the Flea, paladin, London, 1962, 
p.48. 
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have g i v e n i t d i f f e r e n t names such a s i r r e g u l a r w a r f a r e , 
u n o r t h o d o x w a r f a r e , u n d e r g r o u n d w a r f a r s , p a r t i s a n w a r f a r e , 
low i n t e n s i t y w a r f a r e e t c . A l l t h e s e n o m e n c l a t u r e s c r e a t e 
t h e l i n g u i s t i c c o n f u s i o n amd make t h e s t u d y a t r o u b l e s o m e 
t a s k . 
There a r e b a s i c a l l y f o u r t y p e s of u n c o n v e n t i o n a l 
w a r f a r e - r e v o l u t i n o a r y W a r f a r e , i n s u r g e n c y , g u e r r i l l a 
w a r f a r e , and t e r r o r i s m . Be f o r e a t t e m p t i n g t o d e f i n e and 
d e s c r i b e them, i t i s i m p e r a t i v e t o p o i n t o u t t h a t a good 
d e a l o f c o n c e p t u a l c o n f u s i o n e x i s t s i n t h e e x i s t i n g c o r p u s 
of l i t e r a t u r e on t h e s e t y p e s of w a r f a r e , i n l a r g e r p a r t , 
t h i s i s due t o t he lac)c of g e n e r a l a g r e e m e n t on t h e 
d e f i n i t i o n s of r e v o l u t i o n a r y w a r f a r e , i n s u r g e n c y , g u e r r i l l a 
w a r f a r e and t e r r o r i s m . As a r e s u l t , i t i s n o t uncommon t o 
f i n d t h e s e t e r m s / i m p r e c i s e l y , i n d d i s c r i m i n a t e j y and some-
t i m e s i n t e r c h a n g e a b l y ^ Very o f t e n t h e l i t e r a t u r e on t h e 
S u b j e c t p a r t i c u l a r l y g u e r r i l l a w a r f a r e i s used I n t e r c h a n g e a b l y 
w i t h i n s u r g e n c y and r e v o l u t i o n a r y w a r f a r e a s though t h e y 
25 
a r e synonymous . 
The o t h e r t r o u b l i n g t h i n g w i t h u n c o n v e n t i o n a l w a r f a r e 
i s t h * w i t h i n i t s pu rv i ew v a r i o u s k i n d s of v i o l e n c e l i k e 
coup d ' e t a t , r i o t s , s a b o t a g e , r e v o l t , h i j a k i n g , h o s t a g e -
2 5 , J o h n B a y l i s and o t h e r s , o p , c l t , p , 2 1 1 . 
oS 
taking, kidnapping, bombing e t c , have been included. 
We know tha t unconvetional warfare i s ba s i ca l ly a 
pro t rac ted warfare which does not aim a t the immidiate 
r e s u l t s of the warfare bu t r a the r concentrates on 
prolonging the war. The above mentioned kinds of violence 
are of general ly shor t duration which aim a t the quick 
and immOiiate r e su l t s and, therefore , have been excluddd 
excluded from th i s study, 
Tn view of these unhappy s i t u a t i o n s and cricumstances 
the study of unconventional warfare in general and i t s 
typology in p a r t i c u l a r creates .problems for those i n t e r e s t e d 
in the systematic and r a t i ona l s tudies of the problem. To 
understarid the d is t inguish ing features of types of 
unconvetional warfare there i s need fo define them as 
ca re fu l ly and prec ise ly as poss ib le . 
In the present century, unconventional warfare has 
assumed an enhanced importance as an instrument of i n t e r r a c t i o n 
26 
and revolu t ion . To define revolutionary warfare we have 
to understand the meaning of revolu t ion . Various scholars 
have looked upon revolut ion from d i f f e r en t points of view. 
26, John Hcwel, "unconventional and Revolutionary Warfare", 
In te rna t iona l felations. Vol,111, No.4, oc t , 1967, P,297. 
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To Chalmers Johnson, revolution involves "a sweeping, 
fundamental change in political organisation, social 
structure, economic property control, and the predominant 
myth of social order, thus indicating a major break in the 
27 
cont inu i ty of development. Revolution in t h i s sense 
therefore i s a generic term encompassing a l l of those 
d i f f e r en t means by which non-governmental groups within 
a s t a t e attempt to capture power and e s t a b l i s h new p o l i t i c a l , 
soc ia l and economic s t r u c t u r e s . Revolutionary warfare i s 
used to describe a p a r t i c u l a r var ie ty of revolut ionary 
act ion t h a t involves a pro t rac ted s t ruggle in which 
unconventional t a c t i c s are combined with psychological 
and p o l i t i c a l operations to produce a new ideoloa ica l 
28 system or p o l i t i c a l s t r u c t u r e . Revolutionary warfare 
mav be defined as a muXtifacete^.activity in which c o n f l i c t 
takes place on d i f f e ren t planes , very often simultaneously. 
One w r i t e r on the subjec t has coined the phrase fourth 
dimension warfare to d i s t ingu i sh the fundamental d i f ferences 
29 
between the conventional and revolut ionary warfare^ 
27, Chalmers Johnson, Revolution and the Social System , 
However I n s t i t u t e , Stanford press"^ 1964, For the 
Ful le r ana lys i s of the term revolut ion See M. Rejai, 
The Strategy of P o l i t i c a l Revolution, Anchor Press , 
New York, 1973, Chap te r , I . 
28, John Baylis and o ther , o p . c i t , , pp.111-112, 
29, Michael E l l i o t - Bateman, (Ed.) , The Fourth Dimension 
of warfare, Manchester University Press , Manchester,1970, 
For de ta i l ed discussion of di f ferences between conventional 
and revolut ionary warfare s e e , p , p a r e t , "The J'rench Array 
and La Guerre Revolut ionaire , Journal of Royal uni ted 
Service I n s t i t u t i o n . V o l . 104,Feb,19^9,p.59. 
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Conventional warfare concentrates on mi l i t a ry 
considerat ion in terms of land, sea and a i r opera t ions . 
Revolutionary warfare, on the other hand, i s concerned 
much more with fourth dimension of warfare - p o l i t i c a l 
economic, socia l and c u l t u r a l which weigh more in the 
scales of v ic tory than mate r i a l . This view of the warfare 
h igh l igh t s the d i f f e ren t planes on which c o n f l i c t takes 
place and demonstrates the e s s e n t i a l q u a l i t a t i v e difference 
between conventional m i l i t a r y operat ions and revolut ionary 
opera t ions . Extending t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a l i t t l e fu r ther , 
a number of d i f fe ren t b a t t l e f r o n t s of revolut ionary warfare, 
each of which i s supplementary to the others and each designed 
to cont r ibute to the achievement of the overr iding revolu t ion-
ary ob jec t ive , can be i d e n t i f i e d . These b a t t l e - f r o n t s include 
the p o l i t i c a l , s oc i a l , economic, psychological and i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
planes on which the s t ruggle for power between the revolu t ion-
ary forces and those of the a u t h o r i t i e s and i t s supporters 
takes p lace , 
A revolut ionary warfare i s never confined within the 
bonds of mi l i t a ry ac t ion because i t s purpose i s to des t roy 
an e x i s t i n g system. I t i s to say t h a t a revolut ionary warfare 
i s t ha t warfare whose fundamental object ive i s revo lu t ion . 
30. Giap has sys temat ica l ly analysed the d i f fe ren t battlf^ 
f ronts of revolut ionary warfare. See VO Nguyens Giap,re 
o p . c i t , , pp.97-98. 
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The word insurgency or insurgent in some pa r t of 
the ea r th has a venerable and long es tab l i shed meaning 
and connotation of f igh t ing for freedom, l i b e r t y and 
31 abolishment of tyranny. Insurgency^ according to d i c t iona ry 
meaning , is a r i s ing up rebe l l ion or i n t u r r e c t i o n . Broad 
E. O'Neil has defined it as an s t ruggle between a non-rul ing 
group and the ru l ing a u t h o r i t i e s in which the former 
conciously employed p o l i t i c a l resources and instruments 
of violence to e s t ab l i sh legit imacy for some aspect of 
32 the p o l i t i c a l system i t considers i l l e g i t i m a t e , Scott 
has defined insurgency as "effor t to obtain p o l i t i c a l 
goals by an organisat ion and pr imari ly indigenous group 
(or groups) using pro t rac ted i r r e g u l a r warfare and a l l i e d 
33 p o l i t i c a l techniques. I t could be said tha t insurgency 
i s a irebellion or insur rec t ion to weaken, modify or replace 
an e x i s t i n g governmental au thor i ty through the p ro t rac ted 
use of force by an organised group of indigenous outs ide 
the e s t ab l i shed governmental s t r u c t u r e . 
31 . J.K, Zawodny, "Guerr i l la and Sabotage: Organisation 
opera t ions . Motivat ions, Esca la t ions" , The Annals, Vo«341, 
May 1962, p .18 . 
32. Broad E .o . 'Ne i l , "Insurgency: A frame work for Analysis" 
in Broad E.o. 'Ne i l , William R. Heaten and Donald j . Albert , 
(Ed.) Insurgency in Modern World, Westviews p ress , 
colarado, 1980, p . 1 
33 . Andrew M, Scott , Insurgency, Universi ty of North Cal i fornia 
Press , Chapel H i l l , 1970,p,5, 
The terro q u e r r i l l a w a r f a r e i s c o m p a r a t i v e l y new 
b u t a s a form of w a r f a r e i t i s a s o l d a s t h e w a r f a r e 
i t s e l f . The term ' g u e r r i l l a * w h i c h , l i t e r a l l y means s m a l l 
w a r f a r e , was o r g i n a l l y used t o d e s c r i b e t h e m i l t i a r y 
o p e r a t i o n s c a r r i e d o u t by t h p S a p n i s h armed c i v i l i a n 
a g a i n s t t h e French army i n P e n i n s u l a r w a r b e t w e e n 1 8 0 8 -
34 1814 , G u e r r i l l a s , a s t h e i r name i m p l i e s , e n g a g e i n t h e 
• l i t t l e w a r ' , a p r o t r a c t e d war of h i t - a n d - r u n , of 
i n n u m e r a b l e s k i r m i s h e s , o f c o u n t l e s s p i n p r i c k i n g a t t a c k s 
35 t h a t d r a i n t h e enemy' s l i f e b l o o d . i n E n c y c l o p e d i a 
B r i t a n n i c a , R o b e r t Asprey h a s d e f i n e d g u r r i l l a warfar in a s : 
g u e r r i l l a w a r f a r e i s a weapon of p r o t e s t employed t o 
r e c t i f y r e a l o r i m a g i n e d wrongs l e v i e d on a p e o p l e e i t h e r 
36 by a f o r e i a n i n v a d e r o r by t he r u l i n g g o v e r n m e n t , " 
To J u l i o n P a g e t , q u e r r i l l a w a r f a r e i s a form of 
W a r f a r e b a s e d on m o b i l e t a c t i c s used by s m a l l l i g h t i n g 
armed g r o u p s who aim t o h a r r a s t h e i r o p p o n e n t s r a t h e r t h a n 
37 t o d e f e a t them i.n b a t t l e . A r t i c l e 4 3 o f t h e Hague 
c o n v e n t i o n s on l a n d w a r f a r e h a s d e f i n e d a u e r r i l l a w a r f a r e 
a s a w a r f a r e empoyed by t h e w e a k e r f o r c e t o overcome t h e 
34 , W a l f e r L a q u e u r , G u e r r i l l a ; A H i s t d ) r i c a l and C r i t i c a l S t u d y , 
W e i d e n f e l d and N i c o l s o n , London, 1977 , S e e , p r e f a c e , 
3 5 , M o r r i s G r e e n s p a n , " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law and I t s P r o t e c t i o n 
f o r P a r t i c i p a n t s i n U n c o n v e n t i o n a l w a r f a r e " . The A n n a l s , 
V o l . 3 4 1 , May 1962 , p . 3 2 , 
3 6 , E n c y c l o p e d i a B r i t a n n i c a , P , 1 0 0 2 , 
3 7 , Brad E, O ' N e i l , W i l l i e i n ^ . Hea t en and Donald j . A l b e r t , 
( E d . ) I n s u r g e n c y i n Modem World West View P r e s s , C o l a r a d o , 
1 9 3 0 . P . 5 . " ' 
Ou 
' d i sc ip l ine , the a r t of war i s confinrd to the mi l i tpry 
63 
aspec t . I t IS, therefore , insurgency, g u e r r i l l a 
warfare and terrorisin are not waged only, 
on mi l i t a ry fronts but on various fronts l ike p o l i t i c a l , 
economic osychological, propaganda e t c . This cr*-ats a 
b lur r ing s i t u a t i o n . 
There are some s i m i l a r i t i e s and di f ferences among 
these froms of warfare. The intermingleness d)f these 
v/arfare a t the operat ional level makes dividing l ine 
very thin and i l l u s i v e . Nothing with ce r t a in ty could be 
said about these for^ s of warfare as they appear to follow 
no p a r t i c u l a r pa t tern or procedure. War as a whole belongs 
to province of uncer ta in ty and unp red i c t ab i l i t y . This 
s i t u a t i o n in unconventional warfare i s more i n t e n s i f i e d . 
The p r i n c i p l e s of these foarms of warfare have become in 
recent times so erjmeshed that they seem inseparable . 
63. Norm&n D. Palmer, Howard Perkins, In t e rna t iona l Relat ion: 
Tfie World Corrmunitv in Transl t ion,~C.B.S. Publ ishers , 
Delhi, 1985, P.186, See a lso C o J l i o r ' s Encyclopelda/Vol*23, 
Macmillan Education Company, New York, P. 233, 
0:lr 
38 the s t ronqer and b e t t e r organised opponent. Che 
Ernesto Guevara has charac te r i sed g u e r r i l l a warfare 
as a war of the masses, a war of the people, i t may 
be said t h a t q u e r r i l l a warfare i s a form of armed 
s t ruggle bas i ca l ly by indigenous m i l i t a r i l y weak people 
usually without se iz ing and defnding s u b s t a n t i a l land 
areas and using hi t -and-run t a c t i c s aga ins t the super ior 
and b e t t e r organised enemy. 
Terrorism i s a very complex phenomenon. I t has 
almost as many views as there are scho la r s , M^re than 
hundred de f in i t ions have been developed by academicians, 
40 p o l i t i c a l organisa t ions and governmental agencies, but 
none has ye t been accepted universa l ly . This i s , probably, 
because of the reason t h a t ' t e r ro r i sm i s an extremely 
emotional issup and the person defining and describing 
i t inadver tent ly i n j ec t h i s own value judgements in to 
4 1 the d e f i n i t i o n . Therefore the de f in i t i on of ter ror ism 
38. C, Aubrey Dixon and o t to Heilbrun. Con-munist Gue r r i l l a 
warare, Fredrick A, preeger Publ isher7 New York, 195J7 
P.59T~ 
39. '^he Erensto Guevara, G_uerrilla warfare. Translated by 
J . P . Morray, Wintage Books, New York, 1968, P .3 . 
40. William A, Greenshaw, "Civil Aviation: Target for 
Terorism", The Annals, ^ol .498, Ju ly 1988, P ,61 . 
41 . IDR Research Team, "Punjab p ro f i l e of a Te r ro r i s t 
movement" Indian ^efence Review V O I . T I NO,2, January, 
1987, P.121. 
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42 in value free language is next to impossible. However 
the impertive is to try to define terrorism in value 
free language to the extent possible, 
Terrorims is a brutal undeclared^ clandestine 
43 
and lethal form of unconventional warfare. Terrorism 
like other forms of unconvetional warfare is the weapon 
of militarily weak, short of confronting the enemy 
44 
conventionally. Terrorism interestingly is consistent w 
with the essence of classical military strategy, the 
45 efficacious use of force to achieve a desired policy. 
To many scholars terrorism has clearly becomes a form of 
46 
warfare, , Yay Mallin was of the view that war is an 
4 2. Robert Kupperman and ^ arrell Trent, Terrorism: Threat, 
Reality, Response, Hoover Institution Press, Stan?or3 
University, California, 1979, P. 15. 
43, P.N. Kathpalia, "Counter Measures Against Terrorism", 
Indian Defence Review, VolII.2., July 1987, P.66. 
44, Brian Jenkins, "International •'•errorisQ); Trend & potentij 
lities"_, santamonica California, Rand Corp, 1977, P.38, 
see also K, Subrahman, "Terrorism: To the forefront of 
the stage". Strategic Analysis, Vol, 10 No,3, June 1986, 
P,24 0 and Brian Crozier, The Rebels, Chatta & winds, 
London, 1960, P.159. 
45, I b i d . , P . 4 3 , 
46, Marie G, Warek, "Summary of the symposium on In t e rna t i ona l 
Terrorims in the Contemporary World, rjlassboro S ta te 
College 1976" in Marius H, Livingston with Lee Bruce and 
Marie G, Wanek, (Ed), In t e rna t iona l Terrorism in the 
Contemporary World, Green Wood Pres s , London, 19 78, P . 3 . 
To many scholars assebled in symposium terror ism where 
eluded the genera l iza t ion was considered a form of warfare. 
I t was asser ted t h a t so ld ie r s take over when diplomats f a i l 
and t e r r o r i s t s are so l ide r s doing b a t t l e in c i ty s t r e a t s . 
bo 
armed con f l i c t and armed conf l i c t i s the province of 
mil i tary* Terrorism i s a form of armed con f l i c t therefore 
i t i s in mi l i ta ry shpere. Terrorism is a psychological 
warfare because i t pub l i c i zes the t e r r o r i s t s p o l i t i c a l 
cause, demonstrates t h e i r c a p a b i l i t i e s , d ishear tens 
enemy, discourages a l l i e s . I t does mater ia l and economic 
damage. These are mi l i t a ry functions, Tt i s therefore a 
47 form of warfare. He defined te r ror i sm as the t h r ea t of 
violence or an act or s e r i e s of acts of violence effected 
through surrept iuns means b> an ind iv idua l , an organisa t ion 
or a peopike to further h i s or t h e i r p o l i t i c a l goals and, 
therefore a form of mi l i t a ry a c t i v i t y . 
The systematic carefu l ly orches t ra ted terrorisin which 
i s in the Middle East represents a new dimension of warfare , 
Th<=> Black September Hassaere of the I s r a e l i Athletes was 
fundamentally a mi l i t a ry move becuase having fa i led in four 
conventional warfare to defeat the enemy ( I s rae l ) the Arabs, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y the P a l e s t i n i a n s , resor ted to unconventional 
warfare, spec ia l ly t e r ro r ims , ^or them ter ror i sm has become an 
in t eg ra t ed p a r t of s t ra tegy in which there are well defined 
48 
political and military objectives. 
47, Yay Mallin, "Terrorims as a military weapon" in Marius 
H, Livingston, and others (Ed) , International 'terrorism 
in the contemporary world, Green^Wood Frees, London, 
T978, P,391, 
48, Report of. the POD Commission on Beirut International 
Airport Terrorist Act. Oct, 23, T983, US Givt, printing 
Office, Washington 57^., 2o Dec. 1983, PP.116-117, This 
document is also referred as Long Commission ^port. 
One of the interesting features relating to 
terrorism is that its adhetents and practioners tend 
to prefer terming their acts as war against the state 
and consequently if captured, they say they should be 
treated as prisioners of war rather than convicted 
cfiminals, while states have so far not acceded to this 
49 proposition. However many nations have recognised the 
great potential of terrorism, the terrorists are now the 
Spearhead of a developing theory and practice of surrogate 
warfare. It might be said that terrorism is a form of 
unconventional warfare that military weak wages against 
the superior and well organised enemy. It is essential 
to specify that unconventional warfare is basically a 
Warfare of protracted nature, therefore, as isolated 
be, 
t e r r o r i s t inc ident could noi//fcalled as te r ror i sm. To make 
i t a warfare the t h r e a t of occurence of t e r ro r i sm in future 
i s implied. 
All these forms of unconventional warfare have been 
used as instrument of m i l i t a r i l y weak agains t the m i l i t a r i l y 
s t rong. They, therefore , have been described as the weapons 
of m i l i t a r i l y weak. These forms of warfare put emphasis on 
4 9 , K. Subrahmanyam, Op. C j t . , p . 24 3 , 
50. "Disorders and Terrorism", Report of the Task Fprce on 
Disojrders and t e r ro r i sm, P.9. 
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the prolongation of warfare, avoidence of quick military 
decisions. The strategies of these forms of warfare are 
almost the same whereas their tactics have slight 
differences. The over all strategies are defensive in 
nature while their tactics are offensive. 
Their strategies are based an alertness, mobility 
and attack, and continuouslyattacking, continuously 
destroying the enemy. Tl>ey invert one oB the basic principle 
of unconventional warfare - the principle of concentration 
on both sides, Despersion is one of the essential 
characteristics of them as this provides no chance and 
opportunity to the enemy to dominate the warfare. The 
evasion of concentration keeps the warfare going and 
avoids thp quick decision which these forms of warfare 
perceived off. 
The tactics of these forms of warfare are offensive. 
They adopt the tactics of seeming to comr from the east 
and attacking from the west. They avoidattacking the places 
of thcenemy where the enemy can strike back. They attack 
generally the vulnerable targets. However in contrast to 
the rigidity of conventional warfare, these forms of warfare 
< 
invent t h e i r own t a c t i c s for each moment of the b a t t l e . 
Hit-and-run i s the most d i s t i n c t i v e t a c t i c s of these forms 
of unconventional warfare. 
t)ij 
T h e r e i s , however , a l i t t l e d i f f e r e n c e be tween t h e 
t a c t i c s of t e r r o r i s m and t h e r e s t of o t h e r s forms of 
u n c o n v e n t i o n a l w a r f a r e . The u n i q u e n e s s of t h e t a c t i c s of 
t e r ro r i - ^ i s i s t h i s t h a t i t a c h i e v e s i t s g o a l n o t t h r o u q h 
i t s a c t s b u t t h rough t h e r e s p o n s e t o i t s a c t s . In any o t h e r 
W a r f a r e v i o l e n c e i s t h e b e g i n i n g and i t s c o n s e q u e n c e s a r e 
t h e end of i t . For t e r r o r i s . - n , however , t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s 
of t h e v i o l e n c e a r e t h e m s e l v e s m e r e l y a s t e p and a form 
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of s t e p p i n g s t o n e t o w a r d s t h e a c h i e v e m e n t of t h e o b j e c t i v e s . 
T e r r o r i s t s k i l l a p e r s o n o r p e r s o n s who have o r do n o t 
h a v e d i r e c t a n t a g o n i s m w i t h them t o p r e s s u r i s e a n o t h e r 
p e r s o n t o y i e l d t o t h e i r demands , - t e r r o r i s m comes i n 
s e v e r a l v a r i t i e s . I t may b e i n d i s c r i m i n a t e o r s e l e c t i v e b u t 
52 i t i s g e n e r a l l y i n d i s c r i m i n o t e . 
The e n e m v ' s r e a r i s t he b a t t l e g r o u n d f o r t h e s e forms 
of w a r f a r e , p a r t i c u l a r l y r e v o l u t i o n a r y v^a r fa re , i n s u r g e n c y 
and g u r r r i l l a w a r f a r e which a r e g e n e r a l l y f o u g h t w i t h i n 
t h e bou- dari=>s o f / n a t i o n . T e r r o r i s m , a c t u a l l y , h a s b o t h 
i n t e r n a l and i n t e r n a t i o n a l b a t t l e g r o u n d s . I t somet imes 
o c c u r i n c o u i j t i r e s wh ich have d t t e c t l y -nd i n d i r e c t l y no 
concc n w i t h the t e r r o r i s t . I t i s t o say t h a t t h e b a t t l e g r o u n d 
of r e v o l u t i o n a r y w a r f a r e , i n s u r g e n c y and g u r r i l l a w a r f a r e i s 
5 1 . David F r a n k l i n , "^he S t r a t e g y of T e r r o r i s m " , F o r e i g n 
A f f a i r s , V o l , 5 3 7 No. 3', J u l y 1975 , P . 6 9 2 . 
5 2 . B r i a n C r o z i e r , Q2^_cit,, P . 159 . 
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i s generally the t e r r i t o r y of a p a r t i c u l a r nation 
whereas for terrorism i t has become very VaSt-almost 
the en t i r e world. 
The object ives of these forms of warfare are 
mainfold. The basic object ive of revolut ionary warfare 
i s revolut ion - changing of the e n t i r e system. The 
objec t ives of insurgency, g u e r r i l l a . Warfare, and te r ror i sm 
might be disemberment, autonamy, change of a p a r t i c u l a r 
government or change in a p a r t i c u l a r pol icy of the 
government. 
All these fortis of unconventional warfare are 
dependent tD a great ex t en t , for t h e i r success and surviva l 
upon the support of the populace. The degree of support 
of the population in revolut ionary warfare i s highter than 
in other ' forms of warfare as revolut ionary warfare aims a t 
changing the whole system and the soc i r ty too. In case of 
terror ism the degree of population support i s not as 
high as in cases of other forms of warfare . Terrorism may 
servive even i f the majority i s not supporting i t . 
Insurgency and g u e r r i l l a warfare both adopt the same 
s t r a t egy and t a c t i c s to wgge war aga ins t the conventional 
enemy but insurgents obtain an area or terri(bory from where 
they operate t h e i r war a c t i v i t i e s whereas g u e r r i l l a s are 
not necessa r i ly a f t e r the t e r r i t o r y . However, g u e r r i l l a 
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warfaire in i t s eventual development t ry s to e s t ab l i sh 
and control a t e r r i t o r i a l area . According to Z.K. 
Zawodny insurgents control an area continuously 
without an attempt to disappear . For clashing with 
th*^ " conventional forces the insurgents ac t in uni t s of 
approximately b a t t a l i a n s i z e , and they are able to 
crea te cind maintain a government of t h e i r own in the 
53 
contested t e r r i t o r y . The essence of g u e r r i l l a warfare 
i s tha t i t does not defend a p a r t i c u l a r peace of t e r r i t o r y 
54 as recognizable p o s i t i o n . The g u e r r i l l a s general ly f ight 
in S'Tiall grouf)S or bands. 
Guer r i l l a s are i l l u s i v e and the t e r r o r i s t s are even 
more so. Both are more i l l u s i v e than insu rgen t s . Guer r i l l a 
warfare d i f f e r s from te r ror i sm in the sense tha t i t s primary 
to rge t s are usually the government's armed forces , in some 
cases key economic t a r g e s t r a the r than unarmed c i v i l i a n s . 
Guer r i l l a un i t s are l a r g e r than the t e r r o r i s t s and tend to 
require a more elaborate l o g i s t i c a l s t r u c t u r e as well as 
base camps, unlike g u e r r i l l a s , t e r r o r i s t s d i r e c t t h e i r 
operat ions pr imari ly agains t unar-ned civiliaos ra the r than 
57 
enemy mi l i t a ry uni t s or economic a s s e s t s . The long term 
5 3. Z,K, Zawodny, "Civil War" In t e rna t iona l Encyclopedia of 
Social Sciences, •'^ he MacMillan Co., an<i the Free P ress , 
Vol ,5 , 1968, P.500. See a lso Qeneral Vo Nguyne ^ i a p . 
Op, c i t . , P.48. 
54. George H. Questef, "the Guer r i l l a Problem in Retrospect" . 
Mi l i t a ry Review, Vol.54, No,8, August 1976,PP,44-45, 
55. Brad E, 0»Neil, op. c i t . , P .5 . 
56. Ib id . 
5 7. ''^ he systematic, a r b i t a r t y a t t r i b u t e s of p o l i t i c a l te r ror i sm 
aresnalysed coq<^ntly by Paul Wilkinson, EQlliisai-tSlXfiCi^ni-
The John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1974, PP.14-18* 
g o a l s of t e r r o r i s m h a s b e e n n o t so much t h e d e s i r e t o 
d e p l e t e t h e g o v e r n m e n t ' s p h y s i c a l r e s o u r c e s a s i t h ^ s 
been t o e r o d e i t s p s y c h o l o g i c a l s u p p o r t by s p r e a d i n g 
f e a r among o f f i c i a l s and t h e i r d o m e s t i c and i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
s u p p o r t e r s . Though t h e g e n e r a l p u r p o s e o f t e r r o r i m s h a s 
been t o . a l t e r t h e b e h a v i o u r and a t t i t u d e s o f s p e c i f i c 
g r o u p s / t h i s h a s n o t e x c l u d e d t h e s i m u l t a n e o u s p u r s u i t 
of more p r o x i m a t e o b j - ^ c t i v e s , such a s e x t r a c t i n g p a r t i c u l a r 
c o n c e s s i o n , - payment of ransom o r t h e r e l e a s e of p r i s o n e r s , 
g a i n i n g p u b l i c i t y , d e m o r a l i ^ . i n g t h e p o p u l a t i o n t h r o u g h 
t h e c r e a t i o n of w i d e s p r e a d d i s o r d e r , p r o v o k i n g r e p r e s s i o n 
by t h e g o v e r n m e n t , e n f o r c i n g o b e d i e n c e and c o o p e r a t i o n from 
t h o s e i n s i d e and o u t s i d e t h e movement, f u l f i l l i n g t h e need 
t o avenge l o s s e s i n f l i c t e d upon t h e movement, e n h a n c i n g 
t h e p o l i t i c a l s t a t u r e of s p e c i f i c f a c t i o n s w i t h i n t h e 
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movement and unde rmin ing , tlie p o l i c i e s / o t h e r o p p o n e n t g r o u p s . 
In many c a s e s i t h a s b'^en n e c e s s a r y t o accompany t e r r o r i s m 
w i t h g u e r r i l l a w a r f a r e . G u e r r i l l a s have used t e r r o r i s t i c 
59 
means on many o c c a s i o n s . 
I n s u r g e n c y and g u e r r i l l a w a r f a r e b o t h somet imes i n c l u d e 
i n t h e i r e f f o r t s t o a c h i e v e t h e i r o b j e c t i v e s t h r o u n h 
t e r r o r i s t s means . The d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n i n s u r g e n c y and 
fin 
t e r r o r i s m i s t h a t t he l a t e r e v o l v e s i n t o f o r m e r . 
58, Brad E. O'Neil, Qp. cit,,P4-5. 
59, waiter Laqueure, 0£K„.cit,, P,198. See also i^ avid Franklin, 
OP, cit. P.693. ~ 
60, K. Subrahmanyam, Op. cit. , p. 241, 
7. 
Terrorism becomes insurgency when the t e r r o r i s t s are 
able to gain control over a t e r r i t o r y or s izable area 
of safe haven. I t i s qu i t e possible tha t /group in p e r s u i t 
of i t s object ive might switch from a p o l i t i c a l res i s tence 
to g u e r r i l l a warfare and to te r ror ism, depending upon the 
pirevailing condition and the quantum and type of force 
ava i lab le a t a given t ime. The LTTE of Sr i Lanka or Mizo 
National Front (MRF) in nor th-eas t India have gone through 
these phases. In case of Punjab, Western experts are of 
the opinion tha t the problem in Punjab i s not one of urban 
ter ror ism of I r i sh or South American v a r i e t y . Tt i s insurgency 
in inc ip ien t s tage , Tt i s ne i ther but a curious mixture of both, 
however, the accent i s an terrorism - a ru ra l var ie ty of 
terrorism to the Punjab, 
In comparison to revolutionary warfare, the other 
three have more mi l i ta ry overtones, ' ^ i s o r ien ta t ion i s 
much b lu r r i ng because warfare in our time, has not remained 
only a mi l i t a ry a c t i v i t y . I t i s waged on differet i t f ron t s : 
diplomatic , p o l i t i c a l , economic, psychological , propaganda 
e t c . including mi l i ta ry f ron t s . In brodest sense the a r t 
of war h;^s become the coordination of a l l these elements to 
the purpose of v ic to ry . Yet in narrower sense, used in 
61, K,R, •'^ingh, " In te rna t iona l Terrorism and South Asia". 
•strategic Analysis, Voll2 No, 10, Janauary 89, pp. 1165-1166 
6 2 . TDR R e s e a r c h Team, Op. c i t . , p , 1 2 2 . 
C h a p t e r - I V 
NATURE OF UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE 
The n a t u r e of wa r i s v e r y u n c e r t a i n a n d v e r y i m p r e c i s e . 
W h a t e v e r w i t h c e r t a i n t y we c o u l d s a y a b o u t w a r f a r e i s t h a t i t 
i s v e r y c o m p l i c a t e d phenomenon which i s i n t h e p r o c e s s of 
con t i n uoLE c h a n g e , p a r t i c u l a r l y t h e s t r a t e g i e s and t a c t i c s 
of w a r f a r e . Warfare h a s b e e n e v o l v i n g i t s e l f t o w a r d s t h e 
m u l t i p l i c i t y of means and c o m p l e x i t y of m e t h o d s . I t h a s 
become a many s i d e d phenomenon. I t h a s m a n i f e s t e d i t s e l f 
i n t o i n n u m e r a b l e f a c e s and f a c e t s . Hundreds of s c h o l a r s 
h a v e t r i e d t o g e n e r a l i s e t h e n a t u r e of w a r f a r e b u t d o u b t s 
a r e even r a i s e d t o d a y a b o u t i t s t r u e and s p e c i f i c n a t u r e . 
D e t e r m i n i n g the t r u e and e x t a c t n a t u r e of w a r f a r e i s a n 
e x t r e T i e l y u p h i l l t a s k o r we can say i m p o s s i b l e a s i t d o e s 
n o t e v e r r e v e a l i t s t r u e n a t u r e . 
The n a t u r e of w a r f a r e h a s a l w a y s b e e n c h a r a c t e r i s e d 
by new s t r a t e g i e s and t a c t c s , b y t h e ebb and flow of t h e 
i n v e n t i o n s of new weapons and c o n d i t i o n e d by the g e o g r a p h y 
and e n v i r o n m e n t : When t h e n a t u r e of w a r f a r e i s n o t c o n s t a n t , 
i t s o b j e c t t o a l a r g e r e x t e n t h a s r e m a i n e d unchanged . As 
K a r l Von C l a u s e w i t z p o i n t s o u t t h e u l t i - n a t e o b j e c t of a n y 
War i s t h e p o l i t i c a l (end) aim f o r wh ich i t was u n d e r t a k e n , 
t h e means t o t h e end i s t h e d e s t r u c t i o n of t h e enemy. The 
d e s t r u c t i o n t o t h e enemy can be b r o u g h t a b o u t i n v a r i o u s and 
d i v e r s i f i e d w a y s . 
1 , C h a r l e s W, T h a y e r , i n " I n t e r o d u c t i o n " , G u e r r i l l a , H a r p e r 
and Row P u b l i s h e r , 1 9 6 3 , 
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We have very long h i s to ry of unconventional warfare 
but not much can be sa id with some s o r t of absoluteness 
about i t . President Eisenhower once s a id ; "No war ever 
shows the c h r a c t e r i s t i e s t h a t were expected. The only 
iinchanging factor in war i s the most changeable, uncer ta in , 
2 
unpredi table element in war, tha t i s human na ture" . The 
genera l iza t ion or p a r t i c u l a r i z a t i o n of i t s true na tu re , 
exact Cause, aims and objec t ives i s near ly impossible as 
'deJTining and describing tho warfare in a l l inclusive manner 
3 i s ye t an unresolved task . Although unconventional warfare 
i s very old but i t has become a conciously chosen way of 
4 f ight ing ever since the World War I I , Since then, p a r t i -
cu lnr ly when i t received a systematic t heo re t i c a l as well 
as p r a c t i c a l treatment from Mao Tse-Tung and emerged as a 
new doctr ine of warfare, i t has revolut ionaized the whole 
concept of warfare which was known to us as a c l ea r cut 
a f f a i r in which troops used to f igh t pos i t i ona l pi tched 
b a t t l e s and behind b a t t l e f r e n t s there was a rear peace. 
2, Gaddis J ,L , S t r a t eg ie s of Containment; A C r i t i c a l Appraisal 
of pos t War Americal National Secur i ty , Oxford Universi ty 
P ress , New Delhi, 1982,p,173, 
3 , William P. Yarborough, "Unconventional War", The Annals 
Vol,341, May 1962, p . 2 , 
4, c;errad Choliand, Guerr i l la s t ra teg ies ;_A His to r i ca l 
Anthibloqy from long March to Afghanistan. UniversiFy 
of Cal i fornia , Cal i forn ia , 1982, p .173, 
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The most distinguising feature of unconventional 
warfare is its three phased development which has been 
described as defensive phase- building up the foundation 
for unconventional warfare by establishing and expanding 
political, economic and military infrastructure, population 
support and capturing weapons for the conduct o£ the warfare 
through small-scale raids -, phase of stalemate or equilibrium 
- continuation of expansion of political, economic %nd military 
insfrestructure and concentration of unconventional tactics 
(basically harrasment and hit-and-run) to wear the enemy 
down -, and phase of counter offensive - regularizatlon or 
conventionalization of unconventional warfare to defeat the 
enemy In open and conventional pitched battles. The overall 
strategy of unconvestional warfare is to avoid quick military 
decisions in order to prolong the conflict but whenever the 
decision should come it must be favourable. If there are 
chances of defeat, this three phased developmental theory 
of unconventional warfare provide room to slip back to any 
phase. In short, we can say that in this theory retrogression 
is possible - warfare can slip back as well as it can slip 
forward. The very nature of unconventional warfare is 
protracted. The three phased development and the protracted 
nature of the warfare differentiate it to a larger extent 
from conventional warfare. Conventional warfare aims 
5 
a t achieving the quick m i l i t a r y decis ion, which in 
unconventional warfaire i s the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the 
l a s t phase. 
In our military parlance, unconventional warfare 
is described as a warfare which implicity denies recognition 
of all rules and conventions of warfare. It refuses to 
distinguish between combatants and non combatants and 
recognises no humanitarian constrains. Conventional 
warfare, on the other hand, is regularised and controlled 
by rules and conventions of warfare. Unconventional warfare 
is characterised by the absence of pitched battled which is 
the characteristics of conventional warfare. Unconventional 
warfare has always been the choice of militarily weak against 
the superior and well organised enemy. It has always taken 
place where there were disparities between the adversaries. 
Unconventional warfare defies a well known rule of conven-
tional tactics according to which an attacking party must 
concentrate his forces in order to be stronger than his 
apponent at the moment of the conflict. In unconventional 
Warfare, instead of forming in a crowd to attack a crowd, 
soldiers diperse in small groups, attack singly and at 
once fly v.hpn attacked by superior forces, and then 
5, D,L. palit. War in the Deterrent Age, The English Book 
Store, New Delhi, 1966, p,T757 
."^  ^ 
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a t t ack when an apportunity presents i t s e l f . I t , unlike 
conventional warfare, invents i t s own t a c t i c s depending 
upon the circumstances and s i t u a t i o n s . 
Various scholars have wri t ten in d e t a i l about the 
na ture , purpose and causes of warfare and they have 
adopted d i f fe ren t approaches on which they suppose war 
has i t s r oo t s . To some of them war has i t s roots in the 
nature of human beings and to some others in the nature 
of soc ie ty . According to one group, human beings possess 
innate aggressive tendencies, the expression of which 
r e s u l t s in the form of warfare. The other , group on the 
other had, holds that aggressive tendecies in human 
beings are not innate but they are learned. Human being, 
according to them by t h e i r na ture , are ne i t he r aggressive 
nor submissive, ne i the r warlike nor peaceful ; they develop 
themselves in e i t h e r d i r ec t ion depending on what they learn 
by in t e rac t ing with t h e i r environment and cu l tu re , they do 
not a c t and reac t mechanically according to t h e i r i n s t i n c t 
but according to the views and emotions they learn through 
e'-.^erience. This means t ha t i t i s the soc ie ty in general 
and the environment in p a r t i c u l a r , not the human na tu re , 
lii the sole cause of v;arfare. I t i s to say tha t unconventional 
warfare i s not necessa r i ly manifestat ion of human n a t u r e . 
I t i s merely a spec i f ic response to spec i f i c s i t ua t i ons -
soc ia l / p o l i t i c a l or economic. 
6, For d e t a i l See C o l l i e r ' s Sneyclopedia, Vol, 23 Macmillan 
Education Company, New York, 1987, pp.230-35 
7 J 
Every man possesses his own i n t e r e s t and coming 
together means the c o l l i s i o n of i n t e r e s t s . To sa t i s fy 
t h e i r i n t e r e s t s men organised themselves in to group and 
then t h e i r group i n t e r e s t s are in c o n f l i c t . When th i s 
happens, they try to s a t i s fy and resolve t h e i r con f l i c t i ng 
i n t e r e s t s through peaceful means, and f a i l i n g t h i s what 
we c a l l war ensues. I t appears t ha t soc ie ty i t s e l f i s the 
root cause of war. The most famous dictum of Karl Von 
Clausewitz, ^'ar i s nothing but the cont inuat ion of p o l i t i c s 
by other means supports I t . m t h i s respec t Mao proclaimed 
tha t War cannot for a s ingle moment be separated from ' 
p o l i t i c s , p o l i t i c s i s b loddless war and war i s the p o l i t i c s 
of bloddshed. All t h i s implies t ha t war i s a means for 
achieving and obtaining a desired object ive and i t does 
ncil; 6ccur without a reason. 
Unconventional warfare has no s ingle or common cause. 
I t s causes are d iverse , often one cause overlaps another 
or several causes. I t i s , therefore , extremely d i f f i c u l t 
to ident i fy i t s rea l and universal cause. However, i t has 
often occured in nat ions in which, soc ia l grievances 
were manifested by a d e s i r for p o l i t i c a l , and soc ia l 
changes, r e s l t i n g in c o n f l i c t and d i so rgan i sa t ion . These 
grievances are often considered the primary causes of 
unconventional warfare. The sever i ty of condit ions causing 
the grievances can be ac tua l or imagined - Societal 
0 "* 
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grievances can be nationalistic, &g., foreign occupation, 
exploitation or influence; political, e.g., a corrupt 
rulling authority or non representative political system; 
economic, e.g., inequitable distribution of privileges, 
reveneu or their sources of wealth; social, e.g., sectarian, 
racial or class discrimination; or pscychological e.g^ 
injustice and oppression - when a combination of these 
conditions exists, the situation for unconventional warfare 
is incipient or unconventional warfare is in the offing. 
There is no single cause of unconventional warfare. It 
flourishes in different countries in various forms and at 
different times as a iresult of combination of different 
factors. 
Ma * o Tse-Tung puts e.-nphasis upon the existence of 
social/ political and economic grievances so that they 
could be exploited for the purpose warfare. However, for 
Che Guevara the existence of these factors or conditions 
is not essential. He says that warfare itself can creat 
them. But he explicity emphasizes the need to understand 
the social and economic fabric of the society in order to 
shape unconventional warfare then he himself explains, 
"Naturally, it is not be brought that all conditions for 
revolution are going to be created through the impulse 
7. Franklin M. Osanka, Guerrilla Warfare, Encyclopedia of 
Social Sciences, MacMillan Company arTd the Free press, V. 7., 
1968, p.505 
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given to them by g u e r r i l l a a c t i v i t y . I t must always be 
kept in mind there i s a necessary minimum without which 
the establishment and consol idat ion of the f i r s t centre 
(of rebel l ion) i s not p r a c t i c a b l e , " For the outbreak of 
unconventional warfare, the existence of these grievances 
is a must. 
Besides t h i s , the establ ishment of economic base i s 
an e s s e n t i a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of unconventional warfare. 
While bui ld ing up economy, the main t a r g e t of unconventional 
Warfare i s to destroy those i n s t i t u t i o n s which provide 
economic s t rength to the enemy. Attacks on o i l r e f i n e r i e s , 
p o r t s , communication f a c i l i t i e s and on i n s t i t u t i o n s c lose ly 
r e l a t ed t o the commerical l i f e of the enemy s ta te are 
designed to cireat economic chaos, discaurage investment and 
make the economic burden unendurable for the enemy. As Mao 
points out i t i s very hard for the count r ies or nat ions to 
survive unconventional warfare e i t h e r f inanc ia l ly or 
pfiychologically, where the unconventional so ld ie rs f igh t 
on minimum resources - f inancial or ma te r i a l , and continue 
th(^ s t a t e of war i n d e f i n i t e l y . An enemy f ight ing with regular 
forces and organised resources finds the accumulating 
f i i .v ic ia l D :rden increas ingly unto lerable , so tha t there 
Q,.Che Gvevara, Guerr i l la Warfare^ penguin, London, 1969,, p . 13, 
9, Mao Tse-tung, Selected Mil i tary Writ ings, Foreign language 
p ress , Peking, 1963, p.307. 
1 0, Vo Nguyen Giap, People ' s War, People ' s Army, Praegar, 
New York, 1962, pp.97-98. 
8, 
i s an inev i t ab le out cry agains t a form of warfare in 
which no decisions a re made and there i s no prospect 
for v i c to ry . Although la rge ly unsuccessful, t h i s was 
the aim of the t e r r o r i s t s in Malaya who attempted to 
d i s rup t the economic s t a b i l i t y through a t t acks on 
rubber p lan ta t ions which were so v i t a l for the economic 
s t a b i l i t y and prosper i ty of the s t a t e . Similar a t t acks 
on economically important inst. i t ,utions have been a fea ture 
of the IRA campaigns in Northern Ireland as well as 
Beader-Meinhof gang in West Germany, the Red Army f rac t ion 
12 in I t a l y , and the E.T.A, in Spain, 
The s t r a t e g i c object ive of unconventional warfare i s 
to reduce the mi l i t a ry and p o l i t i c a l s t rength of the enemy 
t}-) rough the use of unconventional t a c t i c s - har ras ing , 
ra id ing , sabotaging, ambushing and t e r r o r i s i n g and so 
increas ing the f inancial and material burden while bu i ld ing 
up i t s own strength un t i l and unless i t evolves i t s e l f 
in to a conventional force capable of defeat ing the enemy 
in open co-nbat or causing the enemy to col lapse or surrender 
to the demands of those waying unconventional warfare. 
Unconventional so ld ie r s usually a t t ack when they hold the 
t a c t i c a l advantage or otherwise assured of success. They 
11. D,K, p a l i t , o p , c i t , , p.126 
1^, John Baylis and others, contemporary strategy, Croom 
Helm, London 1987, p,220. 
da 
t r a d i t i o n a l l y avoid pitched b a t t l e s , not of t h e i r own 
choosing, rapidly concentrate for an a t t ack , rapidly 
disperse a f t e r the a t tack and avoid concentrat ion in 
large numbers for long periods of t imes, 
Unconventional warfare for i t s success i s to a 
l a rge r ex ten t i s dependent upon the support of the 
populace. The population is seen as a key to the e n t i r e 
s t rugg le . As one wr i t e r puts i t , "the defeat of the 
enemy, the overthrow of the government a re secondary 
13 
tasks in the sense that they come later. Echoing the 
importance of unconventional v/arfare, Peter Paret points 
out; "Military power plays essentially a secondary role> 
the decisive factor is the population which is both the 
strongest force in the struggle as well as its primary 
14 
object, Paret asserts that military actions are largely 
dotermined by the popular support. Intelligence, mobility, 
logistic freedom and surprise, all these feature of 
unconventional warfare are dependent upon the degree of 
public support. Through the political structure that 
create links between unconventional soldiers and population, 
they are able to obtain the vital information they need. 
13, R, Taber, The War of the Flea, paladin, London,1970, 
P.19, 
14, p, paret, "The French Army and La Guerre Revolutionaire" 
Journal of United Service Institution, Vol,104, Feb.,1959 
p.59. 
I t i s the support of the population which provides the 
necessary i n t e l l i g e n c e , s h e l t e r , suppl ies , and r ecna i t s 
so e s s e n t i a l for the animity of the warfare . This ind ica t e s 
tha t in unconventional warfare the support of the population 
i s indispensible for i t s success and su rv iva l . This fur ther 
e x i b i t s the intimate r e l a t i o n s h i p between the mi l i t a ry and 
c i v i l i a n realms which v/e, general ly , don ' t see in any 
other Warfare. 
Great s t r e s s i s placed on the importance of using 
propaganda techniques to win the popular support and 
d i s c r e d i t the government. I t seems tha t whatever unconventional 1 
so ld ie r s do i s designed to have a psychological impact, 
mi l i t a ry act ions in p a r t i c u l a r are viewed as being more 
important in psychological and p o l i t i c a l terms than they 
are in mi l i t a ry terms. For t h i s reason Robert Paret sees 
the anconventional so ld ie r as "Primarily a propagandist , 
an r>gitatar, a desseminf.tor of the revolut ionary ideas , 
wlio wses the struggle i t s e l f - the ac tua l physical c o n f l i c t 
15 f s in instrument of a g i t a t i o n . The mi l i t a ry struggle i s 
the c a t a l y s t . Through whot Carlos Mfrighella c a l l s the 
• s t ra tegy of m i l i t a r i z a t i o n ' the insurgent attempts to 
r a i s e the l eve l of revolut ionary an t i c ipa t i on and popular 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n to c r ea t the r i g h t psychological environment 
15. R. Taber, o p . c i t . ,p .2 3. 
55 
for the revolutionary movement and for the f ina l 
des t ruc t ion of the enemy. In t h i s sense, each b a t t l e 
i s a lesson designed to demonstrate the impotence of 
the army and to d i s c r e d i t the government. In Norther 
Ireland th is has been an important p a r t of the iRA 
campaigns. This i s well i l l u s t r a t e d by the Brighton 
barib in 1985 aimed a t k i l l i n g the members of Br i t i sh 
Cabinet, pa r t from the a t tacks on the mainland of 
Br i t a in , which are intended to have a psychological 
imprct, Evory tiire ti.c -T ' t h o r i t i e s have claimed t o be win-
ning the IRA has responded with violence intended to 
17 
undermine the prevai l ing mood of confidence. 
Adoption of unconventional warfare seems to be 
very na tura l and reasonable. Supposing t h a t two persons 
are f igh t ing , one armed with a r i f l e and the other with 
a revolver . The aim of both i s to k i l l each other . The 
person ariied with r i f l e possesses g rea te r p o s s i b i l i t i e s 
of k i l l i n g thr> other as the k i l l i n g range of r i f l e i s 
higher than the revolver , Riflewala, on seeing the revolverwala 
even from distance can shoot him while revolwerwala cannot 
do exact ly t h a t . He, in order to k i l l r i f l ewala , w i l l , 
somehow, t ry to reach c lose r to r i f lewala so t ha t he can 
achieve the ob jec t ive . The t a c t i c s , t h a t revolverwala 
aopts would seem very r a t iona l and l o g i c a l . 
16. John Baylis and o ther , o p . c i t . , p,222 
17. Ib id , 
So 
Unconventional warfare has always been used by those 
who were shor t of confronting the enemy in open combat as 
i1. provided them various means for br inging violence to 
wear down the conventionally strong enemy. In shor t , i t 
may be said tha t v;here there i s dif ference between the 
c a p a b i l i t i e s and capac i t i e s of adve r sa r i e s , the weaker 
one w i l l prefer to adopt unconventional means to br ing 
violence against the super ior and well organised enemy. 
The extensive wr i t t en treatment of the unconventional 
warfare and i t s acce la ra t ion a f t e r the World War I | had 
placed i t into the parlance of contemporary s t r a t egy , 
Richard Clusterbuck says tha t unconventional warfare, 
18 
undoubtedly, has become a primary form of warfare. 
The; acce le ra t ion tha t i t received a f t e r the World War I I , 
p a r t i c u l a r l y a f t e r Mao's Victory in China i t appears t ha t 
unconventional warfare i s on increase . Whether, there i s , 
i n fec t , increase of unconventional warfare or not is 
d i f f i c u l t to determine with prec i s ion . However, there i s 
reason to sunport the contention tha t i t i s on inc rease . 
Robert Mc-Namara, in h i s statement before the Senate 
Foreign Relation Committee in May 1966, proclaimed t h a t 
- in the l a s t e ight years alone there have been no l e s s 
that 164 in t e rna t iona l ly s ign i f i can t outbreak of violence 
and the trend of such c o n f l i c t i s growing ra ther than 
18. Richard Clusterbuck, Guerr i l la and T e r r o r i s t . Faber & 
F a b e r L t d . , 1977,p.]6. 
dimnishing. At the begning of 1958, there were 23 
prolonged insurgencies going out around the world. 
As of February 1966, there were 40. Further, the total 
number of outbreaks of violence has increased each year: 
19 in 1958, there were 34; in 1965, there were 58. The 
trends in the 1970s suggested a continuing high level 
of major insurgent activity with an initial shift from 
rural guerrilla warfare to urban terrorism and then back 
20 
agnin in the l a t t e r years of the decade. 
19, L.W, Martin, Arms and s t r a tegy , Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 
1973, p.146. " " 
20, The number of count r ies experiencing g u e r r i l l a wars in 
1970S where as follows; 1971,17 coun t r i e s ; 1972,18; 1973,16; 
1974,12; 1975,16; 1976,12; 1977,15; 1978,14; 1979,12. 
Overall twenty six countr ies experienced insurgencies 
during 1070's.Some countr ies Guer r i l l a Wars in every 
year of the decade. These were Angola, Ehtiopia, Burma, 
Combodia, ph i l ip ines and Thiland, Chad experienced 
g u e r r i l l a warfare in every year of the decade except 
1974, and follov/ing countr ies experienced g u e r r i l l a 
warfare in seven year of the years of the decade: 
Indonesia, Laos, and Malaysia, Morocco and Vietnam 
experienced five years of insurgency each in the deace 
as did Oman, Other countr ies experiencing four or lower 
years of gue r r i l l a warfare were; Mozambique, Colombia, 
Bol iv ia , Afghanistan, Pakistan, Brundi, Lebnon, 'Guinea, 
Bissau, I raq, Nicaragua, Sudan, Uganda, and Zaiir.. (Source; John Baylis and others contemporary s t r a t e g y , 
Croom Helgj, London, 1987, p.230, 
Oo 
Then the incidence of t ransna t iona l t e r r o r i s t 
a t t acks a l so appeared t o be increasing in 1070s and 1980's . 
In 1968 there were 123 reported inc idents while in 1977 
21 the number had r isen to 340. The 1980's have a l so 
witnessed a resugence of Guerr i l la warfare in Central 
America, the Middle East and Western Europe as well as 
22 
an alarming spate of in t e rna t iona l t e r ro r i sm. In p resen t 
day world, unconventional warfare i s being fought in many 
^ • 23 
coun t r i e s . 
The increase in the occurence of unconventional warfare 
in the contemporary v;orld a f t e r the World War I I i s probably 
due to i t s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of being easy weapon for those 
who want to redress and are not in a pos i t ion to defeat the 
enemy in conventional b a t t l e . The other fac tor tha t might 
have motivated the people to f ight unconventional vftrfare might 
be the success the unconventional warfare has obtained. 
21. Edward F. Mickolus, Transnational Terrorism; A chronology 
of events; 1968-1979, Aldwych, Press , 19857P,XVlfl 
22. John Baylis and o the r s , o p . c i t . p . 2 l p 
23. In contemporary World the countr ies in which unconventional 
warfare in i t s various forms in being fought are as 
follows: India, Sr i lanka, Burma, Ph i l i p ine s , Afghanistan, 
Angola, Kampuchia, Kthopia, Somalia, Elsalvadore, Guatemala 
Mazambique, Nicaragua, Peru, Uganda, Western Sahara, 
Spain, Argentinia, I re land , Canada, Kenya, Bangladesh, 
Bol iv ia , Chile, Hondras, e t c . 
To measure how far unconventional warfare has been 
successful in s t a t i s t i c a l terms i s qui te an uphi l l t a sk . 
Since the World War I I there have been many unconventional 
Wat f a re . Somewhere they succeeded but Hhere they were 
defeated m i l i t a r i l y thr. conf l i c t never th less had the 
e f fec t of influencing p o l i t i c a l and soc ia l changes and 
in some cases nat ional independences u l t imate ly r e s u l t e d . 
J.K. Zawodny, however, put, the figure to six - China, 
I s r a e l , Vietnam, I raq , Cuba, Loas - where p o l i t i c a l e l i t e 
and the forms of governments through the apol ica t ion of 
24 
unconventional war were changed. However Indo-china, 
Algeria , Nicaragua, a re the other count r ies where i t 
met with success. In most recent cases where unconvdntional 
war achieved some success, if not t o t a l l y , are Afghanistan 
and Sr i Lanka, 
In Malaysia, Ph i l ip ines and Cyprus, the insurgents 
may not have achieved t h e i r main object ive but there i s 
l i t t l e doubt in each case subs tan t i a l changes were made 
l a rge ly because of V. •• Insurgent campaings. In Malaysia 
and Cyprus, the Br i t i sh . Government announced the 
independence of the respect ive colonies as p a r t of t h e i r 
cotinter - insurgent programme and in Philipin'=s the 
Mai)cssaysay government i n i t i a t e d a number of socia l and 
ecnnomic reforms including land reforms which had been 
24. J.K. Zaw.odny, "t^nconventional Warfare" in Henry A.Kissinger, 
(Ed . ) , Proble.ns of National St ra tegy, Fredrick A. Praeger, 
U.S.A., 1965, p.242. 
[10 
25 one of the main grievances of the Huk insurgent . In 
c ase of terrorism there are very few examples of the 
governments toppled through use of violence as primary 
weapon. The c l ea r example of the Collapse of the 
government under a s sau l t from terrorism i s Uruguay in 
the period 1969-72, The other examples of terrorism 
succeeding in i t s s t a t e g i c aims of removing a government 
and taking power are from the period of colonia l independence 
s t rugg les , forcing Br i t i sh withdrawl from Pa l s t i ne , Cyprus 
and Aden and playing a major ro le in compelling France to 
27 
withdraw from Algeria. The recent example i s probably 
India , where the democrat ical ly e lected s t a t e government 
28 of Punjab was forced to col lapse and the P re s iden t ' s 
rule was effected. 
To o f f se t the success of unconvnetional warfare 
there a r e , however,many cases where i t was b i t t e r l y 
defeated but the heavy pr ice in many l i v e s , and the 
pre5?tige t h a t governments have to inves t and the compro-
mises they often have to make as an attempt to a l ienate . , 
the th rea t caused by unconventional means, make the 
unconventional warfare an a t t r a c t i c e instrument for change 
in the eyes of the d i s s i d e n t groups. About the future of 
25„ John Baylis and o the r s , o p . c i t . , p .229, 
26., Paul Wilkinson, "Terrorism: In t e rna t iona l Dimension" in 
William Gutterdge, ( Ed) , The New Terrorism, Monsel 
Publishing Ltd . , London, 1986, p ,35 , 
27. Ibid_. , p,34 
28, IDR Research Team, "Punjab-profile of a Te r ro r i s t 
movement, "Indian Defence Review Vol, 11.2 Ju ly 1987, p,122, 
J± 
unconventional warfare there are scholars who pred ic t 
tha t in the aftermath of a nuclear s t r i k e , the p o s s i b i l i t y 
of unconventional operat ions i s very high, Liddle Hart 
very aptlywrote about insurgency in the ea r ly s i x t i e s : 
"campaigns of th is kind are mor^ l i ke ly to continue because 
i t i s the only kind of warfare t ha t f i t s the condit ions of 
modorn age, while being <"it the same time well sui ted to 
take advantage of soc ia l discontent; , r a c i a l ferment and 
29 
n a t i o n a l i s t i c ferver" . Walter M i l l i s , one of the s t ronges t 
proponents of the view t h a t mi l i t a ry power no longer performs 
i t s t r a d i t i o n a l function e x p l i c i t l y excludes revolut ionary 
warfare from the category of absolescence, arguing t h a t the 
ver, abo l i t ion of the t r a d i t i o n a l war system, which he 
expijcts i s l i ke ly to give l a rge r scope to g u e r r i l l a warfare 
and c i v i l d isorders ." Similarly^ Hannah Arednt, wr i t ing in 
1963, argues tha t with the emergence of the cold war and 
the nuclear stalemate between the super powers and a l l i * n c e s 
which has become absolute of the t h r e a t of t o t a l ann ih i l a t ion 31 the scope for unconventional warfare i s h igher . The 
u t i l i z a t i o n of unconventional warfare as an auxilary force 
to regular army i s not beyond expecta t ions as in the pas t 
we have seen the use of i t in thp f i r s t and second World 
V/ars. I t is to say tha t the phenomenon of unconventional 
29. B. Liddle Hart. Forew ird to Mao Tse-tung and Che Guerara, 
u e r r i l l a warfare, c a s e l l , 1961,p.XI 
3 0. Walter Mil ls , A World without war, Washington Square 
Press New York7 1961. 
31 . Hannah Arendt, on Revolution, New York, Viking Press , 
1963, " —" 
b :^. 
warfare sp e^ms to bo an important but probable ef fec t ive 
v/a i' for d i s s iden t groups for obtaining t h e i r desired 
ob jec t ives . 
Unconventional v;arfare has been a t h r e a t to our 
nat ional secur i ty . I t has become a se t ious challenge t o 
the secur i ty of a l l na t ions . In essence, nat ional s e c u r i t y 
of p na t ion , cons is t s of i t s t e r r i t o r i a l i neg r l ty , s t a b i l i t y 
of the regime, and the r ea l i z a t i on of i t s o ther na t iona l 
and in t e rna t iona l i n t e r e s t and safeguarding the l i ves of 
i t s inhab i t an t s from any t h r e a t , act ion or s i t ua t ion which 
damages t h e i r way of l i f e in any way. Any thing t h a t 
i n t e r n a l l y or ex te rna l ly comes in the way of nat ional 
s ecu r i ty i s charac ter i sed as a th rea t to nat ional « c u r i t y . 
In present day world, nat ions e x i s t under various kinds of 
threa ts and the d i f fe ren t comoonents of nat ions appear to 
be vulnerable to d i f f e ren t kinds of thre^^ts and these 
thr-eats determine thp secur i ty and in secu r i t y of those 
na t ions . All nations are vulnerable to various kinds of 
t h r ea t s but i t i s the m i l i t a r y th rea t involving the use 
of force t h a t threatens a l l the components of the na t ions . 
Threats to the secur i ty of nations are both in te rna l and 
ex terna l but i t i s the i n t e r n a l nature of t h rea t s which 
c o n s t i t u t e s the most devas ta t ing consequences for the 
secur i ty of every na t ion . As the nature of unconvetional 
warfare i s bas ica l ly i n t e r n a l l th*^  discussion concentra tes 
on i n t e r n a l t h r e a t s . 
b u 
Unconventional warfare by i t s very nature is engaged 
in d i s rup t ing the general ly accepted norms and standards of 
decency. As W'? know, the normal response of the majority 
in any society i s obedience tcj au thor i ty whether i t i s 
from hab i t , apathy, se l f i n t e r e s t , or i r ident i f ica t ion 
witli i t s goals . Unconventional warfare i s a serious challenge 
to the norm of th i s conforming behaviour. I t def ies the very 
groindfrom which such nor'iis draw j u s t i f i c a t i o n . 
Unconventional v;arfare has jeppordized the secur i ty 
of .'any nations in various v;ays. Since the World War I I , 
var.ious p o l i t i c a l e l i t e oitVier have been removed or a s s a s s i -
nated and many governments have been changes through the 
appl ica t ion of unconventional warfare. In our present day 
World, there are various countr ies where unconventioi^al 
32 
warfare i s being fought, and there are other areas of the 
world, p o l i t i c a l l y uns table , economicslly deprived and 
poverty s t r iken , which present f e r t i l e ground for the 
erupt ion of unconventional warfare . 
Unconventional warfare has d e s t a b i l i s e d many na t ions 
and pushed many other on the werge of almost t o t a l co l l apse , 
Wheroever i t erupts i t a t tacks the l i n k s which bind together 
3 2. In South Asian region and i t s close neighbours there 
are five count r ies ; India , Bangladesh,, Sr i Lanka, 
Burma, Afghanistan - facing the problems of unconventional 
Warfare. 
9^ •i 
the p o l i t i c a l , economic, and mi l i t a ry organism of the 
nat ion . The very mechanism through which the nat ions 
exercise t h e i r normal control has been challenged by 
un'onventional warfare. I t may succeed or not, but the 
violp>nce pjerpetrated by i t has made us shudder with a 
33 creeping sense of i n s e c u r i t y . In a r e l a t i v e l y b r i e f 
span of t ime, i t degrades the qua l i ty of l i f e for the 
inhab i tan t s of the na t ions . I t destroys the centur ies 
work of nat ions in economic, p o l i t i c a l and social sphere . 
The enormous burden on the fiances of the na t ions , a lready 
overs t re tched to meet the increasing cos t s of secur i ty 
threatend by unconventional warfare causes damaging bdlow 
34 
to the welfare and economic advancement of the soc ie ty . 
33, John Baylis and o the r s , p p , c i t , 229, 
34, Burma had been facing a number of insurgent movements 
threatening i t s very exis tence s ince i t achieved 
independnece in 194 8. The Kachin s t a t e in Northern 
Bruma had been v i r t u a l l y under the control of:.Kachin 
insurgence for the l a s t two decades, Afghanistan 
where the f ight ing went on for ten years has brought 
the country almost near the demos tra t ing co l l apse . 
There was hue and cry for the shortage of food and 
other n e c e s s i t i e s , very r ecen t ly . The war there has 
brought unbearable consequences for the na t ives , India 
had a lso been facing various forms of unconventional 
warfare since i t s independence. The Naga, Mizo and 
Tripura Insurgency movements which were seeking 
Independnece by s t r e s s i n g the e t h i n i c charac ter of 
the t r i b a l regions liave been subsided. I t i s the Punjab 
where the rural form of terror ism has become a ser ious 
secur i ty problem for India . I t has created a climate 
of b i t t e r n e s s and hatred poisoning the r e l a t i o n s 
between differeuit e t h i n i c groups destroying the b a s i s 
of noma 1 democratic process. The sam^ s i t ua t i on i s 
of various other count r ies p a r t i c u l a r l y of Lat t in 
American Countr ies . 
So 
Unconventional warfare in the form of terror ism i s 
posing a l o t of problems for the secur i ty of na t ions . 
Terrorism, c rea ts such a mess that they find no way to 
l e t themselves out . I t has created for them a dilemma 
as how to defend the na t ive i n s t i t u t i o n s and varied 
i n t e r e s t s agains t the th rea t s of the terrorsm while 
prr-serving the i r e s s e n t i a l character , popular support 
35 and wi l l i ng compliance. Since 1970's thousands of 
bombings, se lected on the signifcance of the t a r g e t s , 
have been car r ied out by t e r r o r i s t s which i n f l i c t ed 
uri oarable c a s u a l t i e s . Eiietween Janauary 1989 and the Nov, 
197 7 there were over 10,000 recorded bombings in Northern 
I r land a lone . These resu l ted in a t l e a s t 476 deaths . Between 
1973 and 1977 over 436 mil l ion do l la r s in demages weire 
re(3istered in tJiis a r ea . Since the World War I I thousand 
of highjaekings and as sass ina t ions were e i t h e r attempted 
or ca r r i ed out while many other were made hostages. Taking 
of hostages for p l o t i c a l gain i s one of the most dramatic 
35. Brian Jenkins , " In te rna t iona l Terrorism^ Trends and 
Potent.i ^ p i t i e s " ."Santamonica . Ca l i fo rn ia , Rand 
Corporation, 1977, P.43. 
36, Bowman H. Mil lar , and Charless A Russel, "The evalut ion 
of Revolutionary warfare from Mao to Marrighella and 
Meinhof", in Robert Kupper Man and Darell Trent, 
Terrorism; Threat, Reality response Hoover I n s t i t u t i o n 
Press , Stanford, Coif. 1979, P.195. 
9o 
and potent forTis oi contornporary ter ror ism, no other 
t a c t i c i s .-nore likf-^ly to cause a sevre disrupt ion to 
norrr.al flow of na t ional and in t e rna t iona l r e l a t i o n s . 
Government are t ruly held to ransom and p o l i t i c a l order 
d i r ec t l y threa tend. S ta tes have more than once been 
fo rced ' in to a l t e r ing t h e i r nat ional p o l i c i e s according 
37 to the d i c t a t e s of thp t e r r o r i s t s . T e r r o r i s t a t t acks 
on over a l l t r anspor t a t ion , t h e i r a s s^ i s s ina t i ng and 
hostage-taking t a c t i c s and t h e i r t h r e a t s to innocent 
l i f e has not only created a fear and casted a creeping 
gloom over the a sp i ra t ion of mil l ions of people but have 
brought many nations to tiie verge of co l l apse . Terrorism 
ha." become a serious secur i ty problem p a r t i c u l a r l y in 
our t ime. 
Terrorism i s a clec.r and dangerous th rea t to the 
noiiTial and democratic liff^ of the n a t i o n s , i t has made the 
decocrat ic p o l i t i c s impossible . The e l ec t ion boycott in 
SrIIanka and Elsalvadore ^re the exampled where i t has 
38 destroyed the ground for any compromise. I t has crea ted 
th'- climate of b i t terner ,3 and hatred, posisoned the 
r e l a t i o n s between d i f f e ren t e thenic groups, i t has become 
the way of l i f e induct ing the whole generat ions in to the 
ethos of violence, suspicion and hatred which renders the 
37, Paul, Wilkinson, O p , c i t , , P,51, 
38. I b i d . , P.34. 
t a s k of c o n c i l i a t i o n and t e tu rn to normal democrat ic l i f e 
39 a l1 the more d i f f i c u l t . 
The p a r a l y s i n g and d e v a s t a t i n g e f f e c t s of 
unconvent iona l war fa re on the economic l i f e of the 
n a t i o n s can not be over looked . I t i s t h e economy of the 
n a t i o n s t h a t appears t o be most v a l n e r a b l e t o the t h r e a t s 
of unconvent ional w a r f a r e . The complex and c o s t l y 
t e r h n o l o g i c a l system of the contemporery world - power 
p l a n t s , a i r p o r t s , o i l i n s t a l l a t i o n s and s t o r a g e d e p o t s , 
p i p e l i n e s and d r i l l i n g p l a t f o r m s , communication c e n t r e s 
and v a r i o u s o thpr k inds of i n d u s t r i e s have been the 
s i t t i n g t a r g e t s of a t t a c k s , d i s r u p t i o n and sabo tage . In 
th^ p a s t , va r ious a t t a c k s on one or o t h e r t a r g e t s have 
been made which were d i r e c t e d t o d i s r u p t the economy of 
the t a r g e t n a t i o n . This was the aim of t e r r o r i s t s in 
Malaysia who a t tempted to d i s r u p t the economy through 
a t t a c k s on rubber p l a n t a t i o n s so v i t a l for t h e econctnic 
s t . T b i l i t y and p r o s p e r i t y of Malays ia , S i m i l a r a t t a c k s on 
economica l ly impor tan t i n s t i t u t i o n have bop>n a f e a t u r e of 
th IRA campaigns in Korth'^rn I r e l a n d as we l l as Baader -
Meinhoff gang in V/est Gnrvany, the Red Army F r a c t i o n in 
40 I t a l y and ETA in Spa in , in Greece between 1945048, the 
39, In E las lvadore t h e Seven Ye/^r Old War has l e f t thousando 
dead, no p o l i t i c a l o r m i l i t a r y s o l u t i o n i s p o s s i b l e 
w i t h o u t the p a r t i c i p a t i o n of r b e l l s in government. Even 
the change of p r e s i d e n t has l i t t l e p r o s e c t s for p e a c e . 
The r e c e n t e l e c t i o n in E l s e l v a d o r e demost ra ted t h i s a l l 
tSie a lmost Same s i t u a t i o n i s in S r i Lanka, This s i t u a t i o n 
e x i s t s too in the Punjab steste of I n d i a , 
40 . Johan Bay l i s and o t h e r s , O p , c i t , / P ,22o , 
So 
Guprr i l la forces successful ly cut the cuntry in two, 
rendering possible the communication between North and 
South only by Sea and Air. A Grefek army of several 
hundred thousand mep, heavily supported by the United 
S t a t e s , Was required to contain the much smaller 
q u e r r i l l a force. The t o t a l cas t of m i l i t a r y - p o l i t i c a l 
pac i f i ca t ion and economic reconstruction was about 
4 1 2 b i l l ion d o l l a r s . T e r r o r i s t s a t tack an e l e c t r i c a l 
4 2 power system to black out Rome and the PIRA a t tack 
a t Canrey Island on 17 Janciuary 19 79 h igh l igh t the 
po t en t i a l danger of t e r r o r i s t a t tacks on gas and s torage 
f a c i l i t i e s and a l l i n s t i t u t i o n s containing concentrat ions 
43 
of Ir .dustr ial fuels and chemicals. 
The at tacks on tho ta rge ts which are v i t a l for the 
economic well being of the nations can c rea te economic 
in; t a b i l i t y within the t a r g e t nations which eventual ly 
minht r e su l t into the col lapse of these na t ions . The 
future a t t acks on these t a rge t s are not out of question 
and to provide these t a rge t s round the clock secur i ty 
fur ther adds to the economic burden of the na t ions . The 
secur i ty arrangenf^nts a l so create the paralysing e f fec t 
r e s t r i c t i n g the mobility of the forces and reducing t h e i r 
nurnt^rical strength, super io r i ty by causing the diversion of 
4 1 , Franklin A, Lindsay, "Unconventional warfare" Foreign 
Affairs,Vol40, No.2, January 1962, P.264. 
42, Brian Jenkins , Op. c i t , , P.45. 
43, Paul Wilkinson, Op_. c i t , , P.43, 
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mJi.y troops to s t a t j c protect ion dut ies and the concentrat ion 
of the large proportion of the remaining forces a t the 
places under a t tack . All t h i s cansiderably reduces the 
nations adminis trat ive con t ro l , demonstrating to the 
populace i t s i n a b i l i t y to maintain law and order . 
The most devastat ing t h r ea t to the secur i ty of a l l 
nat ions i s the p o s s i b i l i t y of t e r r o r i s t s e i t h e r using 
nuclear device or a t tacking nuclear power s t a t i o n s . This 
i s the f i r s t .time in human his tory tha t a s ingle indiv idual 
i.s capable of bringing ar<vdstating des t ruc t ion to the 
e n t i r e humanity through 1 ho usr of nuclear device or a t t ack 
on nuclear f a c i l i t i e s . This thre&t i s however less probable 
but not out of quest ion. There i s no doubt that the attainmr-nt 
of a nuclear bomb i s impossible or a remote p o s s i b i l i t y bu t 
the su f f i c i en t q u a n t i t i e s of enriched uramium and plutonium 
could be obtained through i n f i l t r a t i o n of the nuclear 
industry work force, through thef t from storage f a c i l i t i e s 
for spent fuel , fuel reprocessing plants and fabr ica t ion 
and uranium enrichirent p lan t to make possible the manufacture 
44 
of a pr imi t ive nuclear device. This i s highly probably 
tha t a p r imi t ive nuclear device could be manufactured without 
incurr ing any serious r i sk to the hea l th and safety of the 
manufacturers as was demonstrated by a col lege student in 
44, Paul Wilkinson,Terrorism and the Libera l S ta te , Macmillan, 
London, Ilnd Edit ion, 1986, PP. 22O-221T"~ 
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the United S t a t e s who des igned a workable atomic bomb, 
simply using the t e x t books and da ta a v a i l a b l e fo r the 
45 genera l p u b l i c . 
The a t t a c k s on n u c l e a r f a c i l t i e s a re h igh ly p r o b a b l e . 
They can not be ru led ou t because t h e r e a re v a r i o u s 
i n s t a n c e s when such a t t e m p t s have been made. The a t t a c k 
by ETA on the Lemoniz n u c l e a r r e a c t e r in Nor thern Spain 
46 i s one such ex^^nple. In the view of U.S. o f f i c i a l s , 
between March 1969 and March 1970 , the re were around 175 
cases of a c t s of v i o l e n c e or t h r e a t a g a i n s t n u c l e a r f a c i l i t i e s 
in ' h e United S t a t e s . And tlie U.S. Nuc lear Emergency Search 
Tea,fii (N.E.S .T, ) has been involved in over 70 t h r e a t s i nvo lv ing 
47 n u c l e a r m a t e r i a l s s i n c e I t s e s t a b l i s h m e n t in 1975, According 
t o Paul Wilkinson, the g r a v e s t of these p o s s i b i l i t i e s f a l l 
under the heading , of what George Ques t e r has termed, 'Micro 
p r o l i f e r a t i o n ' . T e r r o r i s t c a p t u r e o r f a b r i c a t i o n of a 
n u c l e a r weapon, or s e i z u r e or e x t e n s i v e sabotage of a n u c l e a r 
f a c i l i t y , or l a r g e - s c a l e r a d i o a c t i v e e x t o r t i o n by means of 
combining r a d i o - a c t i v e m a t e r i a l with a number of b ig e x p l o s i v e 
dev i ce s could pose the t h r e a t of h o l d i n g the whole c i t y o r 
r eg ions t o ransom, mass s l a u g h t e r and i r r e p a i r a b l e damage t o 
the environnr^nt, TVie p o s s i b i l i t y of manufactur ing a n u c l e a r 
devjce and a t t a c k s on n u c l e a r f a c i l i t i e s i s not only the 
45 , I b i d . , P . 2 2 1 . 
46, Paul V/ilkinson.Cp. c i t . P .44 . 
47, Paul Wilkinson, Ter ror i sm and ipne L i b e r a l s t a t e , P. 221, 
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g r a v e s t t h r e a t to the s e c u r i t y of t a r g e t n a t i o n s b u t 
48 i t s e f f e c t a l s o can be d e v a s t a t i n g fo r o t h e r n a t i o n s . 
Ter ror i sm has a lmos t g l o b a l i s e d i t s e l f . The a c t i v i t i e s 
of t e r r o r i s t s have not j u s t been l i m i t e d t o a s p e c i f i c 
number of na t ion nor have they been c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of a 
p a i ' t i c u l a r r-^^gion. T e r r o r i s t phenomenon as r e f l e c t e d a lmos t 
dr'1 ly in the mass media I s world wide . The dramat ic va lue 
of t e r r o r i s m during the pas t decide and i t s concomitant 
polit iCc3l and psycholo t i c a l impact have produced a c r i s i s of 
49 
nea r g l o b a l p r o p o r t i o n s . I t has become a s e r i o u s c h a l l e n g e 
t o the s e c u r i t y of e n t i r e n a t i o n s . I t has posed grave 
problems not only for the law and e x i s t e n c e of tire United 
n o t i o n s bu t to the law and o r d e r of t h e t a r g e t n a t i o n . I t 
was eno r.mously compl ica ted the p o l i t i c a l m i l i ev in which 
UN o p e r a t e s . I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law and p rocedures have simply 
boon inadegua te to deal with the problem and the e f f o r t s t o 
50 rerrrdy the s i t u a t i o n s have run i n t o many o b s t a c l e . The 
Red Br igade in I t a l y has been making a war ori tlie whole 
concept of l e g a l i t y and on the l e g a l sys tem. They murder 
l a w y e r s , j u r i s t s , p o l i c e men, and w i t n e s s e s , and i n t i m i d a t e 
48 , Ibidjj_ p,222 
49 . Robert A, Fried Lrtnder, "The O r i g i n s of I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
T e r r o r i s m , " I n Yonah Alexandar and Semmour Maxwell F i n g e r , 
Ter ror i sm I n t e r d i s c i p l i n a r y p e r s p e c t i v e s , MaGrow H i l l 
Book Cornpany, Ltd,^ O.K. p . S o . 
50„ John F. Murphy, The United Nation and the c o n t r o l of 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Vio lence ; A l e a g a l and p o l i t i c a l A n a l y s i s , 
Manchester U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , ISoT", I n t c o d u c t i o n , p . 2 
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cour t . In many na t ions , such as Turkey, I t a l y and Northern 
I re land , the a c t i v i t i e s of t e r r o r i s t s present a ser ious 
51 obstacle to the rule of law and j u d i c i a l process . 
T e r r o r i s t use the t-actics of blackmail to make 
sub;: t ans t ive changes in foreign or domestic pol icy. The 
Auslrian government was blackmailed i n to closing the 
Schi nak t r a n s i t camp for Soviet jewes en r o u t e / i s r a i l e . 
An olmost invariably t e r r o r i s t demand, however, i s for 
release of t e r r o r i s t r i s i o n e r s from j a i l . This demand i s 
a cliallenge to the au thor i ty not only of the legal system 
but government i t s o l f . This aspect of ter ror ism not only 
challenCfCB the-concept of an'lntelm«tion*l riile of law but 
also d i r e c t l y attacKs the na t ional l ega l system and the 
governments. 
The r e l a t i v e l y new and d i s tu rb ing phenomenon i s a 
comprehensive i n t e rna t i ona l t e r r o r i s t network and the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of obtaining sophis t ica ted and advanced weapons 
54 for t h e i r use. The ins t e rna t iona l t e r r o r i s t cooperetion 
between t e r r o r i s t o iganise t ions has been growing since 
as ea r ly as 1965 when many members of the various organisa-
t ions attended the confereiice a t the Afro-Asian-Latin American 
51, Paul Wilkinson, op, c i t . , p . 33. 
52, Ib id . 
53, I b i d . , p.38 
54, Lord Gholfant, "Terrorism and i n t e rna t i ona l security"-* 
Tg^rrorism; Interna t ion journa l . Vol ,5 , No,4,1982, p . 318. 
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peoples solid^iri ty organisat ion in Havana. These l inks 
were cemented a t the Baddawi meeting in Lebanon in May 
1973, and a t meetings in Algeria, Japan and Dublin in 
55 the same year . The meeting in Lebnon was hosted by 
represen ta t ives of the PFLP and Black September and 
a t tending by members of the Baader - Meinhof gang, the 
j a p a n ' s Red Army, the Turkish Peoples Libera t ions Army, 
the I ranian Liberation Front, the IRA and the Tupamaros. 
All groups agreed to supply each other arms, information 
and to carry out operat ions on behalf of and in the name 
of bro ther movement. This t a c t i c was employed a f t e r the 
meeting in Dublin when the IRA exploded a bomb a t the 
VJe.st German Embassy in Dublin but the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y was 
57 
claimed by Baader-Meinhof. Another i l l u s t r a t i o n of 
growing in te rna t iona l t e r r o r i s t cooperation was the 
establ ishment of a Par i s based co-ordinat ing committee 
of Latin American t e r r o r i s t organisat ion ca l l ed the Junata 
de Coordinacious Revolusionoria (JCR) in 1974. The 
cons t i tuen t members of t h i s body were Uruguayan Typamaros, 
the Argentinian peoples Revolutionary Army (ERP) and the 
Bol ivias National Liberat ion Army. In 1978 the l inks 
55, Paul Wilkinson, o p . c i t , p .38 . 
56, Ib id . 
57, Ib id ;p ,39 
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betv;een Al-Fatah and I t a l i a n Red Br igades p o i n t out 
towards the i n c r e a s i n g c o r p o r a t i o n among t h e d i f f e r e n t 
t e r r o r i s t o r g a n i s a t i o n . 
T e r r o r i s t s a l r eady posses s s o p h i s t i c a t e d weapons 
and the p o s s i b i l i t y of a c q u i r i n g weapons which are a c c u r a t e 
r e l i a b l e and simple t o ope ra t e a t ranges which can f a c i l i t a t e 
the r a p i d escape such a s German a n t i - t a n k gun, which can be 
used even from a small room w i t h o u t d e t e c t i o n because i t 
has no r e a r b l a s t , muzzle f l a sh or smoke and p o r t a b l e 
p r e c i s i o n - qu ided-muni t ion . The development in small weapons 
technology have provided many n a t i o n s wi th a r s e n a l s of weapons 
h i g h l y a t t r a c t i v e to t e r r o r i s t o r g a n i s a t i o n . These i n c l u d e 
the M,A*C,1I r e v o l v e r which f i r e s a t t h e speed of 1200 
rounds p e r minute w i t h o u t making a u d i b l e n o i s e , l i g h t 
weight grenade l a u n c h e r s , and m o r t a r t s , s q u i r t l e s s flame 
t h r o w e r s , s h o r t range p o r t a b l e a n t i - t a n k weapons and 
58 shou lde r f i r e d m u l t i - s h o r t r o c k e t l u n c h e r s . Such weapons 
w i l l be produced in i n c r e a s i n g q u a n t i t i e s in the coming 
y e a r s . That the l i k e l i h o o d of t e r r o r i s t s a c q u i r i n g t he se 
weapons w i l l undoubtedly i n c r e a s e and the a t t r a c t i v e n e s s 
of these weapons for t e r r o r i s t s i s o b v i o u s . Some of them have 
a h i t p r o b a b i l i t y approaching one, over a range of two o r 
th ree k i l o m e t e r s , A t e r r o r i s t group could by t h i s means 
en tourage 
a s s a s s i n a t e a head of s t a t e and h i s e n t i r ^ / i n a motarcade 
from a h i d i n g p lace a t s e v e r a l k i l o m e t e r s d i s t a n s and make 
59 good t h e i r escape in anonymity. 
58 , Paul Wi l lk inson^- Terror i sm and l i b e r a l s_ta,te.,p. 217 
59. I b i d p , 218. 
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Ter ro r i s t s have already demonstrated the attempted 
uso of such sophis t ica ted weapons. As ea r ly as 1973 I t a l i a n 
police found two s u r f a c e - t o - a i r m i s s i l i e s (SAMA) of the 
Soviet SAM 7 type, hidden in a f l a t three miles aiong 
the main f l i gh t path from Rome Airport , Other t e r r o r i s t 
groups have acquired these weapons and in 1976 a group 
of West German and Arabs were foi led in t h e i r attempt 
to launch a missile a t t ack on an I s r a e l Civi l a i r l i n e r 
on the o u t s k i r t s of Nai robi , SAM was used to shoot 
down a Rhodesian a i r l i n e r with 56 people on board s h o r t l y 
a f t e r take off from Kariba, in Punjab t e r r o r i s t have 
attempted many a t t acks using shoulder f i red rocket 
launcher. I t i s c l ea r ly possible for o ther t e r r o r i s t 
groups to obtain these kinds of weapons. The development 
of such a s i t ua t ion presents a genuine and continuing 
t h r e a t to the secur i ty of a l l the na t ions , 
Unconventional warfare was always a secur i ty t h r e a t . 
I t des tab l i sed many nat ions in the pas t . Various nat ions 
even today are facing the devastat ing consequences of 
unconventional v;arfare. The most d i s tu rb ing development 
of our time i s the i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n and g loba l i sa t ion of 
unconventional warfare. No nation today seems to be free 
from i t s t h r e a t s , A spec t re of i t s t h r e a t s looms over a l l 
the na t ion . I t i s no more the secur i ty problem of a p a r t i -
cu la r nat ion but has become the problem of a l l . 
60, paul Wilkinson, o p . c i t . , p .39 . 
Chapter-V 
Tackling Unconventional Warfare 
Since long we have been trying to evolve such measures 
which can ef fec t ive ly be used in t ack l ing the unconventional 
warfare. I t i s very unfortunate that whatever the success we 
have achieved so far in th i s regard i s not worth app rec i a t i ve . 
We have yet to evolve such measures which can e f fec t ive ly be 
used aga ins t the unconventional warfare and in such a way 
that we should not compromise our values and p r i n c i p l e s . 
Tackling unconvefional warfare i s an extremely 
troublesome problem. We kniw tha t unconventional warfare , by 
i t s na tu re , i s very uncnrtain and unpredictable , p a r t i c u l a r l y 
i t s t a c t i c s which is in a s t a t e of continous flux, becuase of 
t h i s , our an t i c ipa t ions and speculat ions about unconventional 
warfare - when, where and how i t s perpe tua te rs w i l l b r ing 
the violence against the contending party (generally the 
governments) are very unre l iab le and imperfect . This 
u n r e l i a b i l i t y and imperfectness fur ther render he lp lessness in 
thawarting the unconventional t a c t i c s . However, we have been 
applying d i f fe ren t measures for tackl ing i t . 
I t i s necessary and essen t i a l to point gut a t the very 
ou t se t , t ha t unconventiona warfare ne i the r can be removed 
t o t a l l y nor can be e l iminated. However, with the app l ica t ion 
of some ef fec t ive measures i t could be tackled & combated. 
l u V 
Unconventional warfare i s not new. I t has been 
with us since the dawn of our h i s t o ry . We are f ight ing 
i t both a t na t ional and in t e rna t iona l f fon ts . And in 
d i f f e ren t times, r a the r in d i f f e ren t s i t u a t i o n s , d i f f e r en t 
measures v/ere applied for tackl ing the unconvemtional 
Warfare, Sometimes, in some cases , mi l i t a ry measure were 
appl ied. However, m i l i t a ry measures in some cases achieved 
some success but is most they fa i l ed . In some pa r t s of 
the world, even today, the operat ions which are being 
conducted agains t unconventional warfare re ly on the t a c t i c s 
of sweeps through the country side l i k e those of Japanese 
regiments t h a t chased g u e r r i l l a s in Burma, Such mi l i t a ry 
mesures may succeed in combating the warfare but can not 
sus ta in the combatment for good and there i s high propensity 
t ha t i f the cause for which the arms were taken up i s t he r e , 
2 people may again take up the arms. Such mi l i t a ry measures 
3 
can lead to antogonism between the government and the people. 
1, Charles T, R, Bohannan, "Ant iguer r i l l a opera t ions" . The 
Annals, Vol,?41, May 1962, P .23. 
2, Z,K. Zawodny, "Unconventional warfare" in Henry A, Kissinger, (Ed) Problems of National St ra tegy, Fredrick A Praeger, USA, 
1 9 6 5 , ~ P T I ^ . 
3, Roger Hilsman, " In te rna l War: The new Communist Tac t i c" , in 
T,K, Greene, (Ed), The Guerr i l la and How to Fight Him,Praeger 
New York, 1962, p ,3 i ' l , Spe also Z.K, Zawodny, O p . c i t , , p ,333, 
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Without taking into account the success, failurs and 
side effects of military measures, there is a school of 
thought which advocates that the only successful way through 
the application of which unconventional warfare can be 
combated and tacklea is changing the overt policies of the 
4 
nations to the methods of unconventiona warfare. Such a 
course entails the adoption of unconvetional tacticcs as 
a mi l i t a ry measures for tackl ing the unconventional warfare . 
Such policy i s almost impracticable as i t s t i p u l a t e s 
,and external 
fundamental changes in internal/attitudes which can eventually 
erode the very basis of our democratic structure and existence. 
Besides, quite apart from the objections on the grounds of 
valu^ -'S and principles, there are other practical reasons why 
such a policy be treated with caution and care. 
It has become almost a historical truism, says Robert 
A, FriedLander, that the state violence when directed 
against the individual engenders the like response. This 
clearly supports the view that a military fight against the 
unconventional warfare inevitably will curb the civil 
liberties which in turn may generate or accentuate popular 
4, D.K. Palit, War in the Detrrent Age, The English Book 
Store, New Delhi, 1956,~P.129, 
5. I b id . 
5. Robert A. FriedLander, "The o r ig ins of i n t e rna t iona l 
Terrorism", in Yonah Alexander and Semmour Maxwell^ 
Terrorism; I n t e r d i s c i p l i n a r y perspec t ives , MaGrov? Hi l l 
Books Company Ltd . , U.S.A., P .31 , 
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discontent against the governments, Z.K, Zawodny points 
out that the more terror the governments apply the more 
7 
fighters they produce. He further says that the ebb and 
flow of the fighters in unconventional warfare is not 
related to the nxmber of tactical victories, to their 
losses or even to their prospects for success, The rate 
of recuitment is directly related to the intensity of 
terror applied by the government through its forces in 
suppressing the warfare. Such measures which apply counter 
terror bring to the ranks of unconventional fighters new 
recruits. In this way the warfare perpetuates. 
Apart from this, the figters in unconventional warfare 
themselves provoke the governments to use repressive measures 
in order to propogandise that the government is ruthless 
9 
and cruel , which does not care for us and about our welfare. 
In this Way, they try to serve theirown purpose of keeping the 
warfare alive for long because they know the continuation of 
warfare is very advantageous for them and disadvantageous 
for the government, at least from the economic point of view. 
The economic burden which keeps on mounting with the continuity 
of warfare will be unendurable for the governments, particularly 
for those which are making their ways towards modernization. 
7. Z,K, Zawodny, Op. Cit,, P, 341 
8. Ibid, 
9. P.N, Kathpilia, "Internal Security «nd CI operations in 
Urban Areas "Indian Defence Review',' Vol.11, 1, Jan, 198 7, 
P.52. 
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And the chances are such tha t i f the warfare keeps going 
i t may des tab l i se the economy which in turn may r e s u l t i n t o 
the col lapse of the governments. 
Unconventional warfare i s , e s s e n t i a l l y , an i n t e r n a l 
d isorder and the prolonged use of troops agains t i t may 
tender i t a kind of combatant s t a t u s . Moreover i1t tends, to 
re inforce a feeling of a s i t ua t ion ge t t ing out of hand. 
As Bruton eloquently puts i t "troops are not policemen -
t h e i r reac t ions must be more vigorous; for them to r e t r e a t 
before r i o t i n g crowds i s a sign of weakness they can. not 
afford to d isp lay . T&ckling unconventional warfare hsing 
mi l i t a ry measures appears to be an inappropria te exe rc i s e . 
As a wise man said t ha t chasing the insurgent in a jungle 
without scent i s l ike scratching a toe with boots on", 
Annan puts i t in d i f f e r e n t way saying t h a t " i f insurgent 
f ight and does not loose, he i s the v i c t o r . If secur i ty 
12 forces oppose and do not win, they loose" . I t i s s^id 
tha t mi l i t a ry measures might succeed in crushing the unconven-
t iona l movement but they can not r e t a in the peope, under 
forced subjugation for long and whenever they (people) w i l l 
find the su i tab le time they again might take up the arms 
aga ins t the regime. H i s t o r i c a l l y , mi l i t a ry measures have 
10. Ib id . 
11. P.N. Kathpalia, National Securi ty perspec t ives . Lancer 
In t e rna t iona l / New Delhi, 1986, P.84. 
12. I b i d . , P . 8 5 . 
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not produced the apprec ia t ive r e su l t s and our experience 
teaches us tha t mi l i t a ry measures alone can not succeed 
in tackl ing the unconventional warfare successful ly and 
moreover in such a way tha t we should not loose our values 
and p r i n c i p l e s . I t i s , there fore , imperat ive t ha t we should 
evolve such measures which can a t leas t e f fec t ive ly contain 
i t , i f not e radica te i t t o t a l l y . 
From the experience i t appears tha t pure mi l i t a ry 
measures are not su f f i c i en t for tackl ing unconventional 
warfare. The mi l i ta ry measures should be accompanied with 
p o l i t i c a l measures; and i f these measures are implimented 
13 
in i s o l a t i o n they have a very remote chance of success. 
For the successful implimentatlon of p b l i t i c o - m i l i t a r y 
measures a close i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p and coordination i s 
e s s e n t i a l between them and t h i s i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p and 
coordination has to be maintained a t every s ta^e of the 
opera t ions to be conducted with a view to t ack le the 
unconventional warfare. The problem we general ly face i s 
tha t we don ' t know the vulnerable spots of unconventional 
warfare where we can a t tack i t to defeat i t . ^oxr the 
purpose we must examine where the unconventional warfare 
i s most .vulnerable. In other words we can say t h a t for the 
13. D.K, P a l i t , Op. c i t . , P.129. 
112 
successful appl ica t ion of po l i t i cao -g i i l i t a ry measures i t 
i s very e s sen t i a l to analyse the p o l i t i c a l , soc i a l , econmic, 
psychological , ideologica l factors which are involved in 
motivating the people to take up the arms and the fac to rs on 
which unconventional warfare i s most dependent. We must 
prepare ourselves to f igh t unconventional warfare a t every 
front, p a r t i c u l a r l y which can break i t s bone. This i s 
very fundamental for the successful tackl ing of unconvention 
Warfare, 
What ac tua l ly provides motivation to the people t o 
take up the arms i s e s s e n t a i l for mounting a p o l i t c o - m i l i t a r y 
offensive ag in s t i t . In other words we must try to e l iminate 
those grievances upon which the Headers of unconventional 
14 Warfare are t rying to c a p i t a l i s e . Socia l , economic, 
d i s p a r i t i e s often offer ready motivations to the population 
to p a r t i c i p a t e in unconventional warfare. To el iminate the 
d i s p a r i t i e s along with mi l i t a ry measures a wel l coordinated 
p o l i t i c a l offensive in tho form of soc ia l and economic reforms 
should be ef fec ted . This might succeed in bui lding up a conf i -
dnnce in pojjulation about the governmental author i ty which, 
in tum^ may a l i ena t e the unconventional f igh te r s from the 
populat ion. 
14, P,N, Kathpalia, " In te rna l Securi ty and CI Operations in 
Urban Areas", Op. c i t , , P.52, 
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A number of Soft spots are inherent in unconventional 
warfare. They are vulnerable to both p lo t i co -mi l i t a ry 
offensives . The indispensible r equ i s i t e of unconventional 
warfare i s i t s su rv iva l . And for i t s su rv iva l , i t depends 
upon the support of the population a t l a r g e , Mao's often 
quated phrase "the q u e r r i l l a must be to the population as 
15 a l i t t l e f ish in the water . For the surv iva l of f ish the 
temperature of the water has to be r i g h t and Su i tab le , This 
s i g n i f i e s the importance and dependency of unconventional 
warfare upon the support of the populat ion. I t i s said t ha t 
whatever the degree of d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n , which forces the 
people to take up the arms against the regime and with 
the in ten t ion tha t through t h i s means they can achieve what 
they are not get t ing otherwise, no leader of unconventional 
warfare can offer to the people, the b e t t e r p l i l i t c o - s o c i o -
economic condit ions as the governm'^nt can. We must t ry to 
develop through p o l i t i c o - m i l i t a r y measures a popular publ ic 
r e s i s t ence against the unconventional v;arfare. In broader 
terms the po l i t i coTmi l i t a ry measures should aim a t defeat ing 
the unconventional f i g t e r s m i l i t a r i l y and severe t h e i r 
connection with the general public , i n s t i t u t i n g such 
p o l i t i c a l / social and economic reforms which would e s t a b l i s h 
15, iMao Tse-tung, Selected Mil i tary Writ ing, Foreign 
Language Press7 Peking, 1983, P ,341. 
1 1 4 
governmental pres t ige and au thor i ty . This may r e s u l t 
in a l i ena t i ng the population from the unconventional 
movement and in e s t ab l i sh ing public t r u s t in the government. 
Public support i s probably the backbone of unconventional 
Warfare and even if we achieve l i t t l e success in s e v e r i n g 
the connections between population and unconventional 
f igh te r s i t wi l l severly a f fec t the i n t e n s i t y of the warfare 
as i t has almost become a fact t h a t when ever popular 
17 support dwindles, insurgency d i s i n t e g r a t e s . On the b a s i s 
of t h e i r understanding, p a r t i c u l a r l y of operation in the 
p h i l i p i n e s and Malaya in the 1950's, w r i t e r s such as 
MaCuen, Thompson, Galula, Paret and Shy have es tab l i shed 
theor ies of counter-revotut ionary warfare based on the 
orches t rac t ion of p o l i t i c a l and mi l i t a ry operations designed 
to v;in back or win over and secure the allegiance of the 
populat ion. This was even rea l i sed by General Briggs when 
he was t ry ing to defeat the g u e r r i l l a s in Malaysia t h a t 
mi l i t a ry measures alone were not s u f f i c i e n t to solve the 
problem and f i r s t requirement would be to severe the l i n k 
16. D.K. P a l i t , Op .c i t . , P. 132, 
17. P.N. Kathpalia, National Securi ty Perspect ive , Op. c i t , 
P .88. 
18. See McCuen,The Art of Counter-Revolutionary Warfare, 
Faber & Faber, London~"l966, R. Thompson, Defeating 
Cormiunlst Insurgency, D. Galula, Counter Insurgency Warfare 
prager . New York, ""1964, Paret and^Shy, Guerr i l la inuthe 
1960's, Pra te r , New York, 1962. ~ 
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be tween t h e g u e r r i l l a s and p o p u l a t i o n w i t h o u t a n t a g o n i s i n g 
19 t h r l a t t e r . In t h e P h i l i p i n e s P r e s i d e n t Magasaysay 
r e a l i z e d t h a t s u c c e s s c o u l d n o t be a c h i e v e d by m i l i t a r y 
m e a s u r e s a l o n e . He, t h e r e f o r e , i n t r o d u c e d a p o l i c y of 
m a s s i v e s o c i a l re form d i r e c t e d a t s t a m p i n g o u t c o r r u p t i o n 
and d e v e l o p i n g p u b l i c w o r k s and i m p r o v i n g t h e l a n d t e n u r e 
s y s t e m . I n e a c h c a s e t h e s u c c e s s was a c h i e v e d t h r o u g h t h e 
u t i l i z a t i o n of a n i f i e d o v e r a l l s t r a t e g i c f ramewor l t h a t 
d e a l t w i t h e a c h of t h e d i f f e r e n t d i m e n s i o n s of t h e c o n f l i c t . 
The i n s u r g e n c y movements v/hich I n d i a was f a c i n g s i n c e i t s 
i n d e p e n d e n c e i n iJts n o r t h - e a s t e r n r e g i © n , t o t he l a r g e r 
e x t e n t , h a s b e e n c o n t a i n e d due t o e f f e c t i v e a c t i o n t a k e n 
t o e i t h e r r e h a b i l i t a t e o r d i v i d e , d i s o r g a n i s e and weaken 
20 t h e i n s u r g e n t g roups t h r o u g h m i l i t a r y and p o l i t i c a l o f f e n s i v e s . 
Most t h e o r i s t s a g r e e t h a t c e n t r a l o b j e c t i v e of o u r 
c o m b a t i n g s t a t e g y must be c i v i l i a n l o y a l i t y , which can 
o n l y b e s e c u r e d by an i n e r l o c k i n g s y s t e m of a c t i o n on 
d i f f e r e n t p l a n e s which " d r a i n s t h e w a t e r from t h e f i s h " , 
which i s o l a t e s t h e i n s u r g e n t s from t h e p o p u l a t i o n , and 
w h i c h s e c u r e s t h e a l l e g i a n c e of t h e p e o p l e . T h i s i s t h e 
c e n t r a l theme of S i r R o b e r t Thompson ' s w r i t i n g on c o u n t e r 
19, D.L. P a l i t , o o ^ c i . t . p . 134 . 
2 0 , P .N, K a t h p a l i a , " I n t e r n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y and CI o p e r a t i o n 
i n Urban A r e a s , q p . c i t , , p p , 4 8 - 5 4 , 
l i b 
21 insurgency v;arfare, " Writing on the ba s i s of h is 
ex{3erience of the Malayan emergency, Thompson, a 
committed counter revolut ionary , e s t ab l i shed a unified 
s t ra tegy contained in h i s famous five p r inc ip l e s designed 
as a guide to be followed by counter insurgent forces in 
other t h e a t r e . According to t h i s general framework, 
Thompson prescr ibes t h a t the government should have a 
c l ea r p o l i t i c a l aim; i t should function in accordance 
with Law; i t should have on overal l plan containing not 
only the mi l i ta ry rr-easures but also the p o l i t i c a l , s o c i a l , 
economic, ad-ninistra t i v e , pol ice , and o ther •Pleasures needed; 
i t must give p r io r i t y to defeating p o l i t i c a l subversion, 
not the g u e r r i l l a s ; and in the g u e r r i l l l a phase on an 
22 
insurgency, i t must secure i t s base areas f i r s t . Despite 
the importance or r;6minance of o o l i t i c a l considerat ions 
and the emphasis on the unif ica t ion of ddvprse stands of 
counter insurgent opera t ions , perhaps the most important 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of Thompson's wr i t ing i s the recognit ion 
of the v i t a l r e l a t i onsh ip betwepn theory and p rac t i ce , 
Thompson, l ike Mao, acknpwledges tha t to be successful , 
theory has to be careful ly applied and adjusted to meet 
the p a r t i c u l a r condit ions of individual s ta tes» Mao himself 
21, See R. Thompson, Revolutionary warfare and World St ra tegy. 
Seeker & Warburg, London, 1970, and No Exit From Vietnam. 
Chatta and V/indus, - London, 1969, 
22, R, Thompson, Jeff'atlf.q Jonimunlst Insurgency, pp-50-57. 
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s t r e s s e s t h e need f o r f l e x i b i l i t y and t h e v i t a l i m p o r t a n c e 
of t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e s t o s p e c i a l 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s of p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n . As Mao e x p l a i n ; 
" t h e d i f f e r e n c e in c i r c u m s t a n c e s d e t e r m i n e s t h e d i f f e r e n c e 
i n g u i d i n g l aws of war ; t n e d i f f e r e n c e of t i m e , p l a c e , 
ana c h a r a c t e r . The l a w s of war i n e a c h h i s t o r i c a l s t a g e 
have t h e i r c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s and n o t m e c h a n i c a l l y a p p l i e d 
In a d i f f e r e n t a g e . A l l g u i d i n g l aws o f War d e v e l o p a s 
h i s t o r y d e v e l o p s and a s war d e v e l o p s , n o t h i n g r e m a i n s 
23 
c h a n g e l e s s , " R e g a r d l e s s of t h e p r o p a g a n d a c l a i r o s made 
f o r t h e i r own t h e o r i e s , much of t h e s u c c e s s i n p r a c t i c e 
of Giap and C a s t r o s t emned from t h e way t h e y m o d i f i e d and 
a d o p t e d M a o ' s t h e o r i e s t o t h e i i r own a d v a n t a g e s , R o b e r t 
Thomson, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n h i s w r i t i n g s a b o u t American 
e x p e r i e n c e in Vie tnam, r e c o g n i z e t h a t t h e same i s t r u e 
24 
of c o u t e r r e v o l u t i o n ^ r y t h e o r y and p r a c t i c e , 
J o | i n . J , McCuen s a y s t h a t "The c o n d u c t o f c o u n t e r -
r e v o l u t i o n a r y w a r f a r e i s a h i g h l y complex o p e r a t i o n r e q u i r i n g 
25 
the unification of diverse agencies, interest and concepts. 
Political, psychological, economic and social actions 
affecting both the civilians and unconventional soldiers 
designed to draw support away from the unconventional 
soli^iers and to attract it to the government, accompanied 
2 3 . Mao T s e - t u n g , o p . c i t . , p , 76 , 
2 4 , R o b e r t Thompson, Mo E x i t from Vietna-^ , C h a t t a & Winds , 
London , 1969, p . 145 , 
2 5 , J o h n J . McCuen, The A r t of C o u n t e r R e v o l u t i o n a r y w a r f a r e 
F e b e r and -^ 'aber,"London, 1966, p . 77 , 
11 
by continuing close coordinated and determined combat 
operation against them should be ef fec ted. This inseparable 
combination of p o l i t i c o - m i l i t a r y measures must be continued 
u n t i l l the unconventional movement i s not only inac t ive 
but 6bso le te , These .neasures should be planned careful ly 
and executed careful ly too. 
We know tha t unconventional warfare possess through 
tliree phases - defensive; a t t r i t i o n and s talemate; and 
regu la r i za t ion of i r r e g u l a r operation to achieve the mi l i t a ry 
decis ion. Mil i tary decision in unconventional i s avoided so 
far i t i s not in a posi t ion to convert i t s e l f in to conventional 
warfare. Th« p o l i t i c o - m i l i t a r y offensives should be launched 
depending on the phase in which i s the warfare. However, i t 
i s preferable that unconventional warfare should be tackled 
in i t s i n i t i a l s tage. This i s to say t h a t when i t i s in i t s 
f i r s t phase because the mobil izat ion and organisat ion period 
is c ruc i a l and important for armed forces for exp lo i t a t i on . 
Attack should be made when the process of organisa t ion , 
recruitment and surpcr t fr m the population i s on the way 
and e r ec t i ng the condit ions for an anti-government c l imate 
is in i t s i n i t i a l s tage . Tlie important thing i s to be 
able to gauge the s t a t e of unconventional campaign; i t s 
mi l i t a ry nrepre^ness rnd i t s areas of v u l n e r a b i l i t y and 
then to mount a concerted p o l i t i c o - m i l i t a r y offensive to 
s t r i k e a t the core r tlier than an the surface of the movement. 
26. D, K. P a l i t , 0£jt.cj.t. , p. 133 
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There a re , of course, no speci f ic solut ions for 
unconventional warfare but a determined po l ico-mi l i t a ry 
offensive i s to be made to s t r i k e the unconventional 
warfare a t the most vulnerable spot - motivat ion of i t s 
membirspand^readines.of.others to jo in i t s ranks or to 
remain and operate within i t s framework. For t h i s 
successful combatment of unconventional warfare i t s 
breeding ground should be at tacked keeping in view tha t 
the public t r u s t has to be won. I t i s therefore suggested 
tha t secur i ty forces should a c t demonstrating t h e i r s t a t u s 
as servants of the people with maximum emphasis an e s t a b l i -
shing governmental c r e d i b i l i t y . The determined and considera te 
p o l i t i c o - m i l i t a r y offensive have the g r e a t e s t chance of 
success . Genoral Shlomo Gazit and Michael Handel have 
suggested some of the poss ible t a rge t s for operation as 
27 
under, : Undermine i n t e r n a l cohesion by s t o r i e s of 
t r a i t o r s , spies or informers wi th in ; undermine the c r e d i b i t y 
of leadership and command create f r i c t i o n and in t e rna l 
r i v a l r y among top leaders of the o rgan i sa t ion ; promote 
c o n f l i c t s between d i f f e r en t t e r r o r i s t o rgan isa t ions ; 
dr ive a wedge between the organisat ion and i t s supportive 
c i v i l i a n i n f r a s t r u c t u r e . 
27. P.N. Kathpalia, " In te rna l Security and C . i . operat ion" 
o p . c i t . , p ,54. 
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For t h e s G c c e s s f u l o p e r a t i o n s a g a i n s t u n c o n v e n t i o n a l 
v ; a r f a re a good and e f f i c i e n t i n t e l l i g e n c e n e t - w o r k t h a t 
can p r o v i d e a r e a l t i m e and a c t i o n a b l e i n t e l l i g e n c e i s 
v e r y i m p o r t a n t and v i t a l . As u n c o n v e n t i o n a l f i g h t e r s 
a r e i n v i s i b l e , an e f f e c t i v e i n t e l l i g e n c e , u n d o u b t e d l y , 
i s one of t h e g r e a t e s t i n s t r u m e n t f o r w i n n i n g u n c o n v e n t i o n a l 
W a r f a r e , The i n t e l l i g e n c e n e t w o r k s h o u l d e f f o r t t o g a i n 
i n f o r n a t i o n p r i o r t o t h e o n s e t of u n c o n v e n t i o n a l w a r f a r e . 
The s u c c e s s seems most o f t e n t o r e s u l t from a d e q u a t e and 
t i m e l y i n t e l l i g e n c e a b o u t th'^ a c t i v i t i e s of u n c o n v e n t i o n a l 
28 
movement and t h e e x p l o i t a t i o n of i t s w e a k n e s s . 
The need f o r r e a l i a b l e and t i m e l y i n t e l l i g e n c e i s n o t 
o n l y n e c e s s a r y b u t an unais/oidablo f a c t o r . I f t h e i n t e l l i ^ n c e 
i s weak? t h e s e c u r i t y f o r c e s can n o t a c t , t h e y can o n l y r e a c t . 
In t h i s r e g a r d we m u s t draw on t h e e x p e i r e n c e of Ma '^Gen, 
F rank K i t s o n , who, h a v i n g c o v e r e d i n s u r g e n c y i n a l m o s t a l l 
p a r t s of t h e w o r l d , h a s r i g h t l y c o n c l u d e d t h a t the s e c u r i t y 
f o r c e s u n i t corrmander v / i th h i s own I n t e l l i g e n c s e t up must 
b e t h e fu l c rum and t b be r e a s o n a b l e f o r g a i n i n g combat and 
29 
t a c t i c a l i n f o r m a t i o n . A f t e r t h e g a i n i n g of r e l i a b l e 
i n f o r m a t i o n no d e l a y s h o u l d b e made i n d e c i s i o n m a k i n g , 
A q u i c k and c o n s i d e r a t e a c t i o n may b r i n g a v i c t o r y 
o v e r ' o n c o n v e c t i o n a l w a r f a r e . 
28 , C h a r l e s 2 .R, Bohannan , o p . c i t , , p . 2 2 
2 9 . P .N. K a t h p a l i a , N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y p e r s p e c t i v e s , o p . c i t - , 
p . 8 8 . 
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The global iza t ion of unconventional warfare in 
the form of i n t e rna t iona l terrorism has become the 
s ecu r i t y , problem of almost every na t ion . No nation 
seems to be secured from the deadly t h r e a t of i t . The 
problem with in te rna t iona l terrorism i s t h a t l i k e other 
forms of unconventional warfare i s i s not so much dependent 
upon the public support for i t s su rv iva l . Even a small 
group of people without having the publ ic support can 
e feec t ive ly p rac t i c , I t . 
The tackl ing of i n t e r n a t i o n a l t e r ror i sm i s an extremely 
t roubl ing task . Whet i s even more unfortunate i s the naive 
way i t i s sometimes to be tackled and the confusing wisful 
thinking that shrouds much of the debate about t h i s problem. 
I t is t rue tha t there i s a great divergence of opinion in 
response to p a r t i c u l a r t e r o r i s t ac ts and then more so about 
the ways and mr-ans of t ack l ing i t , Insp i t e of the grov;ing 
r e a l i z a t i o n t h a t no country i s free from i t s t h r e a t s , and 
dangers, the impact, however, i s not equally severe on a l l 
31 the s t a t e s . The ter ror ism may be general ly condemmned, 
but tiiere are ambigupusand ambivalent a t t i t u d e s towards 
p a r t i c u l a r groups, and s i t u a t i o n s , pe rpe t r a to r s and 
v ic t ims . In fact , "the r e l a t i onsh ip betv/een Government 
and t e r r o r i s t s i s not s i -p ly of c o n f l i c t s between t e r r o r i s t 
30,Akhtar Majeod, "Tackling In te rna t iona l Terrorism" S t r a t eg i c 
s tud ies -journal; Vo l , l , No,l , Jan,1988, p ,97. 
31, Ib id , , p. 98, 
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a n d s t a t e . Governments nave v a r i o u s l y - somf t imes 
s i t n u l t a n e o u s l y - t o l e r a t e d , c o ; i b a t e d , f omen ted , s u p p l i e d 
and e x p l o i t e d t e r r o r i s t g r o u p s . B e n e a t h t he r h e t o r i c o f 
moral o u t r a g e i s a l a b y r i n t h of s e c r e t w a r s , d e a l s , d i r e c t 
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a c t i o n and d e l i b e r a t e i r . a c t i o n . The r e s p o n s e of i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
community t o t h i s p r o b l e m h a s been e v e n more f e e b l e . What t o 
say a b o u t f i n d i n g ? s o l u t i o n t o t h e p rob lpm, t h e community 
has q u i b b l e d o v e r such qu-^s t ion a s t o who i s and i s n o t a 
t e r o r i s t and t h e W. har. n o t managed t o a g r e e even an 
co.nmon d e f i n i t i o n . Hos t S t a t e s have r e m a i n e d u n w i l l i n g t o 
a p p l y s t r i c t l e g a l a c t i o n ^ i f t l s r n a t i o n a l t e r r o r i s m . Many 
of t he T h i r d World c o u n t r i e s have a s y m p a t h e t i c a t t i t u d e 
t o w a r d s t h e p o l i t i c a l a s p i r a t i o n s and o b j e c t i v e s of g r o u p s 
which a p p l i e s t e r r o r i s m . Even t h e d e v e l o p e d c o u n t r i e s a r e 
d i s I h c l i n d t o commit t h e m s e l v e s t o c l e a r s a n c t i o n s a g a i n s t 
t h " t e r r o r i s t s . Th i s a l l h a s c r e a t e d t h e o b s t a c l e s f o r 
t a c k l i n g t he p r o b l e n. Plowever the e f f o r t s have a l w a y s b e e n 
made t o - i r e v e n t i t , 
Th'^ i m p o r t a n t and e f f e c t i v o way f o r t h e p r e v e n t i o n 
of i n t e r n a t i o n a l t e r r o r i s m i s d e a l i n g w i t h i t s u n d e r l y i n g 
c a u s e s . T h i s e-^phesis v/as p u t in by t h e UN s e c r e t a r y G e n e r a l 
whr-n he a s k e d t h e 2 7 t h G e n e r a l Assembly t o c o n s i d e r "Measu res 
3 2 . b.M, J e n k i n s , "Nev; Modes of c o n f l i c t " , o r b i ? V o l . 2 8 , N o . l 
1984, p . 2 4 . 
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to prevent in t e rna t iona l terror ism and other forms of 
violence wJiich endanger or take innoncent human l i ve s 
or Jeopardize funda-^ f n t a l freedom", Tlie X'ssentbly ammended 
i t include "The study of the underlying causes of those 
forms of terrorism end acts of violence vhich l i e in 
misery, f rus t ra t ion ,g r ievances and despa i r , and which 
cause soiae peopie to sec r i f i ce human l i v e s including 
t h e i r own, in en attempt to effect rad ica l changes", i t s 
causes must be analysed and a t tacks should be made a t i t s 
brccvjing ground, 
A general agreement for i n t e r n a t i o n a l cooperation i s 
l ike a sinqua non for the effect ive prevention of i n t e r n a -
33 t iona l terrorism!. In t e rna t iona l communit.y.' s legal 
response towards in t '^rnat ional te r ror ism has largely b-^en 
in terms of a t rea ty-based approach - b i l a t e r a l and 
m u l t i l a t e r a l . Some in t e rna t iona l l ega l conventions l i k e 
the Convention on Offences and Certain other Acts Committed 
on Boards Aircraf t , Tokyo, Septermber 14 1963; the 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of 
Ai rc ra f t , the Hague December, 16 1970; the Convention 
for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts aga ins t the Safety 
of Civi l Aviation, Montorial September 23, 1971; the 
33. Akhtar Majeed, Op. c i t . , P.101. 
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Convention on the prevention and Punishment of Crimes 
aga ins t In t e rna t iona l ly Protected Persons, including 
Diplomatic Agents, New York, December, 1973; and 
In t e rna t i ona l Convention against the taking of 
Hostages, New York, December 17, 1979, have no doubt, 
promoted in te rna t iona l cooperation, which to some 
extent has contr ibuted tov;ards the combatment of 
i n t e rna t i ona l te r ror i sm, 
A general p o l i t i c a l wi l l to uphold the rule of 
law to p ro tec t the innocent and defeat the ter ror ism 
i s very v i t a l for the successful implimentation of 
the t r e a t i e s and conventions, without which a l l the 
t r e a t i e s and conventions w i l l not be worth the paper 
34 they are wr i t ten on. In te rna t iona l agreement aga ins t 
Specif ic t e r r o r i s t tact ics ar^ ^ for more p r ac t i c a l than 
attempt to ourlaw terrori'-.m and ruch fu t i l e exe rc i s e s . 
The most effect ive ac t ion a t ihe leve l of i n t e rna t iona l 
agrec^ment i s the b i l a te r r - l agrement, regional agreement 
and exchange betwoen p o l i c e / i n t e l l i g e n c e / m i l i t a r y agencies 
of two or more countr ies because b i l a t e r a l and regional 
agreements are more l i ke ly to bo reached than general 
conventions adopted by the UN. However, a pre-condi t ion 
34, I b i d , , P.105. 
35, I b i d , , PP.110-111. 
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for the e f fec t ive tackl ing of i n t e rna t i ona l terrorism 
is a soph is t i ca ted i n t e l l i g e n c e gathering system. An 
ef fec t ive i n t e l l i gence system can make i t possible for 
the secur i ty forces to act timely in fo i l i ng a t e r r o r i s t 
a t tack before i t s taking place. Such in te l legence had 
prevented SAM at tacks a t l iairobi and Rome Airports and 
a planned t e r r o r i s t a t t ack a t th( OPEC meeting. Conserted 
e f fo r t s have t o be made to improve both nat ional exper t i se 
and i n t e rna t i ona l cooperation in th is f i e l d . 
^or tackling unconventional v/arfare we can learn 
frrj-n the experiences o: oth'^r countr ies too. However, 
the a r t i c u l a t i o : . of 'u i i tab l" measures aga ins t i t should be 
based on the t radi t io i -s of the country concerned as the 
nature of unconventior.al •.-Trfare d i f f e r s from country to 
coun t ry . 
The argument ib that i f with strong determination 
and conviction , p o l i t i c o - m i l i t a r y measures are applied 
against unconventional warfare, p a r t i c u l a r l y i t s breeding 
ground, wp can succeed in tackl ing i t . As Clausewitz said 
36. Ib id . ,P .102 . 
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said t ha t unconventional v/arfare i s l i k e a slow gradual 
f i r e " the best v/ay to deaJ v/ith i t i s not to l e t i t s t a r t 
bocfuse if i t i^ s t a r t ed i t could be extinguished but i t 
leaves behind unbearaule losses and consequences. I t i s , 
thfc'iefore, suogctod tho t :."or i t s prevention the note i s 
to be taken of the symptoms vvell in time and remedial 
measures organised and i.Tiplimentod with dedicated vigour. 
CONCLUSIONS 
S e c u r i t y i s t h e predominant concern of every 
n a t i o n which to a n a t i o n , g e n e r a l l y , i m p l i e s t e r r i t o r i a l 
i n t e g r i t y , s t a b i l i t y of the regime and t h e r e a l i z a t i o n 
of o t h e r n a t i o n a l and i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s and 
s a f egua rd ing the l i f e of c i t i z e n s from any t h r e a t , 
a c t i o n o r s i t u a t i o n which can damage t h e i r way of l i f e , 
s o c i a l o r n a t i o n a l v a l u e s . Threa t s t o the s e c u r i t y of 
a n a t i o n a r e many which come i n d i v e r s e ways and forms, 
vary enormously in range and i n t e n s i t y and pose r i s k 
to the s e c u r i t y in d i v e r s i f i e d ways. They meaning and 
na tu re of s e c u r i t y d i f f e r s from n a t i o n t o n a t i o n as 
eg.ch one of them i s exposed and v u l n e r a b l e t o d i f f e r e n t 
k inds of t h e r e a t s which t o g e t h e r de termine the s e c u r i t y 
and i n s e c u r i t y of the n a t i o n s . 
Every n a t i o n , today e x i s t s a t the hub of whole 
un ive r se of t h r e a t s and i t s d i f f e r e n t components appear 
to be v u l n e r a b l e t o d i f f e r e n t k inds of t h r e a t s . And each 
n a t i o n i n o r d e r t o p r o t e c t i t s s e c u r i t y from a l l k inds 
of t h r e a t s seems to be in sea rch of a c q u i r i n g irmiunity 
from them. But t h e i r s ea rch for s e c u r i t y appea r s t o be 
an unending p r o c e s s . This i s because of the reason t h a t 
we l i v e i n a pe r iod of t r a n s i t i o n c h a r a c t e r i s e d by 
e x p o n e n t i a l l y i n c r e a s i n g t h r e a t which have made us 
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shudder with a creeping sense of insecurity and the 
devastrating consequences of unconventional warfare 
has augmented that sense of insecurity manifold. 
Unconventional warfare has been With lis since 
the dawn of our history. Unconventional warfare In 
broader sense is that diversity of actions and 
measures through which militarily we»k can bring violence 
against a superior and well organised adversary. For 
bringing violence ihnconventional warfare recourses' 
to all possible means, tricks, stratagems and tactics. 
It is also described as a warfare which implicity denies 
the recognition of all rules and conventions of warfare. 
It refuses so distinguish between combatant and non-
combatants and recognises no humanitarian constraints. 
Conventional warfare, on the other hand, is regularised 
and controlled by rules and conventions of warfare. 
Unconventional warfare is characterised by the absence 
of 
of pitched battles which is the characteristic/conven-
tional warfare. Unconventional warfare has always been 
the choice of military weak against the superior and 
well organised enemy. It has always taken place where 
there were disparities between the adversaries. Unconven-
tional Warfare defies a well known rule of conventional 
tactics according to which an attacking party must 
concentrate his forces in order to be stronger than his 
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opponent at the moment of the conflict. Unconventional 
warfare unlike conventional warfare invents its over 
tactics at every moment of the warfare. The order of 
proceedure in conventional warfare is strategy, tactics 
and the weapon requirements and in unconventional warfare 
the availibility of weapons and tactical possibilities 
plan the strategy. 
The most distinguishing feature of unconventional 
warfare is its three phased development. The over all 
strategy of which is to avoid quick military decisions 
in order to prolong the conflict, but whenever the 
decision should come it must be favourabld. If there are 
chances of defeat this three phased developmental character-
istic of unconventional warfare provides room for retrogre-
ssion - warfare can slip back as well as it can slip 
forward. The three phased development of unconventional 
warfare differntiates it to a larger extent from 
conventionalvarfare. Conventional warfare aims at 
achieving the quick military decisions which in unconven-
tional warfare is the characteristic of last phase. The 
defeat in unconventionalvarfare has almost been eliminated. 
The aim is to continue the state of conflict regardless of 
how long a state of v/arfare may last. In unconventional 
Warfare there is no room for failure because the cycle 
of its development can always be reversed. 
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Unconventional warfare has inflicted devastating 
and unbearable consequences on the security of almost 
all the nations. For many nations its consequences have 
been unendemic and the violence perpetuated by its 
instigators has became the way of life inducting the 
whole generation into the ethos of violence^ suspicion 
and hat>red which, in turn, rendered the peaceful and 
normal existence impossible. 
Unconventional warfare is a living problem to the 
authority of the nations. It is a challenge not only 
to the law and order of the target nation but to the 
international rule of Law too. It poses dangers to the 
very basis of a nation - attacking the links which bind 
together the political organism of a nation and the 
mechanism through which it excersises its control. It 
of 
impairs the effectiveness/the regirje undermining its 
reputation for effectiveness in punishing the enemies 
and protecting its adherents. In sum it undermines the 
competence and capacity of the government to command 
allegiance. This eventual ly/?i§ult ARe political 
instability of the target nation. 
The paralysing and devastrating consequences which 
unconventional warfare has inflicted on the economy the 
nations and particularly on the economy of those nations 
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which have been making their headways towards 
modernization have been catstrophic. The complex 
and costly technological system of contemporary 
World like nuclear power stations, oil instalations, 
its storage depots, piplines, drilling platforms, 
airports, communication centres^ transportation, 
particularly air transportation and various other 
facilities which have been vital for economic stability 
and development have been the sitting targets of 
unconventional soldiers. Attacks on these facilities 
particularly nuclear facilities where pose, grave dangers 
for the security of the target nations, its consequences 
will be devastating for other nations too. It is the 
economy of the nation which is more succeptible to the 
threats of unconventional'waffar?. 
Unconventional warfare like an epedimic has spread 
in almost evdry corner of the World, Its globalization in 
the form of internation terrorism and particularly its 
intensification in our time has accentuated the sense 
insecurity and renewed the quest for a better security 
system. Unconventional warfare is no more the security 
problem of a particular nation rather it has become a 
problem for all. 
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Insplte of various measures, particularly military 
S t 
measures taken agai^/unconventional warfare we have f a i l e d 
to combat i t . Actually the problem in tacking unconventional 
warfare i s t h a t i t very f lu id and amopphous warfare which 
passesses within i t s e l f very high degree of f l e x i b i l i t y 
and c r e a t i v i t y . Which fallows no spec i f ic pa t te rn and 
procedure. This s i t ua t i on gets more i n t e n s i f i e d in case 
of t a c t i c s of unconventional warfare as i t invents them 
a t every moment of warfare and changes them according to 
the circumstances. However, the basic t a c t i c s of unconventional 
«?arfare are hifc-and-run bu t wheif\,where and hOfJ and from which 
side the a t t a c k wi l l be launched is j u s t the matter of 
specula t ion and we can not accurately cq lcu la t e or an t i c i pa t e 
them in order to combat them. 
To tackle unconventional warfare m i l i t a r y means seems to 
be imprac t i ca l . Mil i tary measures endenger the l i k e response 
and create antagonism between the populat ion and the govern-
ment r e s u l t i n g in to the b i r t h of new r e c r u i t as the r a t e of 
recruitment i s re la ted to the i n t e n s i t y of t e r r o r applied 
by the government. Mi l i ta ry measures alone are not su f f i c i en t 
to combat the warfare and i f anyhow they succeed in 
crushing the warfare, the p o s s i b i l i t y i s t h a t i f the cause 
for which arms were taken up aga ins t the regime i s there 
people might again take up measures as no people can remain 
under force subjugation for long. 
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A military offensive along with political 
offensive should be launched against unconventional 
warfare. And for the successful implimentation of 
these measures a close inter relationship and 
coordination between them is essential. This interrelation 
ship and coordination should be maintained at every stage 
of the operations to be conducted against unconventional 
warfare. Political measures should be launched against 
those gtievances which provide motivation to the people 
to ta)« up the arms against the authority of the nations. 
The most vulnerable spot of unconventional warfare 
is its dependency upon the support of the population. 
Through politico-military measures we should aim to 
sever the connection between population and unconventional 
soldiers, A little success in this regard will certainly 
result into limiting and dvindling the warfare. With the 
launching of political measures determined combat operations 
against the unconventional soldiers must be effected. This 
inseparable combination of politico-military measures must 
be continued untill the unconventional movement is not only 
inactive but ebsolete. 
The role of intelligence in this regard should not 
be overlooked. Without an effective intelligence network 
which can provide the timely information the successful 
13 * 
implimentation of pol i t ico-mil i tary measures i s an 
impossibility. 
The best way to tackle unconventionalwarfare is 
that we should take care of i t when i t i s in formative 
stage because the erruption of unconventional warfare 
and i t s continuation means destruction to the welbeing 
of the whole natdon. After the erruption there are 
poss ib i l i t i e s that we can succeed in combating i t but 
from i t s erruption to i t s combatment the consequences 
i t i n f l i c t s on the security of -^the nation may eventually 
lead to i t s collapse. We must adopt such measures which 
can succeed in preventing i t s erruption. 
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